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International negotiations struggle to keep pace with global problems
like climate change. To fill this gap, local governments increasingly take
matters into their own hands. For example, to promote the benefits of clean
energy, a local government might give subsidies to renewable energy
companies. Since 2001, California has given $2 billion in such subsidies, while
states ranging from Minnesota to Kansas and Mississippi have doled out
hundreds of millions of dollars each. Cities, such as Austin and Los Angeles,
have also gotten into the act, contributing millions to renewable energy firms.
To build support for these measures, the local government might condition the
subsidy on the recipient’s use of components manufactured in the locality.
In 2013, the World Trade Organization (WTO) said these kinds of subsidies
are unlawful because they discriminate against foreign products. This Article
argues that the decision fails to account for the public goods generated by such
programs, and suggests a new way for the WTO to review local subsidy
programs that would balance the WTO’s impulse to protect international trade
with the valuable global public goods such programs promise.
To make the case, I report on the results of an original fifty-state survey. I
identify forty-four state renewable energy programs in twenty-three states
within the United States that violate the WTO’s 2013 decision. I argue that
these programs can increase global welfare in the aggregate, notwithstanding
their discriminatory nature. They can do so by creating political support at the
local level for renewable energy programs that might not pass otherwise.
Local governments internalize few of the benefits from providing global public
goods, such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions through costly investments
in renewable energy technology. Local efforts to address global public goods
problems thus have to be linked to a concentrated benefit within the enacting
jurisdiction. Protectionist measures that discriminate against foreign products
provide this link, mobilizing local economic interests to pass global public
goods programs that create benefits in other jurisdictions. Reforming
international trade law to allow these linkages is imperative if local
governments are to continue to play a role in solving global problems.
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INTRODUCTION
Since 2001, California has provided over $2 billion in subsidies for the
purchase of solar panels.1 Minnesota has allocated $150 million for solar
energy subsidies from 2014-2023,2 in addition to $11 million per year for wind
and other renewable energy since the mid-1990s.3 Nor is the trend confined to
left-leaning states. Kansas has allocated $150 million in subsidies to encourage
wind and solar energy businesses.4 Mississippi doled out $173 million in
subsidies to renewable energy firms in 2010 alone.5
As international negotiations on a new climate change agreement have
stumbled forward over the last several years, these local actions have assumed
a critical role in transitioning away from a fossil fuel-driven economy. Indeed,
in September 2015, the top climate change negotiators from the United States
and China announced a plan to achieve their joint climate goals in large part
through coordinated action by states, provinces, and cities.6 Yet many of these
local subsidies, totaling millions of dollars a year, are unlawful under the
World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”) nondiscrimination rules. They contain
local content requirements (“LCRs”): provisions that condition the grant of a
benefit on the recipient’s use of local factors of production. In the renewable
energy context, LCRs frequently provide payments or tax credits for
generating renewable energy, as long as the equipment (e.g., solar panels) used
is produced locally.7 Such LCRs link local governments’ environmental
objectives to economic development objectives, allowing them to kill two birds
with one stone. In 2013, the WTO Appellate Body ruled that these LCRs
violate the obligation not to discriminate against foreign products contained in
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).8 State and local
1 Kenneth Redix II, Solar Photovoltaic Subsidies in California (Nov. 11, 2014)
(unpublished draft Job Market Paper, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill),
http://www.unc.edu/depts/econ/placement/reddixjmp.pdf [http://perma.cc/S3EQ-HKL8].
2 See infra Appendix.
3 See infra Appendix.
4 See infra Appendix.
5 See infra Section III.B.
6 Coral Davenport, U.S. and Chinese Climate Change Negotiators to Meet in Los
Angeles, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/16/us/us-andchinese-climate-change-negotiators-to-meet-in-los-angeles.html
[http://perma.cc/V9VRZXH8]; Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: U.S. – China
Climate Leaders Summit (Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/09/15/fact-sheet-us-–-china-climate-leaders-summit [https://perma.cc/QLM8GTEN].
7 “Buy American” provisions offer a more general example. Such provisions typically
require government contractors to purchase their supplies from American companies even if
those supplies are more expensive than the same products purchased from non-American
companies.
8 Appellate Body Reports, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy
Generation Section, Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, ¶ 5.85,
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efforts to address climate change—and millions of dollars in subsidies for
renewable energy—are now in jeopardy.
This Article argues that the use of these discriminatory subsidies at the
subnational level can sometimes increase global welfare.9 The discriminatory
conditions in these subsidies can create the necessary political support for
programs that provide global public goods—programs that might not pass
absent lawmakers’ ability to discriminate. Local governments internalize few
of the benefits from providing global public goods, such as the reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions through costly investments in renewable energy
technology. Local efforts to address public goods problems thus have to be
linked to a concentrated benefit within the enacting jurisdiction. LCRs provide
this link, mobilizing local economic interests to pass green energy programs
that create positive benefits in other jurisdictions.
To highlight the stakes, I report the results of what is, to my knowledge, the
first fifty-state survey of renewable energy programs containing LCRs within
the United States. I identify forty-four such programs in twenty-three states
within the United States.10 China and India have already identified several of
these programs as incompatible with WTO law,11 raising the specter that these
programs could quickly become the subject of WTO disputes if trade rules do
not evolve to take into account the unique role of local governments in
providing global public goods. Moreover, these programs are similar to ones
found in other parts of the world, including programs within the European
Union challenged by China before the WTO.12
These local measures are part of a broader national and international trend
of providing public goods locally. Internationally, cities and local governments
provide critical support to efforts to deal with issues such as climate change
and public health crises.13 Cities around the world have also come together to

WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R, WT/DS426/AB/R (adopted May 24, 2013) [hereinafter
Canada—Renewable Energy] (finding that Canada’s LCR programs—“Minimum Required
Domestic Content Levels”—violate Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 standards).
9 I use the terms “local” and “subnational” interchangeably.
10 See infra Appendix.
11
See infra Part III.
12 Request for Consultations by China, European Union and Certain Member States—
Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, WTO Doc.
WT/DS452/1 (Nov. 5, 2012).
13 See, e.g., Michele M. Betsill & Harriet Bulkeley, Cities and the Multilevel Governance
of Global Climate Change, 12 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 141, 142 (2006) (explaining that the
European Union has focused on “cities as a means to address environmental issues” and has
called on “all local authorities to establish a Local Agenda . . . through participation with
their communities”); Alan Blinder, Mississippi, a Vaccination Leader, Stands by Its Strict
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2015, at A13 (discussing the success of Mississippi’s mandatory
school vaccination program and a local vote to allow conscientious objectors).
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negotiate climate change agreements meant to fill in the gaps in the formal
international regime.14
Federal nations such as the United States have long celebrated this role for
local government. Local governments act as laboratories for experimenting
with different policies and vehicles for providing critical services.15 In addition
to the benefits of experimentation, local control permits government to
customize policies to fit local circumstances and priorities.16 Local control may
thus increase the flexibility, responsiveness, and effectiveness of government.17
Yet, local government differs systematically from national government. At
any level of government, discriminatory conditions create benefits for the
protected group (e.g., local solar panel producers) while shifting much of the
cost of the measures to foreign constituencies unrepresented in the legislature.
Discriminatory conditions are thus a cheap way of providing an incentive for
protected groups to lobby for public goods measures. They enlist the support of
the protected group in favor of the overall package (e.g., a renewable energy
subsidy).
But discriminatory conditions are likely to be more effective in actually
helping pass such measures at the local level for two reasons. On the one hand,
bargaining in local legislatures typically involves lower transaction costs than
bargaining in national legislatures. Local government involves fewer interest
groups. Creating one more group in favor of a measure thus has a greater
impact on the likelihood that the measure will pass than it would at the national
level. Moreover, because there are fewer players, the transaction costs of
cycling among different combinations of measures and different possible
legislative coalitions are lower. A smaller scale of government may also reduce
the number of veto players who must sign off on a measure.
At the same time, the bargaining space—the number of issues over which
lawmakers can negotiate—is narrower at the local level. Local governments
have smaller budgets, as well as less territory and fewer issues under their
14 See, e.g., Betsill & Bulkeley, supra note 13, passim (analyzing the Cities for Climate
Protection program, a network of municipal governments working to address climate
change).
15 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments . . . .”).
16 See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan
Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1124 (arguing that local governments can provide goods and
services efficiently due to their capacity “to match distinctive local conditions and
preferences”); Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Legislation in Context, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 245, 247-48 (2008) (arguing that local legislation on climate control “spur[s]
innovation and action” and is more efficient because it has insight into the “unique
confluence of factors affecting” the local environment).
17 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) (discussing the virtues
of state government for enhancing the accountability of government officials).

1942

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1937

jurisdiction. Removing discriminatory measures thus causes a greater reduction
in the likelihood of passage than at the national level. Local lawmakers lose
one of their most effective coalition-building tools and have fewer possible
alternatives to which they can turn. By contrast, at the national level,
lawmakers have many more issues over which they can bargain.
Two predictions flow from this observation. First, discriminatory conditions
are more likely at smaller scales of government. The fifty-state survey in this
Article offers some empirical support for this proposition.18 Recent studies on
the rise of protectionism in the wake of the Great Recession have identified
roughly twenty renewable energy LCRs at the national level.19 I identify fortyfour such provisions at the state level alone within the United States.20
Although hardly conclusive, this data provides empirical support for a
hypothesis that can be tested in other federal systems.
Second, applying international economic law’s (“IEL”) nondiscrimination
rules to discriminatory local measures that provide global public goods may be
welfare defeating in some instances. The costs of economic discrimination are
born in part outside of the discriminating jurisdiction. Government officials
that discriminate against foreign products to benefit their constituents may
obtain political benefits from doing so. Foreign businesses and disfavored
domestic consumers absorb the economic costs, which may exceed the private
benefits government officials and their supporters receive. Nondiscrimination
rules exist to solve this political economy problem. By creating costs for
discriminatory government policies, nondiscrimination rules cause government
officials to internalize the trade costs of their discriminatory actions.
Nondiscrimination rules do not, however, allow government officials to
internalize any benefits from passing measures that, while economically
discriminatory, create positive spillovers. International economic law therefore
only partially respects the internalization principle—the idea that the exercise
of authority should be located at the smallest level of governance that fully
internalizes the effect of its exercise.21 For example, Chinese subsidies for
renewable energy benefit Chinese renewable energy companies at the expense
of American corporations, but they also benefit everyone in the world by
reducing the cost of renewable energy technology and therefore reducing
global carbon emissions. The application of nondiscrimination rules aims to

18

See infra Appendix.
SHERRY STEPHENSON, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV., ADDRESSING
LOCAL CONTENT REQUIREMENTS IN A SUSTAINABLE ENERGY TRADE AGREEMENT 3 (2013);
see also Joanna I. Lewis, The Rise of Renewable Energy Protectionism: Emerging Trade
Conflicts and Implications for Low Carbon Development, GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., Nov. 2014,
at 10, 14.
20 See infra Appendix.
21 See ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 107 (2000) (stating that for
optimal governance, “[a]ssign power over public goods to the smallest unit of government
that internalizes the effects of its exercise . . .”).
19

2015]

LOCAL DISCRIMINATION; GLOBAL GOODS

1943

force Chinese officials to internalize the trade effects of their policies on
American producers. It does not, however, allow them to internalize the
environmental benefits non-Chinese citizens receive from Chinese subsidies.
Economic nondiscrimination rules therefore stack the deck against noneconomic concerns.
To be sure, IEL has long recognized a place for the pursuit of non-economic
objectives. The WTO, for example, allows states to deviate from trade
commitments in the pursuit of certain permissible objectives, such as the
protection of human health or the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources.22
But the application of these exceptions has often been uneven. Moreover,
international law in general, and international economic law in particular, has
been slow to adapt to the increased importance of local governmental action
and its unique dynamics. As a default matter, international law treats local
action the same as national action, despite the systematic differences in how
lawmaking operates at different levels of government.23 In the context of the
WTO, panels applying exceptions to the rules requiring nondiscriminatory
treatment typically ask whether there is a less restrictive measure that makes an
equal contribution to the measure’s non-trade objective.24 A measure that does
not include a discriminatory condition will almost always meet this test.
This approach ignores the political realities inherent in small local
governments trying to tackle global problems. In some cases, banning
discriminatory conditions such as LCRs may doom the passage of local public
goods programs. Supporters may be unable to assemble a coalition if they
cannot link public goods objectives to local economic objectives. Where the
benefits from providing the global public good outweigh the costs of economic
discrimination, this result is welfare defeating.
To be clear, I am not arguing that local discrimination is an ideal way to
provide global public goods. From an economic standpoint, a measure without
a trade-distorting discriminatory provision is always preferable to the same
measure with the discriminatory provision. Rather, I am arguing that local
discrimination may, in some cases, be a second-best alternative to an
undersupply of (or complete failure to provide) the public good. In a narrow
set of cases, a measure that creates net global benefits may only be available if
linked to a discriminatory provision.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. In Part I, I explain how IEL’s
nondiscrimination rules prohibit local content requirements. I focus on the
WTO Appellate Body’s recent decision in Canada—Renewable Energy, which

22

See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] (establishing that the Agreement does not prevent
adoption or enforcement of measures that protect public morals, human or animal health,
national treasures, and exhaustible natural resources).
23 See infra Part I.
24 See infra text accompanying notes 236-40.
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declared unlawful a provincial program in Ontario that conditioned payments
to renewable energy electricity generators on their use of locally-produced
renewable energy equipment.25 The Canada—Renewable Energy decision has
touched off a string of trade disputes about allegedly discriminatory renewable
energy support programs. Many of these disputes—including Canada—
Renewable Energy itself—center on local, rather than national, programs.
International law generally treats local violations of international law as
equivalent to national violations, despite the increasingly important role of
local governments in delivering global public goods and the systematic
differences between local and national governments.
Part II reports the results of the fifty-state survey of renewable energy
subsidy programs containing LCRs. To understand their origins, I examine the
history of a number of these programs. This inquiry reveals the critical role
that economic development played in passing renewable energy support
programs. At the state level, a link to economic development objectives
appears critical to passing renewable energy support programs.
Parts III and IV present the Article’s central theoretical contribution. Part III
develops a model of lawmaking that explains how the ability to discriminate
against foreign economic interests lubricates lawmaking. Discriminatory
conditions, precisely because they are cheap ways of creating concentrated
benefits within the enacting jurisdiction, are an effective way to build support
for public goods programs that otherwise would not pass. Part IV uses this
model to advance two hypotheses. First, nondiscrimination rules constrain
local lawmaking more than national lawmaking. Second, economic
discrimination at the local level may be welfare-increasing in some instances.
The basic argument is that discriminatory conditions link a concentrated
economic benefit to a diffuse public good. In so doing, discriminatory
conditions can solve a political collective action problem in which local
governments in particular undersupply global public goods. The application of
nondiscrimination rules to discriminatory local measures that provide global
public goods may thus be welfare defeating.
Finally, Part V considers the implications of this result for GATT/WTO law.
Most discriminatory conditions are welfare-decreasing and thus should remain
unlawful. The challenge is to devise legal doctrines that distinguish between
those discriminatory conditions necessary to pass a measure that increases
global welfare through the provision of a global public good, and those that
merely discriminate to no other purpose. Focusing primarily on the GATT, I
offer two proposals to accomplish this task. First, I propose what I refer to as a
“political necessity” test for use in GATT Article XX cases involving local
measures. Under this test, where a local measure is defended on Article XX

25

See Canada—Renewable Energy, supra note 8 (upholding a finding that Canada’s FIT
Program violates the national treatment obligation incorporated into Article 2 of the TRIMs
Agreement). Throughout the Article I discuss international economic law in general, though
for concreteness I focus on the WTO.
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grounds, WTO panels should ask first whether the measure pursues an
objective authorized by one of the exceptions in Article XX and whether the
measure provides a global public good protected by a multilateral treaty. If the
measure does, then the panel should evaluate the necessity of the measure in
light of politically available alternatives. Using objective evidence, such as the
rate of discriminatory provisions in the local jurisdiction’s code, the panel
should assess whether the discriminatory provision was necessary to the
measure’s passage. If the panel concludes that it was, the panel should still rule
against the measure unless it finds that the benefits from providing the global
public good, including those benefits created outside the enacting jurisdiction,
exceed the costs of economic discrimination. Second, I suggest that states
include narrow, targeted exceptions in IEL agreements for renewable energy
measures.
I.

LOCAL CONTENT REQUIREMENTS

Local content requirements are laws, regulations, or governmental measures
that condition a benefit on the use of a certain percentage of inputs from the
local jurisdiction. LCRs can be found at every level of government and are an
especially common form of economic discrimination. One recent study
estimated that in the wake of the 2008-09 financial crisis and ensuing
recession, governments implemented over 100 new LCRs, reducing
international trade by over $93 billion.26 LCRs are becoming increasingly
popular in the renewable energy sector. Subsidizing renewable energy with
LCRs, when effective, reduces greenhouse gas emissions while supporting the
development of local renewable energy businesses, a technology-driven
industry that produces high-end manufacturing jobs. Renewable energy LCRs
thus allow governments to link environmental and economic development
objectives. As I explain in this Part, however, most LCRs are straightforward
violations of IEL’s nondiscrimination rules.
A.

Nondiscrimination and Local Content Requirements

Governments like LCRs for a variety of policy reasons. LCRs, it is often
argued, can increase employment.27 By protecting infant industries, LCRs can
help establish globally-competitive domestic industries that otherwise would
26 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., LOCAL CONTENT REQUIREMENTS: A GLOBAL
PROBLEM, at xxi (2013).
27 JAN-CHRISTOPH KUNTZE & TOM MOERENHOUT, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND
SUSTAINABLE DEV., LOCAL CONTENT REQUIREMENTS AND THE RENEWABLE ENERGY
INDUSTRY–A GOOD MATCH? 6 (2013) (“The alleged capability for LCRs to create ‘green
jobs’ is often something that helps governments gain political support for green industrial
programs.”). Critically, the empirical evidence as to whether LCRs actually provide these
benefits is mixed. See id. at 8 (“The balance between job losses . . . and job gains . . . is very
difficult to estimate and depends on sectoral and policy specifics.”). In part, LCRs create
inefficiencies in trade that have adverse consequences for welfare. See infra Section III.A.
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not exist.28 Both of these effects increase the tax-base for the government,
providing it with additional revenue.29 Moreover, if the LCR is tied to some
other objective, such as a green energy program, it may have longer-term
beneficial consequences in terms of spurring innovation in green technology,
developing of green jobs, and reducing environmental harms such as
greenhouse gas emissions.30
Local content requirements can be categorized by the kind of benefit
extended to products, services, or investments meeting the prescribed local
content standard.31 Preferential licensing is an especially common benefit.
Governments may only grant licenses for cultural activities such as radio
stations or film, investments, or import licenses to those meeting the relevant
criteria. For example, Australia requires television broadcasters to air fifty-five
percent Australian programming between 6 a.m. and midnight in order to
receive a rebate on their licensing fees.32 Less quixotically, countries may
require that businesses incorporate local content into their business plan as a
condition of a license to extract natural resources.33
Governments may also extend financial incentives to qualifying products,
services, or investments.34 Financial incentives can take the form of
preferential rates, such as Ontario extended to electric companies generating
renewable energy produced with local equipment.35 Governments may also use
direct financing or preferential tax and tariff schemes as a means of conferring
a financial benefit.36 To give but one example, in Indonesia—Autos, the
European Communities, the United States, and Japan challenged, inter alia, tax
breaks that Indonesia provided to imported automobiles and component parts
based on the percentage of components in the vehicle produced in Indonesia.37
Indonesia, in turn, defined local components as “parts or sub parts of Motor
28 KUNTZE & MOERENHOUT, supra note 27, at 6 (“Support is aimed at fostering infant
industries by protecting them from foreign competition . . . .”).
29 Id. (“[I]t is sometimes claimed that LCRs will lead to an increased tax base for
governments because of a larger local manufacturing industry.”).
30 Id. at 6-7.
31 Holger P. Hestermeyer & Laura Nielsen, The Legality of Local Content Measures
Under WTO Law, 48 J. WORLD TRADE 553, 557 (2014) .
32 Id. at 558-59.
33 Id. at 560 (“Conditioning the grant of the concessions required to exploit [natural]
resources on the use of local content is one of the means employed in this respect.”).
34 Id. at 563.
35 See Canada—Renewable Energy, supra note 8, ¶ 1.3 (“The FIT Programme is a
scheme implemented by . . . Ontario . . . through which generators of electricity produced
from certain forms of renewable energy are paid a guaranteed price . . . .”).
36 Hestermeyer & Nielsen, supra note 31, at 564 (stating that governments may use
project financing or preferential tariffs to encourage the use of local content).
37 Panel Report, Indonesia—Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, ¶¶ 1.11.12, 2.6-2.14, WTO Doc. WT/DS54/R (adopted July 23, 1998) [hereinafter Indonesia—
Autos].
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Vehicles which are domestically made and have Local Contents at a level of
more than 40 per cent . . . .”38 Finally, governments may also give qualifying
products, services, or investments preferential treatment in government
procurement processes.39
B.

Disputes over Renewable Energy LCRs

Local content requirements run a very high risk of violating IEL’s
prohibition on discriminating against foreign goods, services, or capital. The
basic problem with LCRs is that they encourage consumers to purchase
potentially more expensive domestic inputs, rather than cheaper foreignproduced inputs. For example, a government might use a renewable energy
LCR to provide a subsidy to homeowners who install solar panels, provided
that the solar panel is produced within the local jurisdiction. The result of such
a measure is that homeowners do not choose which solar panel to buy based on
the true cost of the solar panel. Rather, they choose which panel to buy based
on the cost to themselves, including the government subsidy they receive for
domestically-made panels. As a result, consumers (and the government) pay
more for the same product, while more competitive sellers are deprived of
market-share, a welfare-defeating result.
Indeed, local content requirements, and disputes about their legality, have
become especially common in the renewable energy sector in the last several
years. The most recent and prominent local content case is the WTO’s dispute
in Canada—Renewable Energy. In that dispute, the European Union and Japan
challenged Ontario’s Feed-in Tariff (“FIT”) Program.40 The FIT Program paid
generators of electricity produced from renewable sources a guaranteed rate for
electricity.41 In order to qualify for the FIT Program, facilities had to meet a
number of eligibility requirements, including “Minimum Required Domestic
Content Levels” that required electricity generators to purchase locallyproduced renewable energy equipment.42 Although Canada—Renewable
Energy has been most widely discussed for its implications for renewable

38 Id. ¶ 2.5. The complainants also challenged the “National Car” program, under which
Indonesia exempted from taxation cars manufactured by Indonesian companies that satisfied
certain requirements regarding ownership of facilities and local content, among others. See
id. ¶¶ 2.16-2.17.
39 Hestermeyer & Nielsen, supra note 31, at 562 (“Governments regularly prefer local
over imported products in their procurement policies.”).
40 See Canada—Renewable Energy, supra note 8, ¶ 1.1.
41 Id. ¶ 1.3. Participation in the program was limited to facilities located in Ontario
generating electricity exclusively from wind, solar, renewable biomass, biogas, landfill gas,
or hydro power. Id.
42 Id. ¶ 1.4. The Program was divided between the “FIT stream” and the “microFIT
stream” based on generation capacity. Id. ¶ 1.3. The minimum domestic content
requirements applied to the development and construction of windpower and solar facilities
under the FIT stream, but only to solar facilities under the microFIT stream. Id. ¶ 1.4.
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energy subsidies, as I explain below, its most important implications are for
local governments’ ability to provide such subsidies under international law.
Japan and the European Union alleged that the FIT Program and the
contracts
issued
thereunder
imposed
discriminatory
LCRs.43
Nondiscrimination rules are a core feature of international economic law.
Indeed, the idea that states should not discriminate based on national origin
when regulating trade in goods, services, or capital, is in many ways the key
animating idea behind modern international economic law.44 Both international
trade and investment law contain a number of specific nondiscrimination rules,
as well as rules that ban practices with discriminatory impact, such as
subsidization, that are relevant to renewable energy LCRs.45
The most important nondiscrimination rule—and the one on which Japan
and the European Union ultimately prevailed—is the national treatment
obligation.46 In general, national treatment prohibits treating foreign products,
services, or investments less favorably than “like” domestic products, services,
or investments.47 LCRs usually expressly link the provision of a benefit to the
use of domestic products. Thus, determining that an LCR disadvantages “like”

43

Id. ¶¶ 1.6-1.7.
Cf. Joost Pauwelyn, The Unbearable Lightness of Likeness, in GATS AND THE
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES 358, 361 (Marion Panizzon et al. eds.,
2008) (arguing that the WTO Appellate Body should focus “on the one and only
impermissible criterion [for regulation], namely: national origin”).
45 See GATT, supra note 22, art. III:2 (declaring that no foreign imports should be
accorded less favorable treatment than their domestic counterparts); see also Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186 [hereinafter
TRIMs Agreement] (applying the nondiscrimination requirements of GATT to trade-related
investment measures).
46 For example, GATT Article III provides that: “The products of the territory of any
contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin . . . .”
GATT, supra note 22, art. III:2.
47 See Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and
Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 48,
48 n.3 (2008) (“The obligation to provide national treatment essentially prohibits
discriminating between foreign and domestic products, investments, or investors.”). I use
“services” and “investments” as shorthand. In fact, IEL protects both “services” and
“services suppliers,” as well as “investments” and “investors.” See, e.g., General Agreement
on Trade in Services art. XVII, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter GATS] (providing
that foreign services and service suppliers should be treated the same as domestic services
and service suppliers); 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 3 [hereinafter U.S.
Model BIT], http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf [http://perma.cc
/6LRD-TBA2] (affording protection to both “investors” and “investments”).
44
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foreign products tends not to be difficult.48 Some form of the national
treatment obligation is found in virtually every IEL agreement, including the
GATT,49 the General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”),50 the
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (“TRIMs Agreement”),51
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT Agreement”),52
preferential trade agreements such as NAFTA,53 and bilateral investment
treaties (“BITs”).54 Outside of the trade context, investment treaties also
typically ban “performance requirements,” a concept that includes local
content requirements.55 The U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, for
example, prohibits parties from requiring, inter alia, investors “to achieve a
given level or percentage of domestic content” or “to purchase, use or accord a
preference to goods produced in its territory . . . .”56 Depending on the
relationship between the parties involved, LCRs may thus be vulnerable under
WTO rules as well as regional trade rules and investment treaties.57 In fact, the
48

Hestermeyer & Nielson, supra note 31, at 572 (“In local content cases, the
discrimination is always de jure as the measure discriminates on the basis of the origin of
the product, explicitly conditioning the grant of a benefit on the use of local content and
thereby treating the imported product less favourably than the local one.”).
49 GATT, supra note 22, art. III.
50 GATS, supra note 47, art. XVII.
51 The TRIMS Agreement subjects to GATT Article III measures that require as a
condition of obtaining some advantage “the purchase or use . . . of products of domestic
origin or from any domestic source . . . .” TRIMs Agreement, supra note 45 (providing
LCRs as an illustration of a measure that violates the TRIMs Agreement); see also id. art. 2
(making GATT Article III’s national treatment obligation applicable to investment measures
related to trade in goods).
52 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter TBT
Agreement] (“Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, products
imported from the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable
than that accorded to like products of national origin and to like products originating in any
other country.”).
53 North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 301, Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA] (“Each Party shall accord national treatment to the
goods of another Party . . . .”).
54 See, e.g., U.S. Model BIT, supra note 47, art. 3 (“Each Party shall accord to investors
of the other Party treatment no less favorable than it accords, in like circumstances, to its
own investors . . . .”). The other key nondiscrimination rule in IEL is the most-favored
nation (“MFN”) obligation. The MFN obligation does not, however, figure prominently in
renewable energy or LCR cases.
55 See id. art. 8 (prohibiting parties from imposing or enforcing any commitment or
undertaking “to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content”).
56 Id.
57 For example, in Cargill v. Mexico, an American food company successfully
challenged a Mexican tax on soft drinks containing high fructose corn syrup as both a
violation of the national treatment obligation and an unlawful performance requirement.
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Ontario measure at issue in Canada—Renewable Energy is itself the subject of
an investment dispute under NAFTA Ch. 11.58
Japan and the European Union alleged that Ontario’s FIT Program violated
Article III:4 of the 1994 GATT (national treatment for products) by treating
foreign renewable energy generation equipment less favorably than like
products originating in Ontario, and Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement
(national treatment in trade-related investment measures) for the same
reason.59 They also alleged that the FIT Program violated Articles 3.1(b) and
3.2 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM
Agreement”) by creating a subsidy “contingent upon the use of domestic over
imported goods . . . .”60 The SCM Agreement prohibits such subsidies because
they discriminate most directly against foreign competition, i.e., by providing a

Cargill, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Award, ¶ 2 (Sept.
18,
2009),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0133_0.pdf
[http://perma.cc/7ANH-874C]. In addition to the national treatment and performance
requirement claims—violations of NAFTA Articles 1102 and 1106, respectively—Cargill
also brought a claim for a violation of the obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment.
Id. The principal difference between the national treatment provision and the ban on
performance requirements is that demonstrating a national treatment violation requires
finding a domestic investor in “like circumstances,” while proving a violation of the ban on
performance requirements does not. Dennis Clare, The Final Award in Feldman v. Mexico,
in THE REASONS REQUIREMENT IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: CRITICAL
CASE STUDIES 63, 102 (Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & W. Michael Reisman eds., 2008)
(“[F]inding a violation of NAFTA’s Article 1102 on national treatment requires
demonstrating that a foreign investor was improperly discriminated against relative to
domestic investors in ‘like circumstances.’”). For example, in ADF Group v. United States
of America, an investor brought a NAFTA challenge to the application of “Buy America”
provisions to a construction project. ADF Grp. Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, Award, ¶ 61 (Jan. 9, 2003), 18 ICSID Rev. 195 (2003). The
challenged provisions provided that federal transportation construction funds could not be
spent “unless steel, iron, and manufactured products used in such project are manufactured
in the United States.” Id. ¶ 56. The tribunal held that the United States had not violated its
national treatment obligation because U.S. investors were also required to produce their
steel and iron in the United States for federally-funded transportation projects. Id. ¶ 156.
The United States conceded, however, that the same provision would have been an unlawful
performance requirement within the meaning of NAFTA Article 1106 were it not for certain
exclusions applicable to government procurement. Id. ¶ 159.
58 See Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration ¶ 23, Mesa Power Grp. LLC v.
Gov’t
of
Can.
(2011),
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/mesa.aspx
[http://perma.cc/9DUH-DHRD]
(complaining that Ontario’s FIT Program violates NAFTA Chapter 11).
59 Canada—Renewable Energy, supra note 8, ¶¶ 1.6-1.7.
60 Id.
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subsidy in one market (for example, electricity) contingent on discrimination
by the recipient in another product market (for example, solar panels).61
The challenge caused great concern among environmentalists, who view
renewable energy subsidies as critical to transitioning away from a carbonbased economy. To the initial relief of some, the WTO panel rejected the SCM
Agreement claim, finding that Japan and the European Union could not
demonstrate an unlawful subsidy.62 Showing a violation of the SCM
Agreement requires the claimant to demonstrate that a financial contribution
by the respondent confers a benefit on the recipient. A benefit, in turn, is
measured by comparing the financial contribution—in this case the price paid
for renewably-generated electricity—to some benchmark that reflects what the
recipient would expect to receive in the absence of the subsidy. For example, a
government purchase of a good at market price would constitute a financial
contribution, but there would be no benefit because the price did not exceed
the relevant benchmark—the market price. In Canada—Renewable Energy, the
panel found that the claimants failed to establish a viable benchmark because
Ontario does not have a free market for electricity, and other benchmark prices
proposed by the claimants were similarly influenced by government
intervention.63
Nevertheless, the panel held that the Ontario FIT Program unlawfully
discriminated against foreign renewable energy equipment. Specifically, the
61

See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 3.1(b), Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869
U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM Agreement] (prohibiting “subsidies contingent, whether
solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported
goods”). The SCM Agreement also prohibits “subsidies contingent . . . upon export
performance . . . .” Id. art. 3.1(a). Subsidies that cause “adverse effects to the interests of
other Members” are “actionable” under the SCM Agreement. Id. art. 5. Significantly,
however, a state must provide a “specific subsidy” within the meaning of the SCM
Agreement before a subsidy can either be deemed prohibited or actionable. Id. art. 1.2. In
order to be a specific subsidy, a government must make a) a financial contribution; that b)
confers a benefit above and beyond what the recipient could receive in the market; and c)
that is either 1) targeted in some way at specific industries or enterprises, or 2) prohibited
under Article 3. Id. arts. 1-2.
62 Canada—Renewable Energy, supra note 8, ¶ 5.147 (“The Panel found that Japan and
the European Union failed to establish that the challenged measures confer a benefit within
the meaning of Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.”). Technically, the panel also
declined to address the claimants’ stand-alone claim under GATT Article III:4 for reasons
of judicial economy. That is, the panel found that the FIT Program’s minimum domestic
content requirements constituted a discriminatory trade-related investment measure, which
requires showing discrimination in violation of GATT Article III. Id. ¶ 2.76. Having found a
TRIMs violation, the panel did not feel it necessary to also formally decide that the FIT
Program directly violated GATT article III:4. Id. (“Having made this finding, the Panel
declined Japan’s request to undertake a separate analysis of the elements of Article III:4.”).
63 Id. ¶¶ 5.149-5.151. The panel also rejected benchmarks from other markets as
insufficiently comparable to what prices in a free market in Ontario would be. Id. ¶ 5.152.
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panel held that the FIT Program’s minimum domestic content requirements
constituted a discriminatory trade-related investment measure in violation of
GATT Article III:4 and TRIMs Article 2.1.64 This holding was so
straightforward that Canada did not bother to challenge it during the ensuing
appeal.65
Canada—Renewable Energy thus created a WTO precedent holding what
many observers had long believed—that LCRs are straightforward
discrimination in violation of the national treatment obligation. In so doing,
Canada—Renewable Energy lit the fuse on a trade conflict that had been
brewing for some time. In the wake of the decision, governments initiated a
wide variety of trade disputes challenging government support for the
renewable sector. For example, both the United States and the European Union
initiated domestic trade investigations (which can lead to the imposition of
trade sanctions such as anti-dumping and countervailing duties) into Chinese
support for the solar industry.66 China responded with similar domestic trade
investigations of its own into U.S. support for renewable energy, as well as
into European Union and South Korean trade practices.67 At the WTO, the
United States, joined by the European Union and Japan, had challenged
Chinese subsidies for wind energy.68 China, for its part, challenged feed-in
tariff programs maintained by several European states on the basis that these
programs contain LCRs like that in Canada—Renewable Energy.69 Indonesia
64

Id. ¶¶ 1.23-1.24.
Instead, Canada appealed the panel’s finding that an exception in GATT Article III:8
for governmental procurement did not apply. Id. ¶ 2.1. The Appellate Body rejected this
appeal, interpreting the exception to require that the product purchased by the government
be the same as the product against which it discriminated. Id. ¶ 5.63. Ontario purchased
electricity but discriminated against renewable energy generation equipment, two different
products. Id. ¶ 5.75. The European Union and Japan cross-appealed the panel’s findings
under the SCM Agreement. Here, the Appellate Body reversed the panel’s holdings that the
claimants had not introduced sufficient evidence of a benchmark price against which a
benefit could be measured. Id. ¶ 5.245 (“[W]e have found evidence on the Panel record that
is relevant to a benefit analysis based on a benchmark that takes into account the
Government of Ontario’s definition of the energy supply-mix.”). However, the Appellate
Body declined to complete the analysis of whether a benefit was in fact conferred due to the
inadequacy of the evidentiary record. Id. ¶¶ 5.245-5.246.
66 See Lewis, supra note 19, at 22 (documenting investigations initiated by the United
States and the European Union into the Chinese solar panel industry). The United States
ended up imposing duties on Chinese solar panels, while the European Union reached an
agreement with China on an import quota and minimum price controls. Id.
67 Id.
68 Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Measures Concerning Wind
Power Equipment, WTO Doc. WT/DS419/1 (Jan. 6, 2011) (stating that the Chinese wind
power measures appear to be inconsistent with Article 3 of the SCM Agreement).
69 Request for Consultations by China, European Union and Certain Member States—
Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, WTO Doc.
WT/DS452/1 (Nov. 5, 2012) (stating China’s request for consultation with the European
65
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and Argentina have challenged European Union trade sanctions on biodiesel
that have severely curtailed those nations’ access to the European market.70
Finally, in 2013, the United States filed a request for consultations (the first
stage in the WTO dispute settlement process) with India regarding its
Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission program.71 India responded by filing
requests for information with the WTO Committees on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures and Trade-Related Investment Measures, requesting
the United States to justify certain state and local renewable energy support
programs.72
While not all of these challenges focus on LCRs, a number—including the
challenges involving the United States, the European Union, Japan, Canada,
China, and India—do.73 These disputes suggest that LCRs are a growing form
of protectionism in the renewable energy sector. The use of LCRs and their
legal status thus raises important questions about the viability of government
support for renewable energy programs.
C.

The Importance of Local LCRs

Overlooked in this debate has been the relative importance of truly local
LCRs—those deployed by subnational governments. Critically, Ontario’s FIT
Program was not a national program. A bedrock rule of international law is
that nations are internationally responsible for the actions of their subsidiary
governments.74 The International Law Commission’s (“ILC”) Draft Articles on

Union, Italy, and Greece due to inconsistencies under the GATT, SCM Agreement, and
TRIMs Agreement).
70 Request for Consultations by Indonesia, European Union—Anti-Dumping Measures
on Biodiesel from Indonesia, WTO Doc. WT/DS480/1 (June 17, 2014); Request for
Consultations by Argentina, European Union—Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from
Argentina, WTO WT/DS473/1 (Jan. 8, 2014).
71 Request for Consultations by the United States, India—Certain Measures Relating to
Solar Cells and Solar Modules, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/1 (Feb. 11, 2013).
72 Comm. on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Minutes of the Regular Meeting
Held on 22 April 2013, ¶¶ 116-25, WTO Doc. G/SCM/M/85 (Aug. 5, 2013) [hereinafter
Minutes of the Regular Meeting] (stating questions posed by India to the United States under
Article 25.8 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures); Questions by
India to the United States, Certain Local Content Requirements in Some of the Renewable
Energy Sector Programs, WTO Doc. G/TRIMS/W/117 (Apr. 17, 2013) (stating that some
renewable energy programs in the United States “make the availability of incentives
contingent upon the use of domestic or state specific products, which raises concerns about
their compatibility with . . . Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement read with Article III:4 of
GATT 1994”).
73 In addition to the countries listed above, Lewis identifies renewable energy LCRs in
Argentina, Brazil, Croatia, France, Italy, Malaysia, South Africa, Turkey, and Ukraine.
Lewis, supra note 19, at 14.
74 See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10, at 44 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1, U.N. Doc.
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Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (“Draft Articles”),
which to a large extent reflect customary international law,75 provide that the
“conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under
international law . . . whatever its character as an organ of the central
Government or of a territorial unit of the State.”76 Moreover, the Draft Articles
provide that whether a state has committed an internationally wrongful act “is
not affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by internal
law.”77 The result is that nation-states bear legal responsibility under
international law for the actions of their local governments, even if the local
government’s actions are made pursuant to an express allocation of authority
between the national and local governments. Indeed, these provisions are
uncontroversial, confirmed by dozens of cases.78
Despite their equivalence under the international law of state responsibility,
the distinction between local LCRs and national LCRs is important for two
reasons. First, subnational governments today play a greater role in
international affairs than they have in at least a century. For example, states
within the United States carry on foreign policy activities that receive little
check from the federal government, including entering into agreements with
foreign governments79 and the creation of transboundary carbon trading
schemes.80 The U.S. Conference of Mayors has produced a “Climate
Protection Agreement,” under which hundreds of U.S. cities agree to take
measures to combat climate change, including striving to meet or beat Kyoto
Protocol targets within their own communities.81 Many nation-states have, for
a variety of reasons, devolved authority onto localities. In the United States, a
robust constitutional federalism—one that holds that the states should operate
free from national interference across a wide range of issues—provides the
basis for local action in areas in which the federal government has declined to
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) (“The conduct of any State organ shall be considered
an act of that State under international law . . . whatever its character as an organ of the
central Government or of a territorial unit of the State.”).
75 See id. at 84.
76 Id. at 44; see also id. at 84 (“[Article 4.1] includes an organ of any territorial
governmental entity within the State on the same basis as the central governmental organs of
that State . . . .”).
77 Id. at 43.
78 Id. at 75-78 & nn.78-95, 80 n.96, 84-88 & nn.107-24 (citing cases and authorities
upholding these two principles).
79 See Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 741, 741
(2010) (describing an agreement between Kansas and Cuba).
80 See Hari M. Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, Litigation’s Regulatory Pathways and the
Administrative State: Lessons From U.S. and Australian Climate Change Governance, 25
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 207, 235 (2013).
81 See U.S. Conference of Mayors, The U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement
(2005),
http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/documents/mcpAgreement.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5L2F-EPCW].
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act aggressively, such as climate change.82 In other nations, a push for regional
autonomy drives devolution. For example, in the United Kingdom, Scotland
and Wales received a significant increase in home rule authority in the 1990s,
including individual parliamentary bodies with authority over a variety of
areas.83 In September 2014, Scotland went so far as to hold a referendum on
full independence.84 While the referendum failed, an unexpectedly close vote
resulted in promises from the United Kingdom for even further autonomy for
Scotland.85 Following Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, similar
movements have gained traction in Spain and elsewhere.86
Second, local action may differ systematically from national action.
Scholars and advocates of local governments have long argued that allocating
certain kinds of responsibility to the local level may improve governance
because of the comparative advantage local governments may have in

82 See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, Scaling “Local”: The Implications of Greenhouse Gas
Regulation in San Bernardino County, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 689, 690 (2009) (“[California]
used its power over [San Bernadino], through the California Environmental Quality Act and
the San Bernadino County Superior Court, to push that local governmental unit to take
action . . . .”); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive
Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59, 63
(2010) (“State and local energy, environmental, and land use agencies must consider how to
account for climate change when planning infrastructure and regulating facilities.”).
83 The British Parliament “devolved” a range of authority onto the Scottish, Welsh, and
Northern Irish governments it created. Devolution of Powers to Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland, GOV.UK (Feb. 18, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/guidance/devolution-ofpowers-to-scotland-wales-and-northern-ireland [https://perma.cc/D9ES-JCL3]. Scotland
received the greatest range of authority, including administration of its own justice system,
public works, and some powers over taxation. What Powers Does Scotland Have?, BBC
(Jan.
13
2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-20314150
[http://perma.cc/9BN5-KBHC]. Devolution differs from federalism in that the statutes
devolving authority on local governments are ordinary statutes that can be changed by the
central government. As a result, the state is technically still a unitary state, though the
political costs of changing the allocation of authority between the center and localities may
not differ significantly between a unitary state with devolved authority such as the UK, and
a system of constitutional federalism, such as the United States.
84 Kenan Malik, Opinion, United Kingdom, Divided People, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/opinion/kenan-malik-united-kingdom-dividedpeople.html [http://perma.cc/K54E-KXLH] (discussing referendum for Scotland’s
independence).
85 Id.
86 Alejandro López, Spain: Regional Catalan President Calls Early Elections, WORLD
SOCIALIST WEB SITE (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2015/01/26/cataj26.html [http://perma.cc/49TQ-DJTE] (discussing pressure for a secessionist vote in the
Catalan region of Spain).
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regulating based on local circumstances.87 The U.S. Supreme Court has
emphasized that local governments may be more directly accountable to voters
than more distant national governments88—a concern echoed in debates about
the legitimacy of international institutions such as the European Union.89
Moreover, local governments may be more nimble in certain respects than
national governments, while being hampered by their small size in other
respects. The literature on international organizations has long recognized
benefits to increasing the scale of governance to take advantage of greater
linkages.90 Scholars have also noted, though, that with greater scale comes
greater transaction costs.91 At some point, greater size becomes a vice rather
than a virtue.
Twenty-first century trends in international governance reflect this view. In
place of multilateral international governance, nations are increasingly
empowering institutions with narrower scope, notwithstanding the fact that
regulatory decisions made by these institutions create externalities. At the
international level, nations increasingly turn to regional or “mini-lateral”
institutions, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a free trade agreement
among Pacific Rim countries that may eclipse the WTO as a site of
international trade lawmaking.92 Nations also fragment jurisdiction for related
issues among different international institutions. For example, in 2009, states
created a stand-alone International Renewable Energy Agency (“IRENA”) in
large part because they feared that linking the Agency to existing climate

87 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control In School Finance Reform, 24
CONN. L. REV. 773, 785-804 (1992) (reviewing the benefits of local control in the context of
education).
88 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) (“Where Congress
encourages state regulation rather than compelling it, state governments remain responsive
to the local electorate’s preferences; state officials remain accountable to the people.”).
89 Sophie Meunier, Trade Policy and Political Legitimacy in the European Union, 1
COMP. EUR. POL. 67, 70-74 (2003) (discussing concerns about legitimacy in international
trade organizations and the lack of democracy and accountability in the European Union).
90 See, e.g., Andrew Guzman, International Organizations and the Frankenstein
Problem, 24 EURO. J. INT’L L. 999, 1004 (2013) (“There are at least three reasons why states
may . . . enlarge rather than shrink the scope of an [international organization] . . . .
effectiveness, linkage, and efficiency.”).
91 See, e.g., COOTER, supra note 21, at 361; Guzman, supra note 90, at 1000 & n.2
(describing how international organizations can grow beyond their optimal size); Barbara
Koremenos, Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal, The Rational Design of International
Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 761, 787 (2001) (arguing that international organizations face
increasing transaction costs as the scope of their jurisdiction gets wider); Timothy L. Meyer,
Epistemic Institutions and Epistemic Cooperation in International Environmental
Governance, 2 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 15, 37-40 (2013) (describing how transaction costs
may limit the optimal size of international institutions).
92 CHRIS BRUMMER, MINILATERALISM: HOW TRADE ALLIANCES, SOFT LAW AND
FINANCIAL ENGINEERING ARE REDEFINING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 77-83 (2014).
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change or energy institutions, such as the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) or the International Energy
Agency, would lead to IRENA’s capture or paralysis.93
Yet international law has not adapted to this insight where local versus
national responsibility is concerned. As I show below, many more programs
like Ontario’s—and millions of dollars in renewable energy subsidies from
local governments—may now be at risk.
II.

STATE RENEWABLE ENERGY LCRS

Indian and Chinese challenges to the U.S. renewable energy subsidies are
especially significant in evaluating the future of renewable energy LCRs.
Rather than target federal measures, these investigations have raised questions
about a handful of state and local programs within the United States that China
and India allege contain unlawful LCRs, including programs in Connecticut;
Michigan; Minnesota; Austin, Texas; and Los Angeles, California.94 Local
efforts to address climate change—and by extension, provide other kinds
global public goods—may thus be especially vulnerable to challenge.
In this Part, I present the results of a fifty state survey aimed at identifying
as many state-level renewable energy LCRs within the United States as
possible. An influential report on LCRs implemented since the Great
Recession found only twenty new LCRs on renewable energy globally.95 As
detailed below, my findings suggest that looking subnationally for LCRs
reveals a very different picture. Twenty-three states within the United States
collectively have forty-four programs with renewable energy LCRs. Moreover,
as I discuss in Section II.B, an investigation into several of these programs
suggests that, as a political matter, the use of LCRs is critical to passing
renewable energy support programs.
A.

The Programs

The programs identified by China and India are only the tip of the iceberg. I
conducted a search to locate U.S. state renewable energy programs that contain
LCRs. I relied principally on West’s database(s) of state statutes and

93 The Case for an International Renewable Energy Agency, WORLD COUNCIL FOR
RENEWABLE ENERGY 7 (Apr. 10-11, 2008), http://www.wcre.de/images/stories
/The_case_for_IRENA.pdf [http://perma.cc/8UWB-H6FK] (stating that IRENA will
“constitute an independent driving force in the political process with the goal of creating a
level playing field for the development of renewable energy”).
94 Minutes of the Regular Meeting, supra note 72, ¶¶ 118, 122 ; Lewis, supra note 19, at
20 (explaining that China’s “petition claimed that several state-level renewable energy
incentives violated provisions specified in Foreign Trade Law of the People’s Republic of
China and Investigation Rules of Foreign Trade Barriers”).
95 STEPHENSON, supra note 19, at 3 (“[I]t appears that perhaps 20 new LCRs affect the
renewable energy sector.”). Other estimates for LCRs globally are similar. See Lewis, supra
note 19, at 14 (listing fourteen renewable energy LCRs).
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regulations, searching initially for all statutes or regulations that contained
LCRs.96 I then focused on those statutes that involved renewable energy by
searching for the terms “renewable,” “biodiesel,” “solar,” “wind,” “hydro,”
and “biomass.” To ensure that I did not miss relevant statutes, I also searched
databases specifically for state renewable energy incentive programs, such as
the Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency (“DSIRE”).97
I next reviewed each statute or regulation in greater detail to determine
whether it conditioned a benefit on the use of local products or services.98 My
objective was to determine whether the text of the statute imposed an LCR that
appeared prima facie to violate the national treatment rule.99 Significantly, not
every local content requirement—understood as a provision that conditions the
receipt of a benefit upon the use of local factors of production or on the
recipient taking some local action—necessarily violates the ban on local
content requirements contained in IEL treaties. The ban on local content
requirements applies most straightforwardly to requirements that a recipient
use local products or local service providers.100 As a general matter, the ban
may not apply to measures that condition receipt of a benefit on use of, for
example, local labor.101 While these forty-four statutes are not necessarily
unlawful, they constitute the most vulnerable LCR programs.
96 Searching for local content requirements involved searching for combinations of
phrases, such as “manufactured in [NAME OF STATE]” or “made in [NAME OF
STATE].” I reviewed the results to determine whether each statute actually contained an
LCR. Some, for example, were statutes that simply provided support for business located in
the state, but did not condition the receipt of a benefit on the use of local content.
97 DATABASE STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, www.dsireusa.org
[http://perma.cc/HD2S-WK3V]. DSIRE is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy
and the North Carolina Clean Energy Technology Center. Id.
98 Where a regulation merely echoed an LCR also found in a statute, I report the statute
only.
99 My search terms, for example, yielded a number of subsidy programs under which
location in the state—but not the use of in-state products or services—was a criterion.
GATT Article III:8 makes clear, however, that “[t]he provisions of this Article shall not
prevent the payment of subsidies exclusively to domestic producers.” Thus, paying a
production subsidy to in-state producers is not itself a national treatment violation unless
coupled with an LCR or other discriminatory provision.
100 Not all service sectors are covered by, for example, the GATS. Thus, whether a
preference for in-state services violated IEL rules could depend on the particular service at
issue.
101 NAFTA Chapter 11’s ban on performance requirements, for example, expressly
permits situations in which a party conditions receipt of a benefit upon “compliance with a
requirement to locate production, provide a service, train or employ workers, construct or
expand particular facilities, or carry out research and development, in its territory.” NAFTA,
supra note 53, art. 1106(4). More recently, in several BITs, the United States has entered a
blanket reservation for “[a]ll existing non-conforming measures of all states of the United
States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.” See, e.g., Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement
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To illustrate the distinction, consider Kansas’s Solar and Wind
Manufacturing Incentive, which provides eligible wind or solar projects loans
funded by state bonding measures.102 The criteria for eligibility state that
recipients must 1) make a minimum investment in Kansas of $30 million, 2)
employ at least 200 workers, and 3) engage in activity that might include the
“acquisition of real or personal property and modernization and retooling of
existing property in Kansas . . . .”103 These first two conditions would not
violate the national treatment obligation in any WTO Agreement,104 nor would
they likely violate the provisions in most investment agreements bearing on
LCRs.105 I would therefore not report a program that contained only these first
two conditions. The third condition, however, might well violate the national
treatment obligation in certain instances. For example, if a business qualified
for the program by acquiring and using personal property produced in Kansas
in its manufacturing processes, this would arguably constitute discrimination in
the market for the relevant item of personal property. For this reason, I report
the Kansas program.
This process generated a list of forty-four state programs in twenty-three
states that contain local content requirements—defined broadly to include any
measure that conditions a benefit on the use of any local input, including
products, property, or labor—for renewable energy support programs. Notably,
this list does not include sub-state local programs like the Austin, Texas or Los

and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Uru., Annex I, Nov. 4, 2004, T.I.A.S. No. 061101 [hereinafter U.S.-Uruguay BIT]. The United States has also attempted to contract out
of international responsibility for state actions in non-economic areas through so-called
“federalism reservations.” These reservations purport to exclude from the United States’
obligations any actions for which the U.S. Constitution allocates authority to the states. See
U.S. Ratification of United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime,
ratified Nov. 3, 2005, 2346 U.N.T.S. 440 (“The United States of America reserves the right
to assume obligations under the Convention in a manner consistent with its fundamental
principles of federalism . . . .”).
102 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-50,136(e) (2012) (“[T]he secretary may enter into an
agreement with the . . . eligible wind or solar energy business for benefits under this act.”).
103 Id. § 74-50,136(c)(7).
104 The loans also might not qualify as subsidies within the meaning of the SCM
Agreement, though more information would be necessary. The state raises the money for the
loans through a state bonding measure, and the applicant must repay the principal plus
interest. Id. § 74-50,136(e). A subsidy within the meaning of the SCM Agreement requires
that a benefit be conferred on the private party. SCM Agreement, supra note 61, art. 1.1(b).
In the case of loans, the benefit is typically a discounted interest rate or cost of capital. Thus,
whether the businesses received an actionable subsidy within the meaning of the SCM
Agreement would depend, inter alia, on the relationship between the interest rates Kansas
charges (based presumably on the interest rates it receives) and the interest rates otherwise
available to those receiving the state loans.
105 Investment treaties to which the United States is not a party might not include an
exemption for employment requirements.
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Angeles, California programs identified by India.106 Nor does it include
general subsidy programs that contain LCRs that might be used for renewable
energy unless I identified such a use.107 The complete list of statutes can be
found in the Appendix.
To give a bit more context, thirty-two statutes out of the total forty-four
involve a requirement that to qualify for the benefit, the beneficiary must make
use of local renewable energy-related products. Of these thirty-two, eighteen
relate to renewable energy generation equipment (e.g., solar photovoltaic
panels or wind turbines), while fourteen relate to feedstocks for biofuels.
Fourteen involve renewable energy portfolio requirements (“RPSs”)—
requirements that utility companies purchase or generate a significant portion
of their electricity from renewable sources. Many of these RPSs require that a
utility company purchase electricity generated in the state (thus applying
purely to electricity) while at least two—Michigan’s and Delaware’s—go
further and require that the electricity be generated with locally-produced
equipment.108 Finally, twenty-four measures are fiscal measures, meaning that
the benefit comes in the form of either a cash payment or, very often, a tax
credit. The remaining twenty measures are regulatory measures.
Significantly, this list of statutes is likely to be both under- and overinclusive. The list is likely under-inclusive because I likely failed to identify all
the renewable energy LCRs that exist at the state level. First, I principally
reviewed statutes and regulations. If state agencies impose LCRs in their
administration of government programs without codifying the LCRs in
regulations, I would likely not locate them. For example, the Appendix
identifies Massachusetts’s Commonwealth Solar II program, which includes a
renewable energy LCR. My search terms did not discover this program,
however, because the LCR does not appear to be located in a statute or
regulation, but rather only in the administering agency’s program manual. I
only identified the program based on India’s notification of the program to the
WTO. Second, in some cases determining that an LCR exists is only possible
by reading multiple parts of a state’s code together. For example, Utah has a
program that requires that “[w]ithin a reasonable time after receiving a request
from a contract customer . . . a qualified utility shall enter into a renewable
energy contract . . . to supply some or all of the contract customer’s electric
service from one or more renewable energy facilities selected by the contract
customer.”109 Read on its own, this text does not appear to contain an LCR.

106 Questions by India to the United States, supra note 72 (identifying LCRs in
government programs in Los Angeles, California, and Austin, Texas).
107 For example, Mississippi’s Industry Incentive Revolving Finance Fund is a general
program that has been used to provide significant subsidies to renewable energy companies.
See infra Section II.B.
108 Consequently, I count Michigan’s and Delaware’s RPS programs as both an
equipment measure and an RPS.
109 UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-17-802 (LexisNexis 2015) (emphasis added).
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However, a “renewable energy facility” is by definition located in Utah,110
meaning that the statute requires a utility to purchase in-state electricity rather
than out-of-state electricity. I identified these two provisions because they were
located sufficiently close to each other in the statute, but I may have failed to
locate other similar provisions or ones where the statutory scheme is more
convoluted.111
My findings may also be over-inclusive in the sense that a WTO panel (or
investment law tribunal) might not find unlawful all of those programs that I
report. For example, some of the programs I report, such as Minnesota’s “Solar
Energy in State Buildings” program,112 involve government procurement.
GATT Article III:8 contains an exception for government procurement that
might save these measures.113 I nevertheless report them because 1) their
economic and environmental effects do not depend on the fact that they
involve government procurement; 2) the GATT Article III:8 exception is read
narrowly, as in Canada—Renewable Energy;114 and 3) the WTO has a
plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement that aims to liberalize
procurement policies and could be a vehicle for covering these kinds of
programs.115 Similarly, RPSs that apply only to the purchase of electricity may
technically violate national treatment rules, and hence I report them. However,
some states in the United States may be so far from a national border that no

110

Id. § 54-17-801(4).
I also do not report in the Appendix other renewable energy support provisions that
may well violate the national treatment obligation for reasons other than containing an LCR.
For example, Iowa and Oklahoma both provide tax credits for energy produced in-state and
sold in an arms-length transaction. See IOWA CODE § 476B.2 (2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, §
2357.32A (2014). These provisions arguably establish a discriminatory taxation system in
violation of GATT Article III:2. See GATT, supra note 22, art. III:2. If all sellers of energy
pay sales tax on the sale of energy in Iowa or Oklahoma, and only those who sold energy
produced in-state receive a tax credit, effectively in-state energy is taxed at a lower rate than
out-of-state energy. On the other hand, if the credits are conceived of as production credits
for in-state producers, they might survive under the exception for such production credits
established by GATT Article III:8. See GATT, supra note 22, art. III:8.
112 MINN. STAT. § 16B.323 (2014).
113 See GATT, supra note 22, art. III:8.
114 The exception did not, for example, save Ontario’s FIT Program in Canada—
Renewable Energy. See supra note 65.
115 Similarly, some products might be subject to somewhat specialized rules. For
example, ethanol is subject to the Agreement on Agriculture. See Alan Yanovich, WTO
Rules and the Energy Sector, in REGULATION OF ENERGY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 23
(Yulia Selivanova ed., 2011). The Agreement on Agriculture takes precedence over the
GATT in the event of a conflict. Agreement on Agriculture art. 21.1, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867
U.N.T.S. 410 (“The provisions of GATT 1994 and of other Multilateral Trade Agreements
in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement shall apply subject to the provisions of this
Agreement.”).
111
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foreign producer of electricity tries to serve the market, meaning that at least in
the United States, such measures, while unlawful, may go unchallenged.
Finally, I also report budgetary data where available. Collecting such
information proved considerably more difficult than identifying the programs.
Regulatory measures such as RPSs lack financial provisions. Even where
available, the budgetary data is difficult to compare across programs. Some
programs report budgetary allocations, but very few report actual expenditures,
the more interesting metric. Allocations and expenditures also vary, with some
having annual program caps while others only cap how much individual
claimants can receive. Many tax credit programs do not have express limits on
the size of the credit that recipients may claim. In total, I located annual
budgetary information for only twelve of the forty-four programs. These
twelve programs provide approximately $200 million annually.
B.

The Role of Economic Protectionism in State-Level Programs

Discrimination against foreign products in the renewable energy sector thus
seems rampant at the state level in the United States. In order to get a sense of
the political causes of protectionism, I examined several of the particularly
significant state programs, significant either in terms of dollars or in terms of
number of programs within a single state. I found that renewable energy
support programs containing LCRs typically resulted from a coalition among
environmentally-minded constituencies and local economic interests seeking
support and protection from the government. In most instances, the
environmental case for renewable energy programs seems to have been
insufficient as a political matter to generate sufficient legislative effort. Only
when framed also, or even primarily, as an economic development issue did
renewable energy programs gain the necessary traction to become viable
legislative programs. This finding tracks similar international efforts—most
notably the founding of the IRENA in 2009—to reframe the spread of
renewable energy as an economic development opportunity, rather than
principally as an environmental issue linked to the fight against climate
change.116
The key insight is thus that support for environmental programs, such as
renewable energy, may not be easily disentangled from discrimination. While
the law may make a distinction between the two, they seem to be close
traveling companions in local politics. In short, because of the political
economy of renewable energy programs, passing green energy programs may
require more economic discrimination than international economic law has
traditionally been willing to tolerate.
California’s Self-Generation Incentive Program (“SGIP”) provides an
illustrative example. SGIP began in 2001 as a program to provide an incentive
116

See Meyer, supra note 91, at 20 (describing a deliberate decision to decouple the
IRENA from the international climate change architecture in order to free it from the
political deadlock prevailing in climate change negotiations).
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for the development and installation of “distributed energy resources that the
commission . . . determines will achieve reductions in emissions of greenhouse
gases . . . .”117 Funding for the program comes from Californians, though in
their capacity as “ratepayers” (people who buy electricity) rather than
taxpayers.118 The funds are disbursed as rebates to ratepayers who install
government-approved equipment.119 One estimate puts the total disbursed
under the program at $523.1 million since the program’s inception.120
In 2008, the California legislature added a provision providing for an
additional twenty percent incentive for the installation of eligible energy
equipment manufactured in California.121 The “manufactured in California”
provision is a local content requirement similar to that at issue in Canada—
Renewable Energy. Like Ontario’s purpose in enacting the FIT Program,
California’s purpose is to stimulate alternative ways of generating electricity.
Also like Ontario, California does not pursue this purpose by intervening
directly in the market for electricity. Instead, it provides a subsidy in the
electricity-generating equipment market for locally-produced products.122

117

CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 379.6(b)(1) (West 2015).
Id. § 379.6(a)(2).
119 Id.
120 Dan Morain, Opinion, Bloom Energy and Déjà Vu All Over Again, SACRAMENTO BEE
(June 2, 2014), http://www.sacbee.com/opinion/opn-columns-blogs/danmorain/article
2600181.html [http://perma.cc/BT4Z-KNY4] (“[T]he program has been extended at least a
half-dozen times, and the Public Utilities Commission has paid or intends to pay $521.3
million to companies that meet its criteria.”).
121 In its original incarnation, the legislation provided an additional incentive for
equipment from a “California supplier.” CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 379.6(g)(1) (West 2013)
(“In administering the self-generation incentive program, the commission shall provide an
additional incentive of 20 percent from existing program funds for the installation of eligible
distributed generation resources from a California supplier.”). The definition of a
“California supplier” was convoluted, however, and created the possibility that an out-ofstate company that wished to manufacture equipment in California would not constitute a
California supplier , while a company headquartered in California, but which manufactured
its equipment outside of the state, would. See Morain, supra note 120. As a consequence, in
2014 the legislature amended the provision to give the benefit to eligible equipment
“manufactured in California.” CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 379.6(j) (West 2015) (“In
administering the self-generation incentive program, the commission shall provide an
additional incentive of 20 percent from existing program funds for the installation of eligible
distributed generation resources manufactured in California.”).
122 The entire subsidy program does not necessarily offend nondiscrimination rules,
particularly the national treatment obligation in the GATT or TRIMs Agreement. The
offending part of the SGIP program is the twenty percent additional incentive available only
for installation of equipment manufactured in California. This financial incentive distorts the
market for electricity-generating equipment (“distributed generation resources” in the
language of the statute). The entire subsidy could conceivably be actionable under the SCM
Agreement, however.
118
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The effects of this protectionist legislation are not lost on the firms that
benefit. Indeed, their support was critical to passing the measure. Bloom, a
Silicon Valley company that produces “Bloom Boxes, black cubes fueled by
natural gas that produce [on-site] electricity . . . ” has received $286.7 million
under SGIP, including the “manufactured in California” bonus.123 In 2014, it
was a major backer—along with SolarCity (Elon Musk’s solar company) and
Facebook—of extending the program.124 These efforts resulted in the
program’s extension through 2021.125 California Governor Jerry Brown, in
providing additional funding for the program in 2011, touted it as designed to
“create jobs, lower electric bills and clean up the air we breathe.”126 These
statements, linking job creation and other economic benefits to environmental
concerns, are typical of energy-related LCR measures. The CEO of
FlexEnergy, a company poised to benefit from SGIP through incentives for its
on-site heating and power plants and biogas technology, stated that the
decision to extend the program “will help California maintain its leadership in
the clean technology industry and will create jobs for many Californians. . . .
FlexEnergy technology is available today and will help to improve our
environment and energy independence.”127
The political link between economic and environmental objectives can be
traced directly to the process of building a legislative coalition to pass the
measure. Felipe Fuentes, the bill’s sponsor, alluded to the role of vote trading
in building a coalition to pass the measure.128 When asked about the origins of
the “California supplier” provision, he stated that he could not remember
adding the LCR provision to Assembly Bill 2267,129 a larger omnibus bill that
dealt with various provisions of the Public Resources and Utilities Code.130 He
123 Morain, supra note 120. These amounts represent the total disbursed under the
program, not just the twenty percent “manufactured in California” incentive. If one assumes
that the total amount paid is equal to the normal rebate plus an additional twenty percent of
the rebate, then the additional incentive would be $47.78 million.
124 Id.
125 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 379.6(a)(2) (West 2015) (“The commission shall require the
administration of the program for distributed energy resources originally established
pursuant to Chapter 329 of the Statutes of 2000 until January 1, 2021.” (footnote omitted));
see Morain, supra note 120 (“[Y]ou can bet S-GIP will be extended.”).
126 Dan McCue, California Governor Revives Solar Incentive Program, RENEWABLE
ENERGY
MAG.
(Sept.
24,
2011),
http://www.renewableenergymagazine.com/article/california-governor-revives-solarincentive-program [http://perma.cc/Q2XT-SA8D].
127 FlexEnergy Supports California’s Decision on Proposed Self-Generation Incentive
Program,
CLOSE-UP
MEDIA
(July
29,
2011),
http://closeupmedia.com/manufacturing/FlexEnergy-Supports-Californias-Decision-onProposed-Self-Generation-Incentive-Program.html [http://perma.cc/XR8W-6TB7].
128 See Morain, supra note 120.
129 Id.
130 2008 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3158 (West).

2015]

LOCAL DISCRIMINATION; GLOBAL GOODS

1965

said “‘I don’t know if someone said I had to take this amendment (to get the
bill approved)’ . . . . Sometimes, he added, ‘you have to make the deal to get
the bill out.’”131
Minnesota offers another example of the critical political role of economic
discrimination in passing green energy bills at the state level. With at least five
programs, Minnesota is among the most active states in terms of coupling
support for renewable energy investments with LCRs.132 For example, the
“Renewable Energy Production Incentive” provides payments to, inter alia,
on-farm biogas recovery facilities in Minnesota that are owned by a qualified
Minnesota entity.133 From 2001 to 2007, the program paid for electricity
produced from the biogas that was itself produced on the farm where the
facility was located.134 This mechanism is effectively an LCR because the
payment for electricity hinged on the use of the locally-produced gas.135
Similarly, Minnesota’s Community-Based Energy Development (“C-BED”)
program requires utilities to put in place a tariff and give priority to certain
“community-based renewable energy projects.”136 One of the criteria to qualify
as a C-BED project is that fifty-one percent of the project’s gross revenues are
comprised of, among other things, payments for “components, materials, and
services” purchased in Minnesota.137 The program represents a decision by the
131

Morain, supra note 120.
The programs are “Solar Energy in State Buildings,” MINN. STAT. § 16B.323 (2015);
“Rebates for Solar Photovoltaic Modules,” id. § 116C.7791; “Made in Minnesota Solar
Installations,” id. § 174.187; “Community-Based Energy Development,” id. § 216B.1612;
“Renewable Energy Production Incentive,” id. § 216C.41; “‘Made in Minnesota’ Solar
Energy Production Incentive,” id. § 216C.414; and “Solar Thermal Rebates,” id. §
216C.416. The “Solar Energy in State Buildings” and “Made in Minnesota Solar
Installations” both involve government contracting and thus could fall within the exception
for government procurement in GATT Article III:8 even if they are deemed discriminatory.
See id. §§ 16B.323, 174.187 (involving “project[s] for the construction or major renovation
of a state building” and projects engaged in by the Commissioner of the Minnesota
Department of Transportation, respectively); GATT, supra note 22, art. III:8(a).
133 MINN. STAT. § 216C.41 subdiv. 1(d).
134 Id. § 216C.41 subdiv. 3(a)(3) (stating payments can be made for electricity generated
from “a qualified on-farm biogas recovery facility from July 1, 2001, through December 31,
2017 . . . . ”).
135
From 2007 forward, Minnesota permitted the payments directly for the gas itself,
eliminating the clearest impermissibly discriminatory provision. Id. § 216C.41 subdiv. 3(b)
(stating payments may be made for “gas generated from a qualified on-farm biogas recovery
facility from July 1, 2007, through December 31, 2017”).
136 Id. § 216B.1612 (“A tariff shall be established to optimize local, regional, and state
benefits from renewable energy development and to facilitate widespread development of
community-based renewable energy projects throughout Minnesota.”).
137 Specifically, a project must demonstrate that fifty-one percent of its gross revenues
over the life of the project are qualifying revenues. Id. § 216B.1612 subdiv. 2(h)(2).
Qualifying revenues include both “reasonable fees” paid to a variety of Minnesota entities
for services, id. § 216B.1612 subdiv. 2(d)(2), and “the value-added portion of payments for
132
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state to use its regulatory power over utilities to channel resources to certain
local energy producers that source their components and services within
Minnesota.
The politics behind the “Made in Minnesota” Solar Production Incentive
program provides another clear illustration of the critical role that
environmental and economic coalitions play in passing environmental
programs. The “Made in Minnesota” program provides $15 million per year
for ten years.138 The funding is used to provide incentive payments to
consumers who install photovoltaic or solar thermal systems that are certified
as “made in Minnesota.”139 The program, initially passed in 2013, opened in
2014. By the end of 2013, only two companies, tenKsolar and Silicon Energy,
had their products certified as “made in Minnesota.”140 A companion program,
the Made in Minnesota Solar Installations program, requires that the state use
solar panels “made in Minnesota” on state-funded projects.141
Silicon Energy and tenKsolar actively pushed for these programs. In
connection with the Made in Minnesota Solar Installations program, Silicon
Energy argued expressly that it needed the LCR to compete with cheaper
products from China.142 Legislators from the Iron Range area of Minnesota,
where Silicon Energy’s facility is located, introduced the measure.143 Although
the bill garnered praise from environmentalists,144 the bill’s sponsors urged the
goods manufactured in Minnesota,” id. § 216B.1612 subdiv. 2(d)(4). “Value-added
portion,” in turn, is defined as “the difference between the total sales price and the total cost
of components, materials, and services purchased from or provided outside of Minnesota.”
Id. § 216B.1612 subdiv. 2(i).
138 Made in Minnesota First Incentive Amounts Set for 2014, MINN. DEP’T COM. (Nov.
2013),
https://mn.gov/commerce/energy/media/Newsletters/Renewable-Energy/2013Renewable-Energy-News/November-2013/made-in-minnesota-2014.jsp
[https://perma.cc/5H3H-HW29] (describing the program as a “10-year, $15-million-a-year
Made in Minnesota Solar Incentive Program”); see also MINN STAT. § 216C.414 (“[F]or the
ten-year duration of the incentive payments.”).
139 Made in Minnesota First Incentive Amounts Set for 2014, supra note 138 (“The
incentives . . . from the Made in Minnesota Solar Incentive Program will be available to
customers of investor-owned utilities who install solar electric, or solar photovoltaic (PV),
systems using solar modules or collectors certified as manufactured in Minnesota.”).
140 Id.
141 MINN STAT. § 174.187 subdiv. 2 (stating that if the commissioner of the department of
transportation engages in a project involving real property owned or controlled by the
department, and the project “involves installation of one or more solar photovoltaic
modules, the commissioner must ensure that the solar photovoltaic modules purchased or
installed are ‘Made in Minnesota’”).
142 Pat Doyle, A Fight to Raise Truck Weights, STAR TRIB., May 25, 2013, at 1B
(“Silicon Energy of Mountain Iron said it needed the mandate to compete with cheaper
panels made elsewhere in the United States and in China.”).
143 Pat Doyle, House Passes Perk for Solar Firms, STAR TRIB., May 3, 2013, at 5B.
144 Adam James, The Three Best Things Minnesota Did for Solar in the Last Week,
(May
28,
2013,
3:31
PM),
THINKPROGRESS
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measure’s passage expressly on the grounds that it would create jobs, “a really
hard thing to do, and it’s extra hard in northeast Minnesota.”145 Not
coincidentally, the Iron Range legislators, as well as Minnesota’s Governor,
received thousands of dollars in political contributions from officials at the
solar companies and their parent corporations.146 In defending these
contributions, a vice president of Silicon Energy’s parent corporation
explained, “[w]e’re up against on onslaught of Chinese . . . solar modules. . . .
Politics is part of the solar business. That’s the reality.”147
Nor are the combination of LCRs and green tech support programs confined
to states with liberal political climates such as California and Minnesota.
Indeed, the connection to job creation and economic stimulus is even more
important in conservative-leaning states that are leery of state support for the
private sector, and may not put as a high a value on the environmental benefits
of supporting the renewable energy sector. Conservative-leaning states with
renewable energy programs containing LCRs include Louisiana and Montana,
both of which provide tax exemptions for biofuels made from in-state
products.148
Mississippi provides another reference point. In 2010, Mississippi
established the Mississippi Industry Incentive Financing Revolving Fund.149
Like Kansas’s subsidies for wind turbines, Mississippi’s program requires
recipients to commit to creating a minimum number of jobs and/or investing a
minimum amount of capital in the state.150 As discussed above, these
provisions, while possibly incompatible with the SCM Agreement, likely do
not violate the straightforward national treatment rules. More problematic,
though, is the fact that the statute directs the administering agency to give a
preference to recipients who plan to contract with Mississippi companies.151
Although the details of how the state agency applies this statutory directive
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2013/05/28/2065681/the-three-best-things-minnesota-didfor-solar-energy-in-the-last-week/ [http://perma.cc/L3WZ-EY5Z] (“The Minnesota bill isn’t
perfect, but it’s a great, replicable model for future legislation.”).
145 Doyle, supra note 143.
146 See Pat Doyle, Solar Firm Taps Political Allies, STAR TRIB., Apr. 25, 2013, at 1B
(describing political donations from executives at Silicon Energy and Newport Partners
made to Iron Range politicians and Minnesota’s Governor).
147 Id.
148
See infra appendix.
149 MISS. CODE ANN. § 57-1-221 (2015) (establishing fund to provide grants and loans to
local governments and approved businesses to encourage them “to construct or otherwise
provide facilities related to” projects approved by the Mississippi Development Authority).
150 Id. § 57-1-221(1)(a) (defining “approved business enterprise” based on size of capital
investment in the state and number of jobs created, among other things).
151 Id. § 57-1-221(6) (“It is the policy of the [Mississippi Development Authority] and
the MDA is authorized to accommodate and support any enterprise that receives a loan
under this section . . . that wishes to do business with or cause its prime contractor to do
business with Mississippi companies . . . .”).
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matter, the text of the provision suggests that the program may well violate the
GATT and/or the GATS by steering loans to recipients who purchase products
or services from Mississippi companies.152
The Mississippi program is especially notable for its size. In the program’s
first year under Republican Governor Haley Barbour, Mississippi disbursed
nearly $173 million to renewable energy manufacturers to induce them to
relocate to and build factories in Mississippi.153 Indeed, the fund has been so
successful that the state needed to pass additional appropriations to allow it to
make sizable loans to incoming renewable energy companies.154 These special
appropriations allowed for a $54 million loan to a company called Twin
Creeks Technologies in 2010, and a $75 million loan for the firm Stion.155 In
announcing Twin Creeks Technologies’ move to Mississippi, Governor
Barbour “commend[ed] [Twin Creeks Technologies] for its commitment to
doing business in the state and for creating over 500 jobs for the residents of
Mississippi.”156
***
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Oftentimes, the statutory language of the programs directs or gives the administering
agency discretion to apply the statute in a way that discriminates in violation of the national
treatment obligation. Determining whether impermissible discrimination actually occurs
would require examining the administration of the program. In some cases, such as
Massachusetts’s Commonwealth Solar II program, agency documentation is readily
available and provides evidence of a preference for local firms. In many other situations,
however, state agency documents are more difficult to obtain.
153 Michael Kanellos, Mississippi Strikes Again: Stion to Open Manufacturing Facility,
GREENTECH MEDIA (Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/mississippi
-strikes-again-stion-to-open-manufacturing-facility [http://perma.cc/U3JU-DNQQ] (“In
2010, [Mississippi] gave $44 million in loans and grants to Soladigm (electrochromic
windows), $75 million to Kior (biofuels) and $54 million to Twin Creeks Technologies
(newfangled solar.)”).
154 Michael Kanellos, Tax Holidays, Cheap Loans: Why Mississippi is Attracting
Greentech, GREENTECH MEDIA (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read
/tax-holidays-cheap-loans-why-mississippi-is-attracting-greentech [http://perma.cc/YA24XDFM] (explaining that the loans made to Twin Creek Technologies and Stion were
authorized through separate legislation and did not come from the original Mississippi
Industry Incentive Finance Fund (IIFF)).
155 Id.
156 Renewable Solar Technology Company To Locate Manufacturing Facility in
Senatobia, Miss., REALESTATERAMA (Apr. 6, 2010), http://mississippi.realestaterama.com
/2010/04/06/renewable-solar-technology-company-to-locate-manufacturing-facility-insenatobia-miss-ID086.html [http://perma.cc/TSZ7-KAZC]. Interestingly, the Senatobia
facility closed in 2012 after Twin Creeks’s assets were acquired by another company. See
Twin Creeks Technologies Leaves Mississippi, Prompting Lawsuit, SOLAR INDUSTRY MAG.
(Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.solarindustrymag.com/e107_plugins/content/content.php
?content.11658 [http://perma.cc/LK6P-4WTL].
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Renewable energy LCRs appear considerably more common at the local
level than the national level. Far from the twenty renewable energy LCRs
identified by recent studies, U.S. states alone have over forty such programs.157
They exist in nearly half of the states in the United States.158 Moreover,
investigating the origins of these LCRs suggests that their inclusion in
renewable energy support programs is often a critical component of the bill. In
assembling legislative coalitions, LCRs broaden support for renewable energy
support programs. They are thus common in practice and often politically
necessary to pass environmental measures.
Yet LCRs remain unlawful on the grounds that they are discriminatory and
therefore reduce welfare. This presents a puzzle and conundrum. The puzzle is
whether renewable energy LCRs are, on balance, welfare–increasing, or
decreasing. The conundrum for IEL is how to permit those renewable energy
LCRs that are welfare-increasing while continuing to prohibit those that are
not. The remainder of this Article tackles these two issues.
III. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LCRS
In this Part and Part IV that follows, I argue that economic discrimination,
such as that contained in LCRs, when linked to programs that provide global
public goods, is often welfare-increasing, especially when enacted by
subnational governments. I begin in Section III.A by explaining the intuition
behind this argument. Economic nondiscrimination rules aim to cause
governments to internalize the costs of distortions created by economic
discrimination. No legal rule, however, allows governments to internalize
benefits created outside the enacting jurisdiction. The familiar result is that
governments undersupply public goods. Under some conditions, allowing
discrimination through LCRs can correct this imbalance, allowing
governments to pass programs they would not otherwise be able to pass in
order to provide global public goods. Discrimination can solve a political
collective action problem by allowing governments that cannot capture the
benefit of providing public goods to externalize the costs of doing so.
Critically, discrimination is more likely to play this salutary role when local
governments are trying to provide global public goods. Such governments—
precisely because they are smaller and internalize fewer of the benefits of
providing global public goods—need greater leeway to craft such measures.
After outlining this basic argument, I develop the theory in greater detail.
Section III.B develops a theory of bargaining among lawmakers that explains
the rationale for including discriminatory conditions in legislation. This section
provides micro-foundations for the insight that discrimination against foreign
economic interests is a product of political economy dynamics. Section III.C
then explains how nondiscrimination rules increase the cost of lawmaking by
narrowing the bargaining space. This argument is, to my knowledge, novel. In
157
158

See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.A.
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Part IV, I turn to the welfare effects of nondiscrimination rules. I consider two
circumstances that together make nondiscrimination rules more likely to
reduce welfare: where local governments supply global public goods.
A.

Nondiscrimination and Collective Action Problems
1.

The Rationale for Nondiscrimination

International economic law, much like Madison’s Constitution, is meant to
constrain faction.159 Government officials enact protectionist measures—using
public authority to discriminate against foreign products, services, and
capital—because they receive private benefits in the form of political support
from the domestic constituencies that benefit from protectionism. Economists
have shown that generally, these protectionist measures reduce welfare even in
the protectionist country.160 Consumers ultimately pay higher prices for goods,
services, or access to capital than they would in a free market. In general, these
losses to domestic consumers outweigh the gains to protected domestic
interests.161 Additionally, of course, protectionism hurts foreign economic
interests that lose market access. Protectionism thus causes economic losses to
domestic consumers and foreign producers in order to benefit domestic
producers with political access.
From a political economy point of view, combating economic protectionism
is a collective action problem.162 Domestic producers tend to be well-organized
groups that are relatively small in comparison to the population of a nation.
Moreover, they internalize most of the benefit from protectionism. For
example, U.S. tariffs on steel can make American-manufactured steel more
competitive within the United States, leading to increased profits for American
steel companies and more jobs for American steel workers.163 The
concentrated benefits from protectionism provide the incentive for domestic
producers to seek protection from government officials.

159

THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (“Among the numerous advantages
promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than
its tendency to break and control the violence of faction.”).
160 See, e.g., Gary C. Hufbauer & Ben Goodrich, Steel Policy: The Good, the Bad, and
the Ugly, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY 24, 25
(Philip King et al. eds., 4th ed. 2005) (estimating that the 2002 U.S. steel tariffs cost
$400,000 annually per steel job saved and resulted in net job losses within the United
States).
161 See id. (“On balance, US steel policy in 2001 and 2002 has not been nearly as helpful
to the US steel industry as partisans hoped.”).
162 See MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 2 (1965) (explaining that absent incentives, large groups will fail to
pursue their common or group objectives because of each member’s personal interests).
163 See Hufbauer & Goodrich, supra note 160, at 27 (explaining that the Section 201
tariffs helped increase steel prices).
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The costs of protectionism, on the other hand, are diffuse. Individual
consumers pay only a small amount extra for the products, services, or capital
they acquire. Therefore, they have little incentive to organize to oppose
protectionist measures by their governments.164 Foreign producers hurt by the
loss of market access may feel concentrated costs. By virtue of being
foreigners though, they lack direct political recourse within the protected
market. Consequently, no group within the protectionist jurisdiction has
sufficient incentive to organize and lobby for liberalization.
International trade law corrects for this collective action problem through
reciprocity.165 A state agrees to, for example, reduce its tariffs (or other barriers
to trade) in one sector of its economy, in exchange for similar reductions in
another country’s trade barriers. International economic law, and especially
trade law, thus gives exporters an incentive to urge their own government to
drop barriers to imports. Eliminating those barriers benefits exporters through
the reciprocal reductions in trade barriers in other countries. Nondiscrimination
rules reinforce this reciprocal structure by ensuring that exporters have an
incentive to police their governments’ import policies even after a trade
agreement has been completed. A finding by the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body that a state has violated its obligations can result in the suspension of
reciprocal concessions.166
In this sense, nondiscrimination rules aim to respect the internalization
principle, which provides that governmental authority should be assigned to
the smallest level of government that fully internalizes the effects of its
164 Of course, if the costs are concentrated—as with a single large consumer of a
product—there will be countervailing pressures to reduce barriers to trade.
165 Investment law has not historically operated through this kind of reciprocity
mechanism. BITs in particular have tended to be between capital-exporting countries and
capital-importing countries, rather than between two or more capital exporting countries.
The rationale for BITs was that allowing foreign investors market access was good for
development in capital-importing countries and good for returns in capital-exporting
countries. THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES AND INVESTMENT FLOWS, at xli (Karl P.
Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009) (explaining the increased usage of BITs “as capital
exports seek to benefit from investor protections and capital importers hope to benefit
through increased [foreign direct investment] flows”). As preferential trade agreements that
include investment chapters spread among developed, capital-exporting nations, however,
investment is increasingly subject to the same reciprocal logic as trade.
166 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 22,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (providing for compensation or suspension of concessions in the event a
state fails to fix a measure found to violate trade rules). In the investment context, costs for
violations are created more directly. Although investment disputes between states are
possible, most investment disputes are between private investors and states. The arbitrations
that arise out of these disputes can result in direct financial liability for non-compliant
governments. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 53, art. 1110 (providing for compensation in the
event of nationalization or expropriation of another party’s investment).
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exercise.167 Because discriminatory trade policies have international costs,
international solutions are necessary to ensure that government officials
internalize both the costs and the benefits of their actions. By generating
support for trade liberalization and solving the political action problem, these
solutions facilitate better decision making by individual governments. Shifting
governance of trade policy to the international plane thus increases welfare.
This political logic of nondiscrimination in trade has been enormously
successful. Global tariff rates have plummeted since the creation of the
GATT.168 The World Bank estimates that the average global applied tariff rate
has fallen from 26.3% in 1986 to 8.1% in 2010.169
2.

Nondiscrimination and Public Goods

Unfortunately, while nondiscrimination rules cause government officials to
internalize the costs of trade-distortions and the benefits of liberalizing trade,
they do not allow the same government officials to capture the costs and
benefits of measures that create other kinds of benefits in foreign jurisdictions,
such as mitigating climate change. Neither trade law nor investment law
creates an incentive for domestic groups to lobby officials to provide global
public goods, such as transitions to green energy. Indeed, IEL rules reduce the
ability of governments to solve collective action problems related to the
provision of non-trade global public goods.
The most straightforward example of this difficulty is renewable energy
support programs, such as the one at issue in Canada—Renewable Energy and
those described in the Appendix to this Article. When a government enacts a
renewable energy program, the program creates benefits that extend beyond
the enacting jurisdiction. Reductions in greenhouse gas emissions benefit all
countries that suffer from climate change. These diffuse benefits, however, do
not necessarily translate into political benefits for the government officials
supporting the measure. For the same reason that domestic consumers lack an
incentive to lobby for reduced trade barriers even though these barriers are
costly to them in the aggregate, they also lack a strong incentive to lobby for
environmental measures even though these measures are beneficial to them in
the aggregate. Just as with foreign exporters, the foreign interests that also
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See COOTER, supra note 21.
ANDREW T. GUZMAN & JOOST H.B. PAUWELYN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 3-4 (2d
ed. 2012) (stating that there have been “dramatic reductions in tariff rates between the
establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 and 1980”).
169 Francis K. T. Ng, Trends in Average MFN Applied Tariff Rates in Developing and
Industrial
Countries,
1981-2010,
WORLD
BANK
(Dec.
2011),
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentM
DK:21051044~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html
[http://perma.cc/Y8D9-QLAP] (presenting most favored nation applied tariff rates from
1981 to 2010 for individual countries and groups of countries).
168
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benefit from the environmental measures are unrepresented in the political
process.
In the case of trade discrimination, the WTO provides concentrated benefits
to domestic exporters—in the form of reciprocal trade concessions made in
negotiations and enforced through the WTO dispute process—in order to
overcome the collective action problem. Shifting governance upwards thus
addresses the collective action problem for trade discrimination. Where
environmental measures are concerned, however, shifting governance upwards
does not create a countervailing concentrated benefit. Indeed, as the scale of
governance becomes larger, the global public goods problem may become
more severe; the benefits from providing the public good are diffuse and are
spread among an ever-increasing number of nations. Bargaining among these
nations involves significantly larger transaction costs than bargaining among
smaller groups. Indeed, the transaction costs of governing in large institutions
has caused many international negotiations to grind to a halt.170 Within the
WTO, the Doha Round of negotiations has stalled and seems unlikely to
produce any major agreement.171 Trade negotiations have thus sought a smaller
scale through regional and bilateral negotiations.172 Climate change
negotiations, too, have puttered along for years without making meaningful
progress.173 The little progress that has been made often occurred in fora with
either smaller membership—such as an agreement on limiting emissions from
ships in the MARPOL Convention—or narrower issue jurisdiction—such as
the Montreal Protocol.174 Although the significant transaction costs associated
with a larger governance scale are present in both the trade and environmental
contexts, only in the case of trade discrimination are these costs offset by the
WTO’s enforcement of reciprocal trade concessions, allowing the international
scale of governance to overcome the collective action problem.
Permitting discrimination is a second-best way to solve the collective action
problem plaguing global public goods. Discriminatory measures, like LCRs, in
170

See Ben Otto, Hard-Won Deal Points to WTO’s Struggle, WALL STREET J., Dec. 9,
2013, at A12 (“[T]alks under the WTO, established in 1995, have been bogged down in
disputes among a larger number of participants . . . .”).
171 See Editorial, Modi’s Trade Barricade, WALL STREET J., Aug. 4, 2014, at A12
(“[India’s veto of a trade facilitation agreement] is also a disaster for the WTO, which
needed the accord to revive the stalled Doha Round of talks, underway since 2001.”).
172 Otto, supra note 170.
173 Nations seem poised to reach agreement in December 2015 at the Paris Conference of
the Parties of the UNFCCC. However, climate experts continue to express skepticism that
the terms under discussion will make sufficient progress to avert the worst damage from
climate change. Rebecca Morelle, Paris Climate Summit: UN Negotiations ‘Need
Redesign’, BBC (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-34489266
[http://perma.cc/AY3A-UGE4] (“The UN climate negotiations are heading for failure and
need a major redesign if they are to succeed, scientists say.”).
174 See Timothy Meyer, From Contract to Legislation: The Logic of Modern
International Lawmaking, 14 CHI. J. INT’L L. 559, 586-87, 600-01 (2014).
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environmental support programs create a domestic constituency that receives
concentrated benefits from supporting the program. Of course, such
discrimination may not be welfare-increasing. In any given context,
demonstrating the welfare effects of discrimination would require weighing the
trade losses from discrimination against the long-term benefits from the public
goods. Policymakers and international adjudicators thus need to consider how
to distinguish welfare-increasing discrimination from non-welfare-increasing
discrimination—a task I turn to in Part V.
In general, though, LCRs are more likely beneficial at smaller levels of
government. As a jurisdiction gets smaller, it internalizes fewer of the benefits
from producing global public goods. It is therefore unlikely to adopt global
public goods programs absent a countervailing benefit. National governments,
by contrast, internalize more of the benefits from tackling global public goods
and have more issues around which they can construct coalitions to enact laws.
Therefore, as a political matter, LCRs are much less likely to be necessary to
pass global public goods programs at the national level, while they are more
likely essential at the local level.
Moreover, facilitating local measures aimed at tackling global public goods
is critical. International institutions have, as noted above, slowed dramatically
in their responsiveness to global problems. The transaction costs of negotiating
among so many countries with such diverse interests increasingly pushes
governance into smaller fora. Therefore, the provision of global public goods
by local governments is an important part of strategies to provide global public
goods.175
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Although I focus on renewable energy in this Article, other kinds of global public
goods might profitably be addressed by local government action that requires discrimination
as a matter of political economy. Examples might include public health programs—linking a
public health measure to an economically discriminatory measure might provide the spur
needed to pass proactive measures addressing public health crises.
Compulsory licensing schemes in developing countries offer one such example.
“Compulsory licensing empowers a government to compel a patent-holder to license his or
her rights to generic manufacturers in exchange for monetary compensation.” Naomi A.
Bass, Implications of the TRIPs Agreement for Developing Countries: Pharmaceutical
Patent Laws in Brazil and South Africa in the 21st Century, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV.
191, 198 (2002). Compulsory licensing schemes are typically justified on the grounds that
developing countries cannot afford retail prices for pharmaceuticals that they need to
address public health crises. See id. at 198-200. Compulsory licensing schemes represent a
handout to the local economic interests that receive the license to produce the generic drug.
These schemes thus represent a measure that links the provision of a public good—stopping
the spread of a disease—to a discriminatory economic action—transferring intellectual
property rights from foreign owners to local licensees.
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Economic Discrimination Facilitates Lawmaking

In this section and the next, I unpack the argument set out above by
explaining how discrimination lubricates coalition building among lawmakers
and, therefore, how nondiscrimination rules make lawmaking costlier.
Lawmakers typically require support from multiple actors in order to enact a
measure. This dynamic is easiest to see in legislatures, in which a majority or
supermajority of legislators must support a bill in order for it to pass. Because
many individual measures would not command the requisite legislative
support, legislators build coalitions by packaging multiple measures together
into a single bill or by trading votes across separate bills. These practices are
known as logrolling or vote-trading. The possibility of trading support across
multiple issues is often thought of as one of the key advantages (and
sometimes disadvantages) of legislative lawmaking.176 As I explain below,
protectionist policies are especially attractive to lawmakers engaged in
logrolling. Although I focus on a model of legislative bargaining, regulators
and members of administrative agencies, international organizations, and
political parties frequently have to bargain with each other to enact their
priorities. The basic insights of the model I present would apply to any
situation in which lawmakers or regulators have to bargain with each other
over competing priorities.
To begin, consider a simple model of bargaining among lawmakers. I
assume that legislators are rational and utility-maximizing. They vote for any
measure that improves their chances of reelection. A legislator’s odds of being
reelected are presumably improved by measures that provide their constituents
with an incentive to reward the legislator with financial or political support.
Measures that increase the economic welfare of a legislator’s constituents meet
this condition. For example, a legislator may vote for a renewable energy
subsidy because the subsidy goes to a company in her district. Legislators may
also become better off by enacting a non-economic measure for which their
constituents have a preference—e.g., a legislator might vote for the same
subsidy, absent any economic benefit, because her constituents support green
energy programs on environmental grounds. In either case, inducing the
politician to support the bill requires that the benefits be sufficient enough to
encourage a constituency to mobilize in support of the politician.
In deciding whether to support a bill, each legislator weighs these economic
and non-economic benefits—or, more accurately, the political support
resulting from these benefits—against her district’s share of the costs of the
program. Obviously, programs that call for direct expenditures by the
government create a tax burden that is distributed among constituents. Other
kinds of measures may also create costs for constituents by raising prices for
consumers. For example, RPSs—which require electricity generators to
produce a certain amount of their energy from renewable sources—may
176 Cf. COOTER, supra note 21, at 52-53 (“Although external effects prevent markets for
votes from approximating perfect competition, bargaining can still achieve efficiency.”).
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increase energy costs for consumers.177 Similarly, trade barriers, like the 2002
steel tariffs, increase the cost of goods for consumers.178 I assume legislators
take both these direct costs (taxation) and indirect costs (price increases) into
account.179
In order to pass, I assume a measure must command majority support in the
legislature.180 Many measures will not, however, deliver net benefits for a
majority of legislators.181 Consider a subsidy program, such as Louisiana’s tax
exemption for the sale or consumption of Louisiana-produced “gasohol,” a
motor fuel that contains at least ten percent alcohol.182 The tax exemption
benefits legislators representing districts in which gasohol is sold or consumed.
It also benefits legislators representing districts that favor the development of
alternative fuels on environmental grounds. But it comes at a cost in terms of
reducing tax revenue. By eliminating tax revenue from gasohol, legislators
either must raise taxes elsewhere (holding expenditures constant) or reduce
expenditures elsewhere. Either decision imposes costs on some legislators in
the form of an increased tax burden elsewhere or the reduction in funding for

177

ROBERT BRYCE, The High Cost of Renewable-Electricity Mandates, 10 ENERGY POL’Y
& ENV’T REP. 1, 1-2 (2012) (explaining how renewable portfolio standards can raise
electricity rates for consumers).
178 See Hufbauer & Goodrich, supra note 160, at 27 (“[T]hanks in part to the Section 201
tariffs, steel prices are up, which is good for steel producers but bad for steel consumers.”).
179 The extent to which legislators and voters actually do take indirect costs into account
is unclear. One explanation of protectionism is that consumers, and therefore government
officials, do not consider protectionist measures that raise prices as equivalent to
protectionist measures that raise taxes. See Arthur Dunkel & Frieder Roessler, The Ranking
of Trade Policy Instruments Under the GATT Legal System, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW,
supra note 168, at 224-25. Assuming that politicians do not take into account indirect costs
caused by protectionist policies would, however, make protectionism even cheaper,
reinforcing the conclusion that protectionist policies are ideal for building coalitions.
180 In fact, passing a measure may require supermajority support, even in situations in
which passage only formally requires a majority. Procedural rules such as cloture may
require supermajority votes even if passage technically requires only a simple majority. The
addition of veto points, such as committees, may also effectively increase the burden of
passing a measure. Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Political Preferences for the
Pork Barrel: A Generalization, 25 AM. J. POL. SCI. 96, 97-98 (1981) (“The more widely
distributed these relative vetoes are, the more inclusive the final winning coalition must
be.”).
181 Research in political science has demonstrated that pork projects rarely proceed with
a simple minimum winning coalition. See id. at 96. Shepsle and Weingast argue that the
reason for this is reciprocity—legislators face long-term consequences from imposing costs
on losing legislators in pork projects, and thus work to avoid creating chronic losers in the
pork process. Id. at 109 (reasoning that legislators will support pork projects due to
uncertainty over the composition of winning coalitions).
182 LA. STAT. ANN. § 47:305.28 (2015) (creating a tax exemption for the sale, use,
consumption distribution, and storage of gasohol).
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some programs. If these costs outweigh the benefits for a majority of
legislators, then the gasohol tax exemption will not pass.183
A legislator proposing a measure such as the gasohol tax exemption thus has
to put together a coalition of legislators to support her measure. In particular,
the legislator has to change the balance of costs and benefits for enough
legislators such that a majority is willing to vote for the measure.
The legislator does this through logrolling or vote-trading across measures.
She attempts to assemble a bill that includes measures that increase the
benefits other legislators will receive from voting in favor. Legislators now
must evaluate their overall benefits from the bill, including the costs and
benefits of each included program. Imagine, for example, that our legislator
links her gasohol tax exemption to pork infrastructure projects in districts of
key members. The benefits from those infrastructure projects outweigh the
costs of the gasohol tax exemption, prompting the targeted members to support
the omnibus bill.
Critically, however, increasing the benefits to other legislators also typically
involves increasing the costs of the total bill to the original sponsor. For
example, a bridge project requires the expenditure of additional government
funds that either have to be raised through taxes or cut from other programs.
Our original sponsor sees her utility from passing the gasohol tax exemption
decline by the increased tax burden on her district as a result of the bridge
project. Logrolling thus involves redistributing the benefits created by a
measure from its sponsors to other legislators in order to attract support for the
measure’s passage.
As a consequence, our rational, welfare-maximizing legislator should begin
by adding additional measures to her bill that are the cheapest to include. By
keeping the costs of additional measures down, she maximizes her benefits.
Our legislator’s strategy is to build a coalition to pass her measure at the lowest
possible cost to herself.
Discriminatory protectionist measures, such as LCRs, are ideal instruments
for cheap coalition building. Because I assume legislators are primarily
motivated by their interest in being re-elected, they consider only their
individual costs and benefits. As a result, they do not take into account the
costs and benefits of the measure to constituencies outside their jurisdiction.
Consequently, the cross-border effects of a measure are not considered in the
legislative process (absent some corrective, such as liability imposed under
trade law, which I turn to below).
Discriminatory protectionist measures shift the bulk of their costs outside of
the relevant jurisdiction, while delivering benefits to some constituency within

183 For certain kinds of taxes, one might imagine that the benefits are evenly distributed
throughout the districts, while the costs are concentrated in particular districts. For example,
a tax break such as the one for gasohol might benefit gasohol distributers in a large number
of districts and be offset by cuts to programs in only a few districts. In these types of cases,
the measure would pass relatively easily.
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the legislature’s jurisdiction. Such a measure would thus allow our legislator to
build support for her measure without significantly increasing the costs of the
overall bill to its backers. For example, in enacting a “made in Minnesota”
requirement for solar panels, the Minnesota legislature imposed costs on
Chinese solar panel manufacturers that lost market share in Minnesota. At the
same time, the measure delivered psychic benefits to Minnesota residents who
want their state to support green energy and may have contributed to job
creation in Minnesota. Minnesota lawmakers do not care about the economic
costs borne by Chinese manufacturers. Likewise, they do not care about the
benefits in terms of job creation in California, where one of the companies
benefitting from the “Made in Minnesota” program is headquartered.184 Nor do
they consider the benefits from reducing greenhouse gas emissions, except to
the extent that their constituents in Minnesota consider them in awarding
political support.
Compare, for instance, the costs to our legislator of adding the bridge
program in another district versus adding a discriminatory measure such as an
LCR. The bridge program produces a direct cost to our legislator. Constructing
a bridge requires direct expenditures by the government, which increases the
tax burden on our legislator’s constituents. By contrast, foreign producers
absorb much of the cost of a discriminatory measure such as an LCR. Of
course, domestic consumers pay a cost as well, in terms of increased prices.
But the domestic share of the total cost of the LCR will be less as a percentage
than its percentage share of the total cost of the bridge project. Moreover,
constituents may in fact be less aware of these indirect costs, further lowering
the cost of discriminatory measures to our legislator.185
To give a more concrete example, consider again Louisiana’s gasohol
exemption, which only applies if the alcohol used in the blend “has been
produced, fermented, and distilled in Louisiana.”186 Coupling the tax
exemption for gasohol, which benefits gasohol producers, with the LCR, which
benefits Louisiana brewers, appeals to legislators with constituents who benefit
from either provision. At the same time, the LCR has lower costs for Louisiana
legislators than would a simple pork measure funded directly from the state
fisc. In order to claim the tax exemption, gasohol producers must buy their
alcohol from local brewers. As a result, they are likely to pay higher prices
because they cannot go out and purchase the cheapest or best product available
to them. This price increase, in turn, may be passed on to consumers of
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Doyle, supra note 146.
See GUZMAN & PAUWELYN, supra note 168, at 224 (“It can reasonably be assumed
that the domestic political resistance to protection depends on how clearly the costs of
protection are perceived.”).
186 LA. STAT. ANN. § 47:305.28 (2015).
185
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gasohol. Gasohol producers and consumers thus pay more than they would
with a tax exemption that did not include the LCR.187
The real losers, however, are alcohol producers outside of Louisiana.188 The
tax exemption and LCR operate to make their alcohol more expensive for
Louisiana gasohol producers to use. These alcohol producers may lose sales
and market share. In effect, the protectionist measure adjusts costs in a way
that alters the competitive environment for alcohol, giving an edge to locallyproduced alcohol. As discussed in Part I, this kind of measure is a
straightforward violation of the national treatment obligation contained in the
WTO agreements and investment treaties. Nevertheless, it is attractive to
legislators because it allows them to shift some of the costs of legislative
coalition-building on to foreign jurisdictions.
The result is a thumb on the legislative scale in favor of using measures that
discriminate against foreign producers as a tool to build legislative coalitions.
Economic discrimination against foreigners lubricates domestic lawmaking.
International trade lawyers and scholars have long noted that economic
protectionism is a practice nations engage in precisely because some of its
costs are thrust onto foreign actors unrepresented in the domestic political
process.189 The model presented above provides micro-foundations for this
insight, explaining economic discrimination as a function of lawmaking
processes. This explanation also provides an additional reason to expect
lawmakers to deploy protectionist measures. They do so not only to protect
some domestic constituency, but because from their perspective,
discrimination is especially efficient at generating coalitions to pass a package
of measures.

187

Consumers of gasohol may also pay more than they would in the absence of the tax
exemption entirely. If the market allows gasohol producers to pass the added cost of the
LCR along to consumers, the producers will do so. Moreover, if the tax exemption does not
reduce the market price of gasohol—perhaps because local gasohol competes with imported
fuels—then consumers will see no cost reduction from the production subsidy and may in
fact see a cost increase.
188 Of course, U.S. producers located outside of Louisiana face the same protectionist
dynamic as non-U.S. producers. U.S. producers outside of Louisiana could conceivably
challenge such a local content measure under the Dormant Commerce Clause. See Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997) (“The negative or dormant implication of
the Commerce Clause prohibits state taxation . . . or regulation . . . that discriminates against
or unduly burdens interstate commerce and thereby impedes free private trade in the
national marketplace.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
189 See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution,
114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 574-75 (2000) (discussing how interest groups may try to capture
the legislative process as a way to impose measures that are costly for foreign producers but
not domestic producers).

1980
C.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1937

Nondiscrimination Rules Increase the Costs of Lawmaking

If discriminatory protectionist measures lubricate lawmaking, rules limiting
economic discrimination must increase the cost of lawmaking. More
specifically, nondiscrimination rules—such as IEL’s national treatment
obligation—increase the costs of logrolling by creating international
responsibility for using cheap discriminatory measures to build legislative
coalitions.
To see how nondiscrimination rules increase the cost of lawmaking,
consider the model of legislative bargaining described above. The sponsor of a
measure, such as a renewable energy subsidy, will try to generate support for
her measure by including additional measures up until the point at which the
marginal cost of the additional measure outweighs the marginal benefit in
terms of passing the sponsor’s preferred measure. The marginal cost of
including an additional measure might be greater than the marginal benefit for
at least two reasons. First, it could be that the measure will pass without
additional support.190 In such a situation, the members of the winning coalition
may see little benefit to including an additional costly measure. Second, it
could be that the costs of the additional measure make the package bill a net
loss for the measure’s initial supporters. For example, if passing a renewable
energy subsidy requires the measure’s backers to agree to a significant tax
increase that could reduce their reelection prospects, the subsidy’s supporters
may decide simply to drop the subsidy proposal.
It follows that rules increasing the cost of otherwise cheap methods of
building coalitions will mean that some bills no longer create enough welfare
for legislators to support the bill’s passage. Another simple example illustrates
the point. Imagine our legislator wishes to couple her renewable energy
subsidy program with another measure in order to ensure its passage. Imagine
she only has two options: a tax increase or an LCR. To use concrete numbers,
imagine that the legislator believes passing the renewable energy subsidy
program is worth a 5% increase in her likelihood of being reelected. Support
for the tax increase is worth a 7% decrease in her likelihood of reelection,
while the LCR on balance does not affect her chances of reelection. In this
scenario, our legislator will drop her subsidy proposal rather than couple it
with the tax increase because a combined bill would reduce her reelection

190 In the political science literature on legislatures, this once led to the prediction that
legislators will seek to form minimum winning coalitions. See Barry R. Weingast, A
Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 245 (1979)
(“Theoretical work by several authors suggests that a minimum winning coalition (MWC)
will determine the decisions of a legislature making distributive policy.”). Empirically,
however, legislators often try for consensus in passing pork projects despite the additional
costs of doing so. Id. The explanation for this seeming anomaly is that legislators are repeat
players; they include as many other legislators as possible in the winning coalition to
minimize the chances of being personally excluded in the future. Id. at 245-50 (arguing that
legislators seeking reelection will prefer a system of universalism for pork legislation).

2015]

LOCAL DISCRIMINATION; GLOBAL GOODS

1981

prospects by 2%. The subsidy proposal thus passes only if coupled with the
LCR. Therefore, if the LCR is not an available option due to nondiscrimination
rules, then the subsidy measure will not pass.
One can refer to the universe of possible issues around which legislators
might negotiate as the legislative bargaining space. In the example above, the
bargaining space consists only of the tax increase and the LCR. In real life, of
course, a lawmaking body will have a significantly larger bargaining space;
one that includes a larger number of issues from which legislators might try to
craft a package of measures that creates enough welfare to command majority
support. A number of factors can affect the size of the legislative bargaining
space. Perhaps most obviously, legislatures with larger budgets at their
disposal have greater bargaining space. In jurisdictions with smaller budgets,
legislators may be under greater pressure to make dollars “work twice”—once
as a subsidy to the renewable energy providers and once as a subsidy to the
local content provider. In jurisdictions with larger budgets, such financial
constraints will be less severe.191
Lawmaking bodies with virtually plenary issue jurisdiction, such as the U.S.
Congress, will also have considerably greater bargaining space than
lawmaking bodies with narrower issue jurisdiction, such as commissions or
boards governing utilities regulation. Likewise, the geographic size of a
jurisdiction can influence the scope of a lawmaking body’s bargaining space.
For example, the U.S. Congress has considerably more issues at its disposal
than does the Connecticut State Legislature.
Nondiscrimination rules narrow the bargaining space by removing
discriminatory measures from the list of possible measures available to
legislators, or, more accurately, they increase the cost of such measures by
creating international responsibility for violating the nondiscrimination rules.
Practically speaking, they do so by creating a series of pressures and costs for
legislators that enact discriminatory measures. Legislators may face pressure
from international organizations, foreign governments, their own foreign
ministries, their own national governments (in the case of subnational
governments) and even tribunals and courts, to remove unlawful
discriminatory measures. Following Canada—Renewable Energy, for example,
Canada responded to the adverse WTO ruling and the possibility of sanctions

191 The GATT explicitly permits domestic production subsidies. See GATT, supra note
22, art. III:8(b) (“The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the payment of subsidies
exclusively to domestic producers . . . .”). Providing the local content provider with a
production subsidy, rather than embedding the subsidy in a discriminatory LCR, would thus
not run afoul of the national treatment rule. As a matter of political economy, wealthy
jurisdictions may thus have little problem dispensing with LCRs and providing direct
production subsidies. Resource constrained states, on the other hand, will face greater
political pressure to make scarce dollars generate as much political support as possible—a
task for which LCRs are well-suited.
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by having Ontario change its subsidy program to remove the unlawful
condition.192
The takeaway point is that because discriminatory measures are cheap ways
to build coalitions, increasing the costs of discriminatory measures can
decrease the size of the legislative bargaining space, forcing legislators to build
coalitions with more expensive measures. As the hypothetical example above
with a two-issue bargaining space demonstrates, in some instances, reducing
the bargaining space may mean that a measure cannot pass at all. Of course,
IEL’s nondiscrimination rules are justified precisely because they cause
governments to internalize the costs their actions impose on foreign economic
interests. As I explain in Part IV, however, where local governments produce
global public goods, the aggregate welfare effects of internalization are less
clear.
IV. NONDISCRIMINATION AND THE LOCAL PRODUCTION OF
GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS
In this Part, I advance two hypotheses. First, discriminatory provisions are
more likely at the local level of government and, therefore, nondiscrimination
rules will constrain local lawmaking more than national lawmaking. Second,
nondiscrimination rules can have negative welfare effects when local
governments attempt to supply global public goods. In general,
nondiscrimination rules are welfare-increasing when applied to any level of
government because they properly align a government’s private benefits with
the public costs of its actions. The adverse impact of nondiscrimination rules
on lawmaking is only problematic when it prevents the passage of public
goods measures—laws that create benefits outside the enacting jurisdiction.
Nondiscrimination rules, however, are more likely to have this negative effect
at the local level.
A.

Nondiscrimination Constrains Local Lawmaking More than National
Lawmaking

Nondiscrimination rules constrain lawmaking in accordance with two
variables. First, nondiscrimination rules become more constraining as a
lawmaking body’s bargaining space narrows. Second, nondiscrimination rules
hamper lawmaking more when fewer interest groups are present. Local
government has both a smaller bargaining space and fewer interest groups than
national government. Hence, nondiscrimination rules constrain local
lawmaking more than national lawmaking. I unpack these arguments below.
192 Communication from Canada, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable
Energy Generation Sector, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/19, WT/DS426/19 (June 6, 2014)
(informing the delegations of Japan and the European Union, as well as the WTO’s Dispute
Settlement Body, that “the Government of Ontario has complied with the recommendations
and rulings of the [Dispute Settlement Body] . . . by: [n]o longer subjecting large renewable
electricity procurements to domestic content requirements”).
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To begin, nondiscrimination rules will inhibit lawmaking to a greater extent
when the lawmaking body’s bargaining space is narrow. In such jurisdictions,
there are simply not as many cheap measures available to construct a coalition.
As a lawmaking body’s bargaining space narrows, all else equal, the
lawmaking body will rely increasingly on discrimination as a means of
constructing coalitions. Removing discriminatory measures as a tool for
coalition-building will thus have a much greater impact on the probability of
assembling a package of measures that can pass. In larger jurisdictions, by
contrast, the presence of more issues increases the possibility of assembling a
coalition even if some measures are ruled legally out of bounds. Put
differently, the marginal burden on bargaining of eliminating a class of
measures over which lawmakers can negotiate is greater when the issues that
remain are fewer.
This effect is easiest to see by looking at fiscal matters. All else equal,
jurisdictions with smaller budgets will not be able to enact as many measures
with budgetary impacts as jurisdictions with larger budgets. Consequently,
pork spending may not be as readily available to construct lawmaking
coalitions in smaller jurisdictions. In terms of the model developed in Part III,
a smaller jurisdiction may not have the resources for a bridge project necessary
to woo a reluctant lawmaker. Removing the cheaper means of coalition
building—protectionism at the expense of foreign producers—is thus more
likely to prevent a coalition from forming.
The same effect follows from narrowing the scope of issues under a
lawmaking body’s jurisdiction. Local governments have both smaller territorial
jurisdiction and, often, narrower issue jurisdiction. Scholars have long
recognized that expanding the issue jurisdiction of an institution can lubricate
bargaining by expanding the possible issue linkages.193 My hypothesis extends
this argument. If expanding the jurisdiction of a lawmaking body lubricates
bargaining, shrinking it should, at least in some circumstances, inhibit
lawmaking. Nondiscrimination rules are more constraining at the local level
because they further narrow an already small set of issues around which
lawmakers can bargain.
While they have smaller bargaining spaces, local governments also tend to
have fewer interest groups contesting prospective legislation. The transaction
costs of lawmaking also rise with the number of interest groups present. Thus,
fewer interest groups means lower transaction costs to lawmaking at the local

193

See JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: GLOBAL
GOVERNMENT 154 (2013) (“Broadening bargaining [in the international system] through
linkage should expand the range of potential agreements.”); Barbara Koremenos, Charles
Lipson & Duncan Snidal, The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG.
761, 785-87 (2001) (“As the number of actors increases, however, the heterogeneity within
the group will typically also increase.”); Paul Poast, Does Issue Linkage Work? Evidence
from European Alliance Negotiations, 1860 to 1945, 66 INT’L ORG. 277, 282-83 (2012)
(“[A]dding issues creates more opportunities for each actor to experience some gain.”).
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level, while national governments will tend to have more interest groups and
hence higher transaction costs.
The presence of fewer interest groups reduces transaction costs in three
similar ways. First, fewer interest groups reduces the cost of prevailing in
legislative contests by reducing the number of possible opponents to
prospective measures, or by simply reducing the number of other groups
clamoring for lawmakers’ attention. As described in Section III.A above,
discriminatory conditions mobilize legislative support for a measure by
providing a benefit to a domestic constituency. This mobilization is more
effective at generating lawmaking activity in the absence of multiple
countervailing groups. For example, renewable energy subsidy programs that
contain LCRs create a coalition between environmentalists and local
companies and workers that benefit from the LCR. In a state such as
Minnesota, this coalition may be enough to overcome lawmakers’ opposition
to “handouts” to political donors.194 Move the same contest to the national
level, however, and another raft of interest groups not present in Minnesota
politics—such as coal and oil producers—may decide to oppose federal
subsidization of competing energy sources.
Second, building legislative coalitions is subject to cycling, in which
priorities are amended, added, or removed in response to counter-proposals
from other groups. Cycling is a major transaction cost of democratic
governance.195 Laws become more difficult and time-consuming to enact
because legislative coalitions are unstable. The transaction costs of cycling will
be higher at larger levels of government; more interest groups involved mean
that more groups are trying to break apart existing legislative coalitions so as to
redistribute the legislative benefits to themselves.
Third, increasing the scope of governance may increase the number of veto
points, making it more likely that the multitude of interest groups will capture
at least one veto point. The existence of veto points can be a function of legal
rules. For example, the UNFCCC operates by consensus, formally giving all
states a veto over the adoption of any particular measure. It can also be the
function of norms and rules of an institution. The U.S. Senate allows individual
senators extraordinary leeway to hold up the progress of legislation.196 The
system of committee chairs and the possibility of overlapping jurisdiction
194
See Doyle, supra note 146, at 1B (“Other[] [legislators] object to special treatment
they say could shortchange taxpayers. ‘If government is going to be investing in solar, they
should be . . . finding what’s the best value,’ said Rep. Pat Garofalo, R-Farmington, urging
the state to invite competitive bidding from any manufacturer.”).
195 Neil Siegel, Intransitivities Protect Minorities: Interpreting Madison’s Theory of the
Extended Republic (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California,
Berkeley) (on file with UMI/ProQuest Dissertations and Theses) (“[G]overning coalitions
are subject to the threat of intransitive cycling.”).
196 See Dan T. Coenen, The Originalist Case Against Congressional Supermajority
Voting Rules, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1091, 1096 (2012) (describing U.S. Senate filibuster
procedures and how they effectively create a supermajority voting rule).
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among committees—features that are more likely to exist at larger levels of
government—can also introduce multiple veto points in the legislation.197 The
point is that as the number of veto points grows, the transaction costs of
passing legislation grow as well. To stop a bill one merely needs to capture one
of the veto players. Building a successful coalition, by contrast, requires
securing the acquiescence of all veto players. In smaller levels of government
where fewer interest groups are present, it is less likely that there will be
multiple veto points and less likely that interest groups will capture the veto
points. Consequently, the transaction costs will be lower.
All else equal, adding a motivated interest group through the use of a
discriminatory condition will be more effective when that group has fewer
additional interest groups to compete with. At the same time, the issue linkages
created by discriminatory conditions—politically linking the protected local
interest with the interest of those backing the initial measure—are more
important to the lawmaking process because fewer issue linkages are available.
On the other hand, as the scale of governance grows, discriminatory conditions
are both less necessary to the passage of legislation—because the bargaining
space is larger—and less effective because there are so many more players.
Thus, IEL’s nondiscrimination rules are a greater burden on lawmaking at the
local level because discrimination is a more effective tactic for coalition
building there.
The relative efficacy of economic discrimination as a lawmaking tool at
local levels suggests two further points. First, one might predict that we would
observe discriminatory conditions more frequently at local levels of
government or in smaller jurisdictions, as compared with national governments
or larger jurisdictions.198 The evidence presented in Part III along with findings
of national renewable energy LCRs, supports this thesis. As discussed above,
recent studies have identified only around twenty renewable energy LCRs at
the nation-state level in the world, of which only a handful are U.S. federal
measures.199 On the other hand, I identify forty-four at the state level alone
within the United States.200 Thus, there appears to be a relatively strong
197

See Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of
Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85, 88-89 (1987) (“[V]eto groups are pervasive in
legislatures; committees are but one example.”).
198
Such a proposition should, in principle, be empirically testable. In future work I hope
to test this hypothesis, as well as the more general claim that nondiscrimination rules inhibit
lawmaking. One might, for example, compare the rates of economic discrimination in laws
across jurisdictions of varying GDPs. In such a test, one would focus on size as measured by
GDP, rather than the level of government. For example, though it is a subnational
government, California is more properly compared to larger European nations than it is to
small U.S. states such as Connecticut. Alternatively, one might collect data on the rates of
discriminatory conditions at the national and subnational level in other federal systems, such
as Brazil or India.
199 STEPHENSON, supra note 19, at 3; Lewis, supra note 19, at 14.
200 See supra Section II.A.
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correlation between the smaller scales of government and the use of LCRs in
renewable energy support programs. While one cannot draw strong causal
inferences from this correlation, it at least suggests that LCRs are in fact more
important for legislative coalition building at the state level than at the federal
level within the United States.
Second, nondiscrimination rules have much more mixed welfare effects at
smaller, i.e., local, levels of government than they do at larger levels of
government, where they are more unequivocally positive. This point is
independent of whether discrimination actually occurs at variable rates
depending on the size of the jurisdiction. The claim here is that IEL’s
nondiscrimination rules affect the ability of smaller jurisdictions to enact laws
more than they affect larger jurisdictions’ lawmaking efforts.
Nondiscrimination rules increase the costs of the following kinds of laws: 1)
those that do not require a discriminatory measure to pass, and 2) those that do
require a discriminatory measure to pass.
Nondiscrimination rules have their greatest welfare effects when most of the
laws they invalidate fall into the first category. Protectionism provides no
offsetting benefit to this category and eliminating protectionism here provides
all of the gains from trade that justify IEL’s nondiscrimination rules. As more
laws fall into the second category, though, the welfare effects of
nondiscrimination rules start to become more mixed. Nondiscrimination rules
eliminate the beneficial effects of all of the laws that are not passed because
protectionism is not available. For the reasons explained previously, we would
expect smaller levels of government to have more laws that fall into the second
category as compared to larger levels of government. Although it is difficult to
estimate how many laws fall into the second category, one state senator
reported that in voting on renewable energy subsidies, it would be “politically
unthinkable” not to include an LCR to benefit local industry, rather than allow
some of the benefits from the subsidy to leak out of the state.201
B.

Nondiscrimination Rules Are Especially Likely to Discourage Local
Action Providing Global Public Goods

The constraints nondiscrimination rules impose on local lawmaking have
their most negative consequences when local governments try to provide
public goods. Absent correctives such as nondiscrimination rules, rational
lawmakers do not consider costs felt outside of their jurisdiction. The same is
true, however, of externalized benefits; rational legislators do not take into
account the benefits from the measures they pass that are felt outside their
jurisdiction. For example, Minnesota legislators do not directly consider the
beneficial climate change ramifications of subsidizing green energy on
constituencies outside of Minnesota. They may care about these effects, but
only to the extent that their constituents care about them. In other words, the
201 Interview with Edward Meyer, Conn. State Senator, in Guilford, Conn. (Dec. 29,
2013). In the interest of full disclosure, I note that Senator Meyer is my father.
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utility that a rational legislator, motivated principally by her reelection
prospects, derives from benefits outside of her district depends on voters
within her district having other-regarding preferences.
The most obvious ramification of this point is that bargaining among
lawmakers will not only over-supply protectionist policies but it will also
under-supply policies that produce public goods. Indeed, public goods laws
will be especially disadvantaged in the local lawmaking process precisely
because lawmakers are already not capturing the full benefits of such
measures. We can temper this prediction in light of citizens’ other-regarding
preferences. Jurisdictions that have large numbers of citizens who care about
environmental causes like climate change, will internalize to a greater degree
the global benefits of policies aimed at reducing climate change. Such
jurisdictions will therefore have an easier time passing measures that produce
global public goods. In general, though, measures that produce global public
goods will be supplied at suboptimal levels.
In keeping with the internalization principle, the first-best solution is to shift
decision-making to the level of government that internalizes the benefits from
providing the public good and thus does not require discrimination to pass the
measure.202 Where national governments can so act, welfare is indeed
improved. As a political economy matter, national governments are more
likely to be able to produce measures free from discriminatory conditions when
they pass measures at all.
But in some cases, local governments may be more able to provide global
public goods, or may fill the gap in an undersupply of global public goods left
by national governments and international institutions. In other words, the
first-best solution may not be available.203 First, governments may find it
impossible for political or other reasons to shift governance upwards.
Politicians may have concerns about sovereignty, concerns that American
lawmakers have sometimes expressed in regard to the United Nations.204
Constitutional limits may also constrain the alienation of authority to
international institutions, as U.S. courts have sometimes held.205

202 See COOTER, supra note 21, at 107 (arguing that the internalization prescription
means that authority over a matter should be allocated to the smallest level of government
that fully internalizes the costs and benefits of the relevant policy).
203 See PAUL KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY &
POLICY 214-17 (7th ed. 2005) (discussing market failures and the theory of the second-best).
204 See, e.g., Sean Lengell, U.N. Disabilities Treaty Blocked; U.S. Sovereignty Issue
Raised, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2012, at 6 (describing Senator Mike Lee’s concern that
ratifying the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities could lead to a U.N.
committee denying American parents the right to home-school their children, and quoting
the Senator stating “I applaud the Senate for preserving our sovereignty”).
205 Defs. of Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 532 F.3d 913, 926-27 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that
the U.S. Coast Guard could not delegate its “congressionally given authority” to the
International Maritime Organization); Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C.

1988

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1937

Second, even when an institution with appropriate authority exists, it may be
unable to use that authority as a practical matter. The transaction costs of
lawmaking in international institutions (and some national institutions, such as
the U.S. Congress) may simply be too high to permit decisive action on the
provision of global public goods. Where the transaction costs of bargaining
increase faster than the scope for bargaining, larger levels of government may
be rendered unable to act for reasons that have nothing to do with the
availability of discriminatory measures. In these situations, local action plays
an especially important role in providing global public goods. The reduced
transaction costs of local government free it to act when national government
cannot.
The United States’ approach to climate change for much of the 21st century
illustrates this point. As recently as January 2015, the U.S. Senate defeated a
resolution that provided: “It is the sense of Congress that 1) climate change is
real, and 2) human activity significantly contributes to climate change.”206 This
resistance to acknowledging climate change has made it difficult for the federal
government to take measures to address climate change.207Although the federal
government does provide renewable energy subsidies208 and has more recently
begun to take administrative action to combat climate change,209 subnational
measures—including efforts to establish carbon trading markets,210 as well as
the renewable energy subsidies described in this Article—have been an
important supplement to federal action. In such situations, IEL’s
nondiscrimination rules pose a major challenge to local action to supply global
public goods left undersupplied by national governments.

Cir. 2006) (holding that treating decisions of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol as legally
binding commitments would raise constitutional issues under the nondelegation doctrine).
206 Eric Holthaus, Senate Votes 98-1 that Climate Change is Real but Splits on That
Pesky
Cause,
SLATE:
FUTURE
TENSE
(Jan.
21,
2015,
6:33
PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/01/21/senate_votes_that_climate_change_is_
real_but_doesn_t_agree_on_cause.html [http://perma.cc/7C2B-CWRX].
207 In response to Congressional resistance, President Obama in his second term began
using administrative means that do not require congressional action to address climate
change. John M. Broder, Obama Readying Emissions Limits on Power Plants, N.Y. TIMES,
June 20, 2013, at A1 (“[N]one of the [climate change] initiatives being considered by the
[Obama] administration required legislative action or new financing from Congress.”).
208 Federal Financial Support for Fuels and Energy Technologies: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Energy of the H. Comm. on Sci., Space & Tech., 113th Cong. 2 (2013)
(statement of Terry M. Dinan, Senior Advisor, Cong. Budget Office) (“The federal
government supports the production and use of . . . renewable energy and encourages
increased energy efficiency through provisions of law that reduce the amount of taxes paid
by producers and consumer of energy . . . .”).
209 Broder, supra note 207.
210 Osofsky & Peel, supra note 80, at 235 (“[L]egislation for the introduction of a
national carbon pricing mechanism was successfully passed in 2011.”).
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Put differently, the internalization prescription implicitly assumes that
transaction costs do not vary as the scale of governance increases.211 If this
prescription is correct, aligning incentives would have a net beneficial impact
on welfare. But when increasing the scale of governance increases the
transaction costs of lawmaking, the likelihood of action may decline.
Increasing the scale of governance may thus increase the likelihood of the firstbest outcome—non-discriminatory provision of the global public good—but
decrease the likelihood of any action at all.
Discriminatory conditions offer a second-best solution to the internalization
dilemma. If lawmaking authority cannot be allocated to an effective body that
internalizes the benefits of providing a global public good, smaller levels of
government can be incentivized to provide the benefit either through side
payments or by allowing them to externalize some of the political costs of
providing the public good. In other words, if full internalization of the costs
and benefits is not an option for public goods, externalizing both some costs
and some benefits may be the best available option.
To be clear, I am not arguing that IEL’s nondiscrimination rules are, on the
whole, welfare-decreasing or unjustified. To the contrary, most discriminatory
measures, even at the local level, are welfare-reducing, and prohibitions on
discrimination are thus welfare-increasing. My point is more targeted; a narrow
class of measures exists where discriminatory conditions actually promote
welfare by facilitating the provision of global public goods. As I discuss in Part
V, international economic law needs to evolve to permit this narrow, but
vitally important, range of measures.
C.

Limitations

The theory presented here is a generalizable theory on the effect of
nondiscrimination rules on local versus national governance. It is worth
considering, however, several possible objections. First, one might object that
the model of bargaining here only applies to democracies. I have framed the
argument expressly as one about legislative bargaining based on legislators’
desire for reelection, but many countries—including economic powerhouses
such as China—are not democracies. Moreover, Westminster-style
parliamentary governments, in which the legislature is not independent of the
executive, may alleviate the need for bargaining among lawmakers.212 Second,
many countries are not organized as federal systems, and countries like China

211 Cf. COOTER, supra note 21, at 108 (“Assuming zero transaction costs of bargaining,
the supply of public goods is efficient regardless of the number of governments.”).
212 Elhanan Helpman & Torsten Persson, Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining,
ADVANCES ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y, Nov. 3, 2001, article 3 at 3 (explaining how the
agenda-setting powers and the effective veto powers of “the coalition supporting the
executive in parliamentary systems . . . produce greater legislative cohesion in parliamentary
systems, which affects the strategic interaction between lobbies as well as lawmakers”).
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have strong central control of decision-making. The model’s implications may
thus be limited.
Third, the theory may be too American-centric. Of course, the data on which
I draw in Part II is from local polities in the United States and so the empirical
part of the Article is necessarily focused on the United States. One might
object further that the legislative gridlock that would prevent lawmakers from
enacting public-minded legislation without handouts to domestic interests may
characterize the American Congress, but does not accurately reflect conditions
in other democracies, let alone non-democracies.
The first two concerns are really concerns about the extent to which the
model applies only to a particular form of government: a federal democracy
with separated powers. Bargaining dynamics among lawmakers are, however,
a generalizable phenomenon. Studies have shown that administrative agencies
and judges on collegial courts engage in bargaining with one another.213 To be
sure, the institutional environment in which bargaining occurs affects
outcomes. Parties bargaining under a majority rule will often reach different
outcomes than those bargaining under a unanimity rule—i.e., a rule in which
each player has a veto, as might arise in certain administrative contexts.
However, the general bargaining dynamic described above—one in which a
law’s sponsor must attract support from other parties who must sign off—need
not be limited to legislatures. Such a dynamic can occur across or within
administrative agencies or other governmental entities.214 The absence of a
legislature, in other words, does not eliminate bargaining among government
officials.
The distinction between formally federal states and formally unitary states
can also be overstated. Of course, many states in the world, including major
greenhouse gas emitters, are federal states: Australia, Brazil, Canada,
Germany, India, Mexico, Russia, and the United States. The European Union
also bears a considerable resemblance to a federal state with its members
constituting the “local” governments. Many formally unitary states also
devolve authority over various issues onto local actors. The United Kingdom’s
policy of devolving authority onto Scotland and Wales provides an illustrative
example.215 Likewise, Spain is formally a unitary state, but it grants substantial
authority, including, in some cases, full control over taxing and spending, to its
various autonomous regions.216 Even in countries like China, which are often
thought to be strongly centralized, the complexity of regulatory affairs and the
size of the country necessitate a role for local actors in environmental

213

See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Lax & Charles M. Cameron, Bargaining and Opinion Assignment
on the U.S. Supreme Court, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 276, 276-78 (2007).
214 See, e.g., id.
215 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
216 Cf. Enrique Guillén López, Judicial Review in Spain: The Constitutional Court, 41
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 529, 543-44 (2008) (explaining the evolution of the autonomy of Spain’s
regions, and their similarity to individual states in the United States).
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policymaking and economic development.217 Indeed, the functional difference
between a federal state and a unitary state may not be terribly significant when
it comes to local policymaking. National governments in both kinds of states
can typically overturn action taken at the local level. What differs is the cost of
supervising local action. Formal legal structures—federalism versus a unitary
state—may affect those costs, but so too do a wide variety of other factors such
as politics, the size of the nation, and legal doctrine governing the center-local
relationship.218
Finally, some may object that political polarization and resulting legislative
gridlock might affect the United States more than other countries. But many
other nations have been slow to embrace climate change measures at the
national level, leading to a vibrant movement among cities around the world to
address climate change.219 Indeed, as noted in the introduction, the United
States and China have made local action the centerpiece of their joint efforts to
tackle climate change.220 Perhaps more importantly, many public goods cannot
be provided without contributions from key players.221 Climate change is
arguably such a good.222 The United States remains the second largest emitter
of greenhouse gases, after China.223 Beyond its own contributions to climate
change, U.S. efforts to fight climate change are critical to convincing China to
tackle its own emissions. Thus, even if legislative gridlock is a particularly
American phenomenon, as far as climate change is concerned, the fact that
nondiscrimination rules may inhibit U.S. efforts to combat climate change is
alone enough cause for worry. Solving climate change requires U.S.
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See YANG ZHONG, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN CHINA: CHALLENGES FROM
BELOW 3-5 (2003) (“[A]fter close to two decades of economic reform, the power of the once
mighty center (zhongyang) is believed to be severely weakened. . . . [L]ocal government
officials are more interested in building ‘dukedom economies’ (zhuhou jingji) than carrying
out centrally directed economic plans, and the central government is losing fiscal control.”).
218 For example, the expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause in U.S.
constitutional jurisprudence means that the costs of policing local action may increasingly
fall on Congress as opposed to the judiciary. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the
National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 559-60 (1954).
219 See, e.g., U.S. Conference of Mayors, supra note 81 (urging the federal government
and state governments to take action against climate change).
220 See supra note 6.
221 See SCOTT BARRETT, WHY COOPERATE? THE INCENTIVE TO SUPPLY GLOBAL PUBLIC
GOODS 3-7 (2007) (explaining that “weakest link” public goods “can only be provided with
the active participation of every country” and that action to address climate change “depends
on the aggregate effort of all countries”).
222 Id.
223 Tom Boden, Bob Andres & Gregg Marland, RANKING OF THE WORLD’S COUNTRIES
BY 2011 TOTAL CO2 EMISSIONS, CARBON DIOXIDE INFO. ANALYSIS CTR.,
http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/top2011.tot [http://perma.cc/9RNP-KKQU].
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leadership, which very often comes from the local level. The question is thus
when and how international law should enable local leadership.
V.

DISTINGUISHING WELFARE-INCREASING LCRS FROM
WELFARE-DECREASING LCRS

Demonstrating that permitting discriminatory LCRs at the local level can
facilitate the provision of public goods leaves unanswered the question of how
states and international tribunals should distinguish those LCRs that increase
welfare by contributing to the provision of a public good from those that do
not. Creating greater space for local governments to use discriminatory
measures to provide global public goods will cause governments to adjust their
behavior. Governments may pass measures that fall within the exception but
pursue welfare-reducing protectionist ends. The trade-related costs of these
measures may be higher than the non-trade-related benefits. Ideally, legal rules
should continue to prohibit these welfare-reducing measures—i.e., the majority
of discriminatory measures—while allowing bona fide welfare-increasing
measures to go forward. In this Part, I assess how trade law can separate these
two very different kinds of measures. My focus is on providing some scope for
discrimination that is politically necessary to pass public goods programs,
while minimizing the possibility that states will abuse the opportunity.224
To begin, I explain why existing law is inadequate to the task. Throughout
this Part, I focus predominantly on the GATT. Of course, LCRs may be

224 Another potential objection is that allowing economic discrimination will undermine
the value of the public good provided by distorting the markets that provide the public good.
For example, subsidization may allow an inferior solar panel to capture market share,
crowding out the development of a more efficient solar panel that would have reduced
greenhouse gases to a greater extent. This concern is a serious one in situations where the
market that provides the public good is relatively free of government interference. In such
situations, discriminatory subsidization could indeed limit the production and value of the
public good in the long run by distorting the market’s development.
Such a concern seems misplaced, however, when analyzing public goods measures
connected to renewable energy. Renewable energy must compete for market share with
traditional fossil fuels, which are subsidized to a considerably higher degree. See Timothy
Meyer, Energy Subsidies and the World Trade Organization, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS
(Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/22/energy-subsidies-andworld-trade-organization [http://perma.cc/K4PN-GZWT] (explaining that globally
renewable energy subsidies amount to a small fraction of fossil fuel subsidies). Moreover,
nations like China heavily subsidize their renewable energy sectors, often putting foreign
competition at a significant disadvantage. See Keith Bradsher, Strategy of Solar Dominance
Now Poses a Threat to China, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2012, at B1. Indeed, the backers of some
of the discriminatory measures described in Part II conceived of them as counter-subsidies
to Chinese subsidies. See supra note 147. It is difficult to see how the subsidies involved in
these discriminatory programs will distort the market substantially more than the massive
subsidies that already exist but are perhaps framed in ways that do not expressly violate the
national treatment rule.
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challenged under a variety of WTO agreements, but space constraints prevent a
comprehensive evaluation of how the days reflected herein would play out
under each agreement. The approach presented here is intened to be illustrative
and could be applied under other WTO disciplines—such as the TBT
Agreement or Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (“SPS Agreement”)—as well as investment law.225 I then present
two proposals: a doctrinal solution and a negotiated resolution. Both proposals
involve trying to ensure that any exception for local public goods measures is
narrow in scope. At the outset, I concede that no proposal can ex ante ensure
that only those programs that increase overall welfare survive and only those
that reduce welfare are struck down. Rather, the choice is between different
degrees of over- and under-inclusivity. The task is to design legal mechanisms
that maximize welfare ex ante, given the strategic behavior of governments
and the inability to perfectly identify the welfare effects of various programs.
A.

The Existing Doctrine

Existing GATT/WTO case law is inadequate to the task of facilitating local
provision of global public goods for at least two reasons. First, as discussed in
Section I.C, the international law of state responsibility makes national
governments liable for the actions of their subsidiary governments.226
Consequently, tribunals assess local action in the exact same way they assess
national government action, ignoring the differences between local and
national action identified in this Article.
Second, GATT/WTO case law systematically disfavors nations’ pursuits of
non-trade objectives when they conflict with the objective of liberalizing trade.
The GATT/WTO, and indeed IEL more generally, has long provided that
states may engage in economic discrimination in pursuit of certain legitimate
non-trade objectives.227 Article XX of the GATT, originally adopted in 1947,
codified a set of non-trade objectives that can excuse a state’s violation of its
GATT commitments.228 Moreover, over time the GATT/WTO has become
increasingly sensitive to the importance of non-trade objectives. This rising
sensitivity is reflected in agreements such as the TBT and SPS Agreements,
which expressly permit measures that may have protectionist effects when they

225 Although similar doctrines exist under the TBT Agreement, SPS Agreement, and
investment agreements, tribunals apply the doctrines somewhat differently, reflecting in part
variation in the exact drafting of the provisions.
226 See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
227 See GATT, supra note 22, art. XX (listing exceptions such as measures that are
necessary to protect public morals; secure compliance with domestic laws; protect human,
animal, or plant life or health; or measures that are related to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources).
228 Id.
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are supported by a scientific risk assessment.229 The WTO Appellate Body has
also recognized greater space for states to pursue non-trade objectives in its
application of the GATT Article XX exceptions.230 In the investment context

229 TBT Agreement, supra note 52, art. 2 (listing permissible objectives and stating that
in assessing the risks of non-fulfillment of the objective, “relevant elements of consideration
are, inter alia: available scientific and technical information”); Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493
[hereinafter SPS Agreement] (“Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or
phytosanitary measures which result in a higher level of . . . protection . . . if there is a
scientific justification . . . .”). The SPS and TBT Agreements protect states imposing
discriminatory measures in part by flipping the burden of proof. Under GATT Article XX,
the respondent (the state enacting the challenged measure) bears the burden of
demonstrating that the measure advances a permissible non-economic objective. Panel
Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, WTO Doc. DS21/R-39S/155 (Sept.
3, 1991) (not adopted) [hereinafter U.S.—Tuna] (“[T]he practice of panels has been to
interpret Article XX narrowly, to place the burden on the party invoking Article XX to
justify its invocation . . . .”). Under the SPS or TBT Agreements, the complainant bears the
burden. E.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Concerning the Importation,
Marketing, and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, ¶ 323, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R
(adopted June 13, 2012) [hereinafter U.S.—Tuna II] (“With respect to the burden of proof in
showing that a technical regulation is inconsistent with Article 2.2 [of the TBT Agreement],
the complainant must prove its claim that the challenged measure . . . . is more trade
restrictive than necessary to achieve the contribution it makes to the legitimate
objectives . . . .”). The Agreement on Safeguards might also be understood to protect nontrade interests. That Agreement governs when states may impose “safeguards,” or
temporary trade restrictions designed to protect a domestic market during rapid and
dislocating transitions. Agreement on Safeguards art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154
(providing that a member state “may apply a safeguard measure to a product only if that
member has determined . . . that such product is being imported into its territory in such
increased quantities . . . and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious
injury to the domestic industry”). The Agreement on Safeguards is not meant to
permanently protect a domestic market. Id. art. 7 (“A Member shall apply safeguard
measures only for such period of time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy serious
injury and to facilitate adjustment.”). Rather, it ideally allows a country to manage a
transition in a way that reduces the costs, many of which are social, that come with rapid
economic transitions.
230 Compare Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Nov. 6, 1998)
[hereinafter U.S.—Shrimp-Turtle] (finding that the United States’ measure was “within the
scope of measures permitted under the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994,” but
failed to meet the requirements), with U.S.—Tuna, supra note 229 (finding that the United
States’ direct import prohibition could not be justified under GATT Article XX(b), (d), or
(g)).
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too, states and investment tribunals have made clear that IEL is not an absolute
constraint on a state’s ability to pursue non-economic objectives.231
The difficulty with the GATT’s approach to non-trade welfare is thus not an
unwillingness to recognize its existence or importance. Indeed, clean air has
already been held to be an exhaustible natural resource, and thus measures
protecting it fall within the scope of GATT Article XX(g).232 Rather, the
difficulty is that WTO tribunals tend to administer these exceptions in a
technocratic way that ignores the political economy considerations at work in
the lawmaking process.233 The tribunals first decide whether a challenged
measure furthers a permissible non-trade objective, and then assess whether the
chosen means of attaining the non-trade objective is more trade restrictive than
necessary.234 In so doing, they ignore the political and related legal costs of
different kinds of measures, focusing instead on technical feasibility and cost.
Focusing on the application of the GATT, these rules contemplate a threepart analysis.235 First, a tribunal asks whether the policy pursued by the
challenged measure “fell within the range of policies” designed to attain an
231 See, e.g., Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States, ICSID, Award, ¶ 24 (NAFTA Ch. 11
Arb. Trib. June 8, 2009), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125798.pdf
[http://perma.cc/G4WM-ANGY] (“[T]he Tribunal finds that the acts of the federal
government and the State of California . . . do not . . . violate the Article 1105 obligations of
the United States.”); Methanex Corp. v. Unites States, ICSID, Award, (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb.
Trib.
Aug.
3,
2005),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf
[http://perma.cc/U5L5-885Q] (finding that Methanex’s claim under NAFTA Article 1110
failed because “as a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for
a public purpose . . . is not deemed expropriatory and compensable unless specific
commitments had been given by the regulating government”).
232 Panel Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, ¶ 6.37, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/R (adopted May 20, 1996) [hereinafter U.S.—
Gasoline] (finding that clean air could be considered an exhaustible natural resource and
thus, “a policy to reduce the depletion of clean air was a policy to conserve a natural
resource within the meaning of Article XX(g)”). Brazil and Venezuela did not properly
appeal whether clean air constitutes an exhaustible natural resource, so the Appellate Body
did not address this issue on appeal. Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (adopted May 20,
1996).
233
See OREN PEREZ, ECOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY AND GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM 54-64
(2004) (“The law of the GATT ignored, completely, the acute institutional asymmetry
between the trade and environmental systems.”).
234 See id. at 62.
235 Similar, though not identical, rules exist under the TBT and SPS Agreements. See
TBT Agreement, supra note 52, art. 2.2 (“[T]echnical regulations shall not be more traderestrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks nonfulfillment would create.”); SPS Agreement, supra note 229, art. 5.6 (requiring that
measures taken pursuant to the agreement to protect health and safety “are not more traderestrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary
protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility”).
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authorized non-trade end, such as the protection of human, animal, or plant life
or health.236 Put differently, the first prong asks nothing about the trade costs of
the measure. It merely asks whether the objective identified is a “legitimate”
non-trade objective, and whether the challenged measure can be characterized
as pursuing the legitimate objective.237
At the third stage (review under the chapeau of GATT Article XX), the
tribunal asks whether the measure constitutes “arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,” or
whether it constitutes “a disguised restriction on international trade.”238 At this
stage, tribunals consider larger dynamics such as the extent to which
governments tried to mitigate the discriminatory impact of their measures,
whether through negotiations with other governments or by building in
flexibility in administering the discriminatory measure.239 Review under the
chapeau should catch pretextual invocations of GATT Article XX’s
exceptions.
In the middle, the tribunal assesses the means-ends relationship between the
challenged measure and its stated purpose. For most of the GATT Article XX
exceptions, tribunals ask whether the challenged measure is more trade
restrictive than necessary to fulfill the legitimate objective.240 In making this
assessment, WTO tribunals assess “the extent of the contribution to the
achievement of a measure’s objective and its trade restrictiveness, in the light
of the importance of the interests or values at stake.”241 A favorable
determination under these criteria is “confirmed by comparing the measure
with its possible alternatives, which may be less trade restrictive while
providing an equivalent contribution to the achievement of the objective
pursued.”242 Additionally, this comparison is limited to “genuine” and
236 See U.S.—Gasoline, supra note 232, ¶ 6.20 (explaining that the United States bore
the burden of proving “that the policy . . . fell within the range of policies designed to
protect human, animal or plant life or health . . .”).
237 U.S.—Tuna II, supra note 229, ¶¶ 313-14, 317 (considering the meaning of the term
“‘legitimate objective’ in the sense of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement,” and comparing the
panel’s job to “determining the contribution of a measure to the achievement of a particular
objective in the context of Article XX of the GATT 1994”).
238 GATT, supra note 22, art. XX; U.S.—Gasoline, supra note 232, ¶ 6.20 (explaining
the requirements of Article XX).
239 U.S.—Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 230, ¶¶ 161-66 (analyzing whether the measure
constitutes “unjustifiable discrimination” and criticizing the United States for establishing a
“rigid and unbending standard” and failing to engage other states in negotiations).
240 U.S.—Gasoline, supra note 232, ¶ 6.20 (explaining that the United States had to
establish “that the inconsistent measures for which the exception was being invoked were
necessary to fulfil the policy objective”). Other means-ends formulations are used elsewhere
in the GATT, but necessity is the most prevalent standard.
241 Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶
156, WTO Doc. WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil—Tyres].
242 Id.
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“reasonably available” alternatives.243 Alternatives are not “reasonably
available” if they are prohibitively costly or involve “substantial technical
difficulties.”244 Tribunals thus assess, inter alia, the scientific and technical
information related to the measure and its possible alternatives.245
Throughout this inquiry, it is undisputed that “it is within the authority of a
WTO Member to set the public health or environmental objectives it seeks to
achieve, as well as the level of protection that it wants to obtain, through the
measure or the policy it chooses to adopt.”246 In other words, if an objective is
legitimate, a WTO panel should not, in principle, second-guess or evaluate the
non-trade objective or the level of protection chosen by the member state. If
the member state decides to completely eliminate the risk from a known
carcinogen, a WTO panel may not evaluate the non-trade welfare benefits from
such a choice.247 At most, the tribunal can ask about the extent to which the
measure actually succeeds in obtaining the objective and weigh that against the
trade restrictiveness of the measure.248
This jumble of standards offers little guidance into how to actually evaluate
trade restrictions that pursue legitimate non-trade objectives. Commentators
themselves do not agree on what kind of analysis the WTO Appellate Body
employs for Article XX. Most agree that at a minimum, the “necessity”
standard used at the second stage of most Article XX disputes requires that a
243 Id. (explaining that an alternative is not genuine if it does not “preserve for the
responding Member its right to achieve its desired level of protection” and is not reasonably
available if “it is merely theoretical in nature, for instance, where the responding Member is
not capable of taking it, or where the measure imposes an undue burden on that Member,
such as prohibitive costs or substantial technical difficulties” (quoting Appellate Body
Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and
Betting Services, ¶ 308, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted Apr. 20, 2005))); see also
United States—Tuna II, supra note 229, ¶ 320 (explaining that the measures at issue must be
compared to “possible alternative measures that may be reasonably available and less trade
restrictive than the challenged measure . . .”).
244 Brazil—Tyres, supra note 241 (quoting U.S.—Gambling, supra note 243).
245 United States—Tuna II, supra note 229, ¶ 321 (“Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement
further stipulates that the risks non-fulfilment of the objective would create shall be taken
into account, and that, in assessing such risks, relevant elements of consideration are ‘inter
alia: available scientific and technical information . . . .’” (citation omitted)).
246
Brazil—Tyres, supra note 241, ¶ 140.
247 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶¶ 167-68, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Apr. 5,
2001) [hereinafter EC—Asbestos] (“[W]e note that it is undisputed that WTO Members have
the right to determine the level of protection of health that they consider appropriate in a
given situation.”).
248 Brazil—Tyres, supra note 241, ¶ 143 (stating that necessity analysis involves “‘an
assessment of the “relative importance” of the interests or values furthered by the
challenged measure,’ . . . ‘the contribution of the measure to the realization of the ends
pursued by it’ and ‘the restrictive impact of the measure on international commerce’”
(quoting U.S.—Gambling, supra note 243, ¶ 306)).
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state employ the least restrictive means.249 Others, however, have argued that
the WTO has adopted a “proportionality” analysis (under either the second or
third step of the analysis) that requires weighing the trade restrictiveness of the
challenged measure against the benefits of the non-trade objective.250
How proportionality analysis would work in the context of Article XX is
unclear. At a minimum, using proportionality analysis undermines the claim
that a WTO member may select its own level of protection. The least
restrictive trade measure might still be struck down under a proportionality
analysis on the grounds that its trade-related costs are disproportionate to its
non-trade benefits.251 Moreover, a blending of a least restrictive means test
with a subsequent proportionality review is a one-way ratchet that stacks the
deck against non-trade interests; states must choose the least trade restrictive
means of pursuing their non-trade objectives, and even then their actions may
be disallowed. Because of this, some commentators have urged the adoption of
proportionality analysis without a least restrictive means component.252 Other
views require both that a measure be the least restrictive and that it be
“appropriate” in the sense that the costs do not outweigh the benefits.253
Beyond the confusion about what the Appellate Body is doing and should
do in these cases, its analysis is insufficiently engaged with the dynamics of
lawmaking. The means-ends evaluations undertaken as part of the GATT
Article XX analysis occur in a vacuum. They fail to account for political
economy dynamics that, as a practical matter, determine the set of feasible
alternatives. In particular, local governments may differ systematically in how
they make law, rendering the set of politically feasible alternatives at the local
level different from that at the national level. As a consequence, WTO
tribunals risk holding a welfare-increasing measure unlawful on the grounds

249

See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Reconciling International Trade With Preservation of the
Global Commons: Can We Prosper and Protect?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1407, 1448
(1992) (discussing GATT panels’ requirement that states employ the least trade restrictive
measure); Ingo Venzke, Making General Exceptions: The Spell of Precedents in Developing
Article XX GATT into Standards for Domestic Regulatory Policy, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1111,
1132-33 (2011).
250 See Venzke supra note 249, at 1132-36 (analyzing the Appellate Body’s conflation of
a “least restrictive means” test with a proportionality analysis in a line of cases including
Korea—Beef, European Communities—Asbestos, and Brazil—Tyres); Meinhard Hilf,
Power, Rules and Principles – Which Orientation for WTO/GATT Law?, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L.
111, 120-21 (2001) (arguing that proportionality is already a principle of WTO law); Axel
Desmedt, Proportionality in WTO Law, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 441 passim (2001) (discussing
where WTO law has or could incorporate proportionality).
251 See Venzke, supra note 249, at 1131 (arguing that proportionality analysis “demands
a weighing and balancing of competing interests with the possible consequence that a
measure may be found illegal because it imposes an undue disadvantage even if no
alternative was available that could achieve the stated objective to the same extent”).
252 Dunoff, supra note 249, at 1447-49.
253 See Venzke, supra note 249, at 1131.
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that a less trade restrictive alternative that is politically impossible exists and is
“reasonably available” when judged in terms of cost and technical feasibility.
Thai—Cigarettes illustrates how the tribunals adjudicating cases under the
GATT ignore political economy considerations in assessing trade
restrictiveness.254 There, the United States challenged a ban on the importation
of cigarettes into Thailand.255 While banning foreign imports, Thailand
permitted local cigarette sales to continue.256 Thailand sought to justify its
import ban on the grounds that it was necessary to protect human health within
the meaning of GATT Article XX(b).257 The panel ruled against Thailand on
the grounds that the import ban was not “necessary” because labeling measures
could address the same issue in a less trade restrictive fashion.258 As a political
matter, however, it appears that the Thai regulation represented a compromise
between domestic cigarette producers who opposed more stringent domestic

254 Report of the Panel, Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on
Cigarettes, DS10/R (Oct. 5, 1990), GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.), at 1 (1991) [hereinafter
Thai—Cigarettes]. Outside of the GATT/WTO context, Ethyl Corp. v. Canada provides
another illustration. There, an American manufacturer of the gasoline additive MMT
brought a NAFTA claim challenging a Canadian law banning the import and interprovincial transport of MMT. Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction, 38 I.L.M. 708
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 1998). Ethyl challenged the Canadian measure as, inter alia, a
violation of national treatment obligations and as creating performance requirements in
violation of NAFTA’s nondiscrimination rules. Id. The essence of the claim was that
Canada’s measure permitted the intra-provincial production and use of MMT, but not trade
in MMT that crossed provincial or international borders. Id. As a consequence, the measure
would have favored Canadian manufacturers (in violation of the national treatment
obligation) or required Ethyl to establish local Canadian manufacturing plants to produce its
MMT (an LCR in violation of the ban on performance requirements). Canada objected to
the merits of this claim because Canadian law did not permit it to ban the domestic, intraprovincial production and use of MMT. Id.; see also DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1297 (4th ed. 2011). The form of the law was thus a
function of what Canada could practically accomplish domestically. Moreover, no Canadian
firms manufactured MMT, so the discrimination was, in Canada’s view, entirely
hypothetical. See Statement of Defence by Canada ¶ 81, Ethyl Corp, 38 I.L.M. 708 (arguing
that Canadian business cannot be favored because Canadians are not a part of the market).
But, because the measure discriminated against Ethyl Corp. as compared to the hypothetical
ban on production, use, and trade, Canada faced a likely defeat. After the NAFTA tribunal
rejected Canada’s jurisdictional defenses, Canada settled the case, paid $13 million in
damages and withdrew the legislation. HUNTER ET AL., supra.
255 Thai—Cigarettes, supra note 254, at 1.
256 Id. ¶ 12 (“[T]he restrictions operated as an import prohibition, they were not imposed
in conjunction with domestic supply restrictions and they had a disproportionate effect on
imports.”).
257 Id. ¶ 14 (arguing that their restrictions were justified under Article XX(b) because the
measures to control smoking “could only be effective if cigarette imports were prohibited”).
258 Id. ¶¶ 75-77 (finding that the measure was not necessary because “non-discriminatory
labelling [sic] and ingredient disclosure regulations” were available).
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regulations of their products, and health authorities looking for a way to reduce
smoking rates.259 In effect, efforts to restrict smoking in Thailand required the
support of the Thai cigarette industry. Health officials garnered this support
through discriminating against foreign cigarettes. Notwithstanding this
discrimination, it appears that the health benefits of the Thai measure would
have been significant. After losing the case, Thailand opened its market to
cigarettes.260 Within four years of opening its markets, smoking had increased
by ten percent on a per capita basis, an increase likely attributable in part to the
opening of the Thai markets.261
Thai—Cigarettes highlights the critical role of political economy
considerations in evaluating reasonably available alternatives. It involved a
health measure that, due to political constraints, included discriminatory
conditions. Specifically, the measure banned the import of foreign cigarettes
on health grounds, while permitting the sale of domestic cigarettes. This
discrimination in favor of domestic cigarettes was necessary to pass the overall
ban on foreign cigarettes in an effort to reduce smoking, but was not
“necessary” for the measure to achieve its non-trade objective once the
measure had been enacted. For this reason, the measure fell. Estimates suggest
that smoking rates in Thailand (and other Asian countries that faced pressure
from the United States to liberalize their cigarette markets) resulted in
significant increases in smoking, especially among the young.262
The same basic problem applies to renewable energy LCRs or any
discriminatory provision appended to a public goods program for the purpose
of attracting political support. Under existing doctrine, the necessity of the
discriminatory condition is evaluated at the implementation stage. A renewable
energy LCR passed by a legislature that forces electricity generators to buy
more expensive, locally-produced solar panels does not necessarily further the
objective of reducing greenhouse gases, if one assumes that the subsidy to
which the LCR is attached can pass without the LCR. As a consequence, any
renewable energy support program with an LCR has a less trade restrictive
alternative—the same program without the LCR. The LCR (or other
discriminatory condition) only furthers the non-trade objective if one looks not
only at implementation, but also at lawmaking.
The challenge for GATT/WTO case law is thus to adjust its understanding
of “necessity” to allow discrimination that is necessary for a measure to pass.
As I argue below, in practice this inquiry still requires looking at proxies to
identify situations in which discriminatory conditions are politically
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See Perez, supra note 233, at 83 n.264 (“While there can be little doubt that the Thai
ban was also motivated by a desire to protect the local tobacco industry one should not
ignore, then, the undeniable health benefits of this ban.”).
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 F.J. Chaloupka & A. Laixuthai, Do Trade Pressures Lead to Market Expansion?, in
TOBACCO: THE GROWING EPIDEMIC 389 (Rushan Lu et al. eds., 2000).
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“necessary,” as well as if alternatives are “reasonably available” from a
technical implementation standpoint.
B.

Doctrinal Solutions

Providing space for the use of local welfare-enhancing discrimination under
the GATT requires a three-part approach. This approach follows the ordinary
Article XX analysis, but modifies each step to take into account the distinct
features of local efforts to provide global public goods.
First, in assessing whether the challenged local measure falls within the
scope of one of the Article XX exceptions, WTO tribunals should also
determine whether the measure provides a global public good. Second, when
evaluating whether a measure is “necessary” (the means-ends portion of the
test), panels should use a political necessity test, in lieu of a least restrictive
means test. This test modifies the set of “reasonably available” alternatives that
a challenged measure is judged against. It does so by comparing the challenged
measure only to those alternatives that are “politically available.” Panels
should undertake this inquiry by assessing whether objective evidence tends to
show that the discriminatory measure was necessary to the passage of the
otherwise permissible public goods measure.
Finally, if the measure both falls within the scope of an exception and
provides a global public good, the tribunal should ask whether the costs of the
measure are proportional to the multilateral benefits created by the measure.
Where a local measure contributes to a global public good, it creates benefits
beyond the borders of the jurisdiction in question. In such situations, tribunals
should weigh the trade restrictiveness of the measure in light of these
multilateral benefits. Such an analysis allows the local government to
internalize the benefits of its program felt elsewhere. This analysis is
particularly important for local governments because they are by definition
smaller than their national governments, and thus internalize even less of the
benefit from providing global public goods.263
If the respondent can meet these three tests, the measure should survive
review under Article XX. Furthermore, the presence of politically necessary
discrimination should not, by itself, be a reason to strike down a measure under
the chapeau.264 Taken together, this modified Article XX analysis will continue
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This test resembles a “proportionality test.” Although the term “proportionality” has a
variety of meanings, it often refers to a test under which a measure must 1) pursue a
legitimate aim, 2) be suitable or effective at achieving that aim, 3) be necessary in the sense
that no less restrictive alternative is available, and 4) be appropriate in the sense that the
costs are not excessive when weighed against the benefits. See Venzke, supra note 249, at
1131. The chief difference is that in the test I propose, necessity is evaluated in light of
politically available alternatives, rather than merely technically available ones.
264 Politically necessary discrimination that passes balancing and proportionality can still
be struck down under the chapeau if, for example, the measure discriminated among foreign
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to invalidate most discriminatory provisions, while also correctly aligning local
government incentives to provide global public goods by permitting welfareincreasing measures.
1.

In Order to Qualify for Balancing, a Measure Must Pursue a Global
Public Good Protected by a Multilateral Agreement

In applying the GATT Article XX exceptions to local measures, tribunals
should ask a two-fold question at the outset. They should ask, as they currently
do, whether the challenged measure pursues a permissible objective authorized
by one of the Article XX exceptions. Second, they should identify whether the
measure’s purpose is the pursuit of a global public good protected by a
multilateral international regime with membership that substantially overlaps
that of the WTO.265 For example, contributing to climate change mitigation is a
global public good of the highest importance that falls within the scope of
GATT Article XX(b) and XX(g).266 Moreover, nations have moved to protect
against climate change within the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and
increasingly within the Montreal Protocol as well. The existence of these
climate change treaties, which have virtually universal membership, attest to
the multilateral nature of the problem.267
Identifying a global public good protected by an international regime limits
the scope of the balancing and proportionality review I am proposing. The
review thus allows the WTO to continue to aggressively enforce its
nondiscrimination rules, while taking into account the multilateral benefits that
discrimination can—in very narrow circumstances—create. The requirement
that a measure pursue a global public good recognized by a multilateral regime
that falls within the scope of one of the Article XX exceptions, also limits the
scope for gamesmanship by states in two ways.
products, rather than just against foreign products in order to protect a particular local
economic interest.
265 The approach I describe here bears much in common with Jeffrey Dunoff’s proposal,
though I would allow greater discrimination in the name of providing public goods than I
believe Dunoff would. See Dunoff, supra note 249, at 1441-50 (“One approach would
involve a determination of whether the specific environmental interest at stake is protected
by customary or treaty law.”).
266 See, e.g., U.S.—Gasoline, supra note 232 (“[A] policy to reduce the depletion of
clean air was a policy to conserve a natural resource within the meaning of Article XX(g).”);
see also GATT, supra note 22, art. XX (providing exceptions for measures “(b) necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health,” and “(g) relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption”).
267 See, e.g., Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION
ON
CLIMATE
CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php
[http://perma.cc/EJX7-XR3A] (listing the 192 parties to the Kyoto Protocol to the
UNFCCC).
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First, the requirement that the measure provide a global public good limits
possible abuse. Global public goods are multilateral objectives that the
multilateral system is not especially good at providing; states have little
incentive to provide a good if other nations are already providing it. The WTO
parties thus have a special reason to encourage each other to unilaterally
provide those public goods. Unilateral provision of public goods provides a
shortcut around the bargaining problems that can bedevil multilateral
negotiations.268 This difficulty is particularly acute at the local level, where the
relatively smaller size of the jurisdiction means that a greater portion of the
benefits from providing global public goods will be externalized.
To demonstrate the existence of a global public good, a respondent state
must come forward with evidence that its measure creates benefits outside its
own jurisdiction. It would not be sufficient, for example, to claim that a
measure protects public morals as defined within the enacting jurisdiction.
Instead, the respondent would have to come forward with evidence of a
concrete cross-border spillover.
Many measures governments might seek to justify under Article XX do not
involve these kinds of cross-border spillovers. Rather, they attempt to protect
some objective specific to the enacting nation. This is almost by definition true
of Article XX(d) measures that are justified as necessary to the enforcement of
a nation’s otherwise GATT-consistent laws.269 It is also true of many Article
XX(a) exceptions for measures necessary to protect public morals, given that
public morals will often be relative to the community that shares the norm.270 It
also might be true for the conservation of exhaustible natural resources located
in a single country (such as China’s supply of rare earths),271 as well as
country-specific health risks,272 under Article XX(b) and (g) respectively.

268

See Gregory Shaffer, International Law and Global Public Goods in a Legal Pluralist
World, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 669, 683-89 (2012) (discussing international law’s approach to
global public goods); cf. Timothy Meyer, Soft Law as Delegation, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
888, 892-94 (2009) (discussing how states design international agreements to facilitate
welfare-enhancing unilateral renegotiation).
269 See GATT, supra note 22, art. XX(d) (allowing measures that are “necessary to
secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Agreement, including those relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of
monopolies . . . the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention of
deceptive practices”). The objective of these measures is to protect the laws specific to the
enacting nation.
270 See GATT, supra note 22, art. XX(a); U.S.—Gambling, supra note 243, ¶¶ 291-96
(“[T]he term ‘public morals’ denotes standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or
on behalf of a community or nation.”).
271 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of
Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum, ¶¶ 5.76, 5.207, WTO Doc. WT/DS431/AB/R,
WT/DS432/AB/R, WT/DS433/AB/R (adopted Aug. 29, 2014) (“The Panel accepts China’s
argument that encouraging foreign users and investors to explore alternative sources of
supply could relate to the goal of conserving China’s exhaustible natural resources . . . .”);
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At the same time, the public good must be one that falls within the scope of
one of the GATT Article XX exceptions. Many public goods, such as
preserving global financial stability or the production of knowledge, would not
fall within the scope of any of the Article XX exceptions. As a consequence,
limiting balancing and proportionality review to measures supplying global
public goods that fall within the scope of GATT Article XX provides a narrow
exception.
Second, even those public goods that create cross-border spillovers and fall
within an Article XX exception must be protected by a multilateral regime
with widespread membership to qualify for balancing and proportionality
review. Many issues might be described as public goods, insofar as many
people care about them. For example, animal welfare might be seen as a global
concern that falls within the scope of the GATT Article XX(a) exception for
the protection of public morals.273 Unlike climate change, though, animal
welfare is not protected by an international treaty with wide membership. The
range of measures qualifying for balancing and proportionality review is thus
further limited. Looking to other international agreements in this way also has
precedent within the WTO. For example, in the famous U.S.—Shrimp-Turtle
case, the Appellate Body used the fact that parties to the Convention on the
International Trade in Endangered Species (“CITES”) had protected sea turtles
to determine that sea turtles constitute an exhaustible natural resource.274
Requiring that a public good be protected by other multilateral institutions
serves two other important purposes. First, it ensures that WTO panels do not
have to make difficult value judgments about what kinds of values the global
community should protect. Instead, they would apply the balancing and
proportionality test only to those public goods that member states have already
chosen to protect through both GATT Article XX and a multilateral agreement.

Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw
Materials, ¶ 360, WT/DS394/AB/R, WT/DS395/AB/R, WT/DS398/AB/R (adopted Feb. 22,
2012) (holding that measures to conserve exhaustible natural resources are permitted if such
measures “work together with restrictions on domestic production or consumption, which
operate so as to conserve an exhaustible natural resource”).
272 For example, smoking could pose a more acute health risk in certain countries. See
Perez, supra note 233, at 83 n.264 (“From 1975 to 1995 consumption of cigarettes in
developing countries has doubled (while in the developed countries it has actually fallen).”
(citation omitted)).
273 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, ¶¶ 5.179, 5.199-5.201, WT/DS400/AB/R,
WT/DS401/AB/R (adopted June 18, 2014) (affirming the Panel’s finding that “the policy
objective pursued by the European Union, namely, addressing EU public moral concerns on
seal welfare, fell within the scope of Article XX(a) on the protection of public morals”).
274 See U.S.—Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 230, at ¶ 132 (“The exhaustibility of sea turtles
would in fact have been very difficult to controvert since all of the seven recognized species
of sea turtles are today listed in . . . the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (“CITES”).”).
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Second, such an approach would grant states more leeway in situations of
conflict between international regimes. For example, the relationship between
environmental treaties such as the UNFCCC or CITES and the GATT has
never been expressly defined. This leaves states with obligations under both
agreements that may be difficult to square. Providing deferential review to
state action taken under a GATT Article XX exception in pursuit of values
protected by another transnational agreement gives states the space to
determine how to satisfy their obligations under both agreements, rather than
having the Appellate Body potentially determine that the state cannot comply
with its environmental commitments due to its trade commitments.
2.

Assessing the Political Necessity of Discriminatory Measures to the
Passage of Local Public Goods Measures

If a measure falls within the scope of an Article XX exception and provides
a global public good, the measure would qualify for balancing and
proportionality review at the second stage of the Article XX analysis. This
analysis involves two steps. First, in lieu of a least restrictive means test,
panels should ask whether the discriminatory condition was necessary to the
measure’s passage in light of the reasonably and politically available
alternatives. If the panel determines that the condition was necessary, then the
panel should evaluate whether the benefits from the challenged measure are
proportional to its costs. I discuss “political necessity” here and balancing and
proportionality in Section 3 below.
GATT Article XX textually supports consideration of political economy
dynamics: “[N]othing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures . . . .”275 As the
italicized portion of the text indicates, the chapeau of Article XX expressly
distinguishes between the process of lawmaking (adoption) and
implementation (enforcement).276 The GATT exceptions should thus apply to
both processes separately. The same distinction can be found in other IEL
agreements, such as the TBT Agreement.277
The political necessity test has two elements. First, tribunals should inquire
into political necessity only where local government measures are involved.
The analysis above supports this distinction, showing that national
governments—with wider scope for bargaining—will not need to employ
discriminatory conditions to pass public goods measures. Second, tribunals
should not require that local governments employ the least restrictive means,
as that test is conventionally understood. As described above, the consideration
of less restrictive trade alternatives currently employed by the WTO Appellate
275

GATT, supra note 22, art. XX (emphasis added).
Id.
277 See TBT Agreement, supra note 52, art. 2.2 (“Members shall ensure that technical
regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating
unnecessary obstacles to international trade.”).
276
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Body focuses almost entirely on identifying alternatives that are “reasonably
available” only when viewed from an implementation (i.e., enforcement)
perspective. In the case of discriminatory conditions, such as renewable energy
LCRs, the identical measure without the discriminatory condition will always
be available as a less restrictive alternative when viewed in this technocratic
manner. The effect of this cramped reading is to prohibit the adoption of
measures that are necessary when viewed in light of the process of adoption,
i.e., lawmaking. In effect, GATT and WTO panels have conflated the adoption
and enforcement prongs, whereas the GATT itself distinguishes between
lawmaking and enforcement processes and protects each separately.278
What kinds of evidence should tribunals look to in evaluating the political
necessity of local discriminatory measures? Historically, WTO tribunals are
reluctant to inquire into the subjective intent of legislators.279 Thus, tribunals
have to look to other kinds of evidence demonstrating that the discriminatory
condition is necessary to the adoption of the measure.
First, tribunals should look to objective evidence that tends to demonstrate
that the challenged local government does not regularly make use of
discriminatory conditions. Such evidence could include a survey of the use of
discriminatory conditions elsewhere in its laws. Regular use of unlawful
discriminatory conditions tends to show that local governments are not
selectively employing discrimination to advance global public goods. By
contrast, if the government’s use of discriminatory conditions appears
connected to measures that provide public goods, that tends to show that
discrimination is used to offset the externalized benefits associated with public
goods. On the other hand, if a jurisdiction regularly enacts similar global
public goods measures without discriminatory conditions, that tends to show
that discrimination is unnecessary.280 Finally, consideration of such evidence is
consistent with the WTO tribunals’ emphasis on objective, rather than
subjective, evidence.281 Local governments are unlikely to manipulate their
entire code for purposes of passing particular discriminatory measures. This
evidence is thus a reliable indication that the local governments are selective in
deploying discriminatory measures only when they are welfare enhancing.
278

See GATT, supra note 22, art. XX.
See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc.
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (adopted Nov. 1, 1996) [hereinafter
Japan—Beverages] (“It is not necessary for a panel to sort through the many reasons
legislators and regulators often have for what they do and weigh the relative significant of
those reasons to establish legislative or regulatory intent. . . . [I]t does not matter that there
may not have been any desire to engage in protectionism in the minds of the legislators or
the regulators who imposed the measure. It is irrelevant that protectionism was not an
intended objective . . . .”).
280 Of course, one has to compare like programs, e.g., a subsidy program would be
compared to other subsidy programs, not regulatory schemes.
281 See Japan—Beverages, supra note 279 (rejecting a subjective inquiry into legislative
intent in favor of an objective analysis of how the measure is actually applied).
279
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Second, borrowing from investment law and European jurisprudence, this
analysis might include a procedural component. Governments considering
adopting discriminatory conditions linked to public goods measures should
have to demonstrate that they considered the adverse trade consequences in a
public forum during their deliberations. They would be required to show that
they gathered and considered the same kind of evidence that a tribunal would
examine in determining the relationship between the costs of discrimination
and the benefits of the program. Moreover, examining this evidence in
transparent public fora, where domestic and foreign interests would be able to
participate, would make it more difficult for government officials to feign
ignorance about the welfare effects of truly discriminatory conditions. Instead,
they would be forced to mount a public defense of the need for the
discriminatory condition. This public debate, and the possibility of public
sanction for acting adversely to the interests of one’s own constituents, should
act as some brake on lawmakers’ protectionist instincts.
To be sure, legislators are capable of complying with procedural
requirements while only paying lip service to the underlying substantive
concerns. However, because local governments are not directly responsible
under international law, many of them may be unaware of international law’s
requirements. At the least, a procedural requirement would require legislators
to educate themselves and would create the conditions—which may not exist
in local governments today—for them to consider the cross-border effects of
their measures and international trade rules.282
3.

Balancing and Proportionality

If the panel determines that the measure is politically necessary, it should
then consider whether the benefits of the measure in terms of providing the
global public good, are proportional to the costs in terms of trade
restrictiveness. Such a test requires the tribunal to balance the challenging
government’s interests and rights in trade liberalization against the respondent
government’s right to protect its environment or population.283 On top of that,
the tribunal would also inquire into the benefits to the multilateral system as a
whole. This test would allow a panel to strike down a discriminatory measure
that was politically necessary but did not create sufficient benefits to justify the
costs in terms of trade restrictiveness. In this way, the test provides another
important limiting principle.

282 As I discuss in note 299 infra, another possible solution would be to allow direct
liability for local governments. Such a suggestion goes beyond simply changing existing
WTO doctrine, however, so I defer its consideration to future work.
283 See Venzke, supra note 249, at 1130 (explaining that applying the chapeau of Article
XX requires “marking out a line of equilibrium between the right of a Member to invoke an
exception under Article XX and the rights of the other Members under varying substantive
provisions” (quoting U.S.—Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 230, ¶ 159)).
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A respondent government might be able to produce quantitative evidence
showing the trade distortions and benefits (e.g., greenhouse gas emissions
reductions) caused by its measure. The test should look at the specifics of the
program in question. For example, subsidizing certain renewable energy
technologies (solar) may produce more benefits in terms of greenhouse gas
reductions than other technologies (biofuels). Local discriminatory programs
that support the solar sector could thus create greater costs compared to
biofuels and still seek shelter in Article XX.
This proportionality review should also include analysis of the size of the
government enacting the program. The theory of local discrimination and
global public goods suggests that the size of a jurisdiction—not just whether a
government is local or national—influences whether discriminatory conditions
are necessary to pass public goods measures.284 As a jurisdiction gets larger,
discriminatory conditions are less likely to be beneficial because they are less
likely to be politically necessary.285 Therefore, panels should require greater
benefits in relation to costs as the size of a jurisdiction increases. This test
ensures that large subnational governments, like California, are treated more
like nations of comparable size.286
***
Taken together, this inquiry would allow tribunals to feel sufficiently
confident that a local government did indeed need the discriminatory condition
to muster political support for the adoption of the public goods measure. For a
measure to survive, the tribunal must find that the discriminatory measure was
politically necessary to the passage of the public goods measure, that the
discriminatory costs are proportional to the benefits created by the program,
and that those costs and benefits were considered in the process of adopting the
measure. Of course, this test is far from perfect. Inevitably, some protectionist,
welfare-decreasing measures will survive under this test. Overall, however,
this test would increase welfare by permitting local governments to tackle
global public goods issues more aggressively through the use of discriminatory
conditions when political constraints warrant those conditions.
Finally, it is worth noting that adopting these proposals would not likely
result in a host of new opportunistic or pretextual discriminatory actions by
local governments. Both national and local governments already engage in
actions that violate WTO rules on a regular basis.287 Many of these actions go
284

See supra Section III.C.
See supra Section III.C.
286 See supra note 198.
287 See Don Ikenson, U.S. Abides Global Trade Rules . . . Just Ignore The Steel
Protectionism, Antidumping Abuse, WTO Violations, Etc., FORBES (July 16, 2014, 8:59
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danikenson/2014/07/16/u-s-abides-global-trade-rulesjust-ignore-the-steel-protectionism-antidumping-abuse-wto-violations-etc/print/
[http://perma.cc/E5KZ-JV6Z] (stating that the United States has “run afoul of the [WTO
285
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unchallenged because the trade impacts of the unlawful measures do not justify
a challenge.288 This is especially true of many local measures. Only those local
programs that target high-value, politically important industries prompt
challenges to local measures. The European Union, for example, has
challenged Washington State’s support of Boeing because of its effects on the
European aircraft industry, specifically Airbus.289 Thus, permitting the
proposed type of review for public goods measures would not encourage more
discriminatory measures in part because international law already does not do
much to deter them.
Renewable energy presents a special problem, however. Governments
expect renewable energy to be a growth sector, one that provides jobs in
technology and manufacturing. As the Chinese and Indian action against the
United States, as well Canada—Renewable Energy, indicate, nations are more
likely to bring challenges to local measures because of the expected high value
of the sector involved and its political importance. We thus need a solution that
deals with those measures that are likely to actually face challenges, like
renewable energy LCRs, rather than worrying about the wide-range of local
measures that will not be challenged regardless of the state of the law.
C.

Negotiated Solutions

Nations can also use international agreements to protect local welfareenhancing discriminatory measures. Rules on national responsibility for local
measure are default rules only. States have the ability to craft exemptions for
local conduct into their agreements.290 Moreover, they increasingly do so in
agreements ranging from the WTO’s Agreement on Government Procurement
to bilateral investment treaties.291 Governments are not consistent in when they
create these exemptions. They appear ad hoc in some multilateral agreements,
but not other similar agreements. In bilateral agreements, some states, such as
the United States, have taken to exempting non-conforming local measures
across the board.292

Antidumping Agreement] more often than any other WTO member and has been found in
violation of its broader WTO obligations more frequently than any other member”).
288 Leslie Johns & Krzysztof J. Pelc, Free-Riding on Enforcement in the WTO 1 (July 8,
2015) (unpublished paper), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2628441
[http://perma.cc/VAJ8-RFP7] (“Yet the WTO’s dispute settlement system sometimes
appears ineffective, with trade violations going unchallenged for years.”).
289 See Request for the Establishment of a Panel, United States—Measures Affecting
Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), ¶ 29, WTO Doc. WT/DS353/18 (Oct. 12,
2012) (stating that the subsidies to Boeing “cause present adverse effects, in the form of
serious prejudice, and the threat thereof, to EU interests”).
290 See supra note 101.
291 See supra note 101.
292 See supra note 101.
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States should refine this practice by including narrow exculpatory provisions
in their agreements. First, states should exempt renewable energy subsidy
programs maintained by subnational governments from review under IEL
agreements. This could include an agreement within the WTO to protect local
measures that pursue renewable energy programs. A sufficient number of
states seem to have such measures, including the United States, India, Canada,
and the European Union (through member states such as Italy), that a deal
protecting local action might be possible.293 Seventeen WTO members,
including many of these countries, are currently negotiating a plurilateral
Environmental Goods Agreement.294 While the emphasis of the negotiations
seems to be reducing tariffs, the European Union in particular has pushed for
reducing barriers to renewable energy.295 One could imagine future negotiating
rounds expanding beyond reductions in tariffs to facilitating renewable energy
through exemptions from other WTO rules.
Although I focus predominantly on the WTO here, negotiated solutions
could also play a role in investment law. The situation in investment is
somewhat different, however. Currently, investment treaties, especially recent
U.S. bilateral investment treaties, are much more protective of exemptions.
Article 14.5 of the U.S. Model BIT, for example, provides that the agreement’s
nondiscrimination rules do not apply to “subsidies or grants provided by a
Party, including government-supported loans, guarantees, and insurance.”296
Moreover, recent U.S. BITs include blanket exemptions for “[a]ll existing nonconforming measures of all states of the United States, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico.”297
Taken together, these provisions likely insulate the narrow class of
potentially welfare-increasing discriminatory subsidy programs from challenge
under investment agreements. Unfortunately, these provisions are overly
broad, exempting from liability all existing local measures and all subsidies—
local or national, predating or post-dating the treaty—without any
consideration of the welfare effects of the exemption. The United States does
not include these provisions out of a desire to craft legal rules that permit
welfare-enhancing measures but discourage welfare-decreasing measures. The
U.S. approach is driven by a defense counsel mentality. The U.S. government
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See HUFBAUER, supra note 26, app’x.
Environmental Goods Agreement Talks Review Product List, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE &
SUSTAINABLE
DEV.
(May
13,
2015),
http://www.ictsd.org/bridgesnews/biores/news/environmental-goods-agreement-talks-review-product-list
[http://perma.cc/XW6Y-FJA8] (explaining the results of the sixth round of talks between the
seventeen WTO members).
295 Cf. id. (stating that the list of product proposals “addressed products related to ten
categories of environmental goods, ranging from cleaner and renewable energy to water and
wastewater treatment”).
296 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 47, art. 14:5.
297 See U.S.-Uruguay BIT, supra note 101.
294
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includes these exemptions to deter challenges to measures that are widespread
and likely otherwise incompatible with the general nondiscrimination
provisions of IEL agreements. It does so because, as a practical matter, the
executive branch lacks the ability to identify all existing non-conforming
measures. Moreover, in many cases, changing these measures would require
legislative action at the local level or a Congressional statute to preempt
inconsistent state or local laws, both of which can be hard to obtain. The
executive branch thus includes broad exculpatory provisions as a way to
minimize the government’s potential liability and its obligation to defend
noncompliant measures.
These overly broad exemptions should be eliminated and replaced with
narrow reservations that protect existing and future renewable energy subsidy
programs, such as those enumerated in the Appendix to this Article.298
Eliminating these overly-broad exemptions and replacing them with more
narrowly-tailored ones will increase welfare by allowing challenges to generic
discriminatory programs while shielding those that create non-trade, e.g.,
environmental, benefits. This elimination would thus match the exemption
from IEL’s nondiscrimination rules with the justification for discrimination.299
Thus, this proposal is not one that expands the scope of exemptions from
IEL’s rules. Rather, it narrows the scope of the exemption to areas in which
providing the exemption would deliver positive benefits outside the national
jurisdiction that are not accounted for within the ordinary trade calculus. In
short, this proposal makes it more likely, relative to the status quo, that
298 Formally, existing measures would be protected by listing all such measures,
including those identified in the Appendix of this Article, as well as any similar programs at
the state or truly local level, in Annex I or III of U.S. investment agreements. Annex I and
III of recent U.S. bilateral investment treaties provide a list of existing measures that are
exempted from the nondiscrimination provisions of the agreement. See id. (“The Schedule
of a Party to this Annex sets out, pursuant to Article 14 (Non-Conforming Measures), a
Party’s existing measures that are not subject to some or all of the obligations imposed by:
(a) Article 3 (National Treatment); (b) Article 4 (Most-Favored-Nation Treatment); (c)
Article 8 (Performance Requirements) . . . .”). Future subnational renewable energy support
programs would be protected through inclusion in what is currently Annex II of recent U.S.
investment agreements. Future measures described in each country’s schedule to Annex II
are exempt from the treaty’s nondiscrimination rules. See id. art. 14.2 (providing that
national treatment rules, most favored nation rules, and the ban on performance
requirements “do not apply to any measure that a Party adopts or maintains with respect to
sectors, subsectors, or activities, as set out in its Schedule to Annex II”).
299 Another possible approach would be to consider allowing direct liability for local
governments. The U.S. government prefers broad exemptions for local programs because
local governments largely shift the costs of their unlawful action to the federal government,
which is required to defend the suit and deal with any resulting judgments (either financial
or reciprocal in the case of the WTO). Direct liability for local governments would cause
them to internalize the costs of their unlawful actions. Direct liability would, of course, have
to be coupled with substantive rules that allow local governments to internalize the
externalized benefits their actions sometimes create, as discussed in this Article.
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national governments will be liable for local government action that has
harmful international consequences, but not for local government action that
has beneficial international consequences.
***
International legal rules must differentiate between discriminatory
provisions that are welfare-enhancing and those that are not. To date, however,
international rules have created two competing and ultimately unsatisfying
trends for local discriminatory measures that support public goods programs.
On the one hand, international rules on state responsibility have not evolved to
take into account the increased role of local governments in international
affairs and the different dynamics that animate local decision-making. As a
consequence, governments such as the United States’ have increasingly pushed
for an overbroad exemption for all local measures that are inconsistent with
IEL rules. On the other hand, IEL rules hold local measures that pursue
permissible non-trade objectives to the same standard as national measures,
with the potential to significantly curtail the large number of state renewable
energy support programs identified in this Article. To avoid both the overexclusion of local programs emerging in treaty practice and the underexclusion evident in IEL doctrine, I propose reforming treaty practice and case
law to recognize the narrow but important role discrimination can play at the
local level in solving collective action problems related to the provision of
global public goods.
CONCLUSION
International economic law has long sought to stamp out discrimination
among nations in the name of boosting economic welfare. The logic of the
international trade regime has long been that IEL’s nondiscrimination rules
allow governments to solve domestic collective action problems that prevent
them from liberalizing trade. But not all problems are better solved at the
national or international level. The twenty-first century is one of
disillusionment with global institutions. No longer do commentators and
politicians hold out hope that the WTO, the UNFCCC, or the UN Security
Council will serve as the primary fora in which to resolve global challenges.
World leaders increasingly hedge their bets, pursuing their global objectives in
smaller fora.
This trend has trickled all the way down to local governments, which
increasingly participate in international politics. Yet local governments do not,
and cannot, tackle global problems in the same way that national governments
do. As I have shown in the Article, their constraints and decision-making
environments differ considerably from national governments. International
rules thus have to evolve to create space for the role that local governments
have already assumed.
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APPENDIX: STATE-LEVEL RENEWABLE ENERGY LCRS

State

California

Connecticut

Program
Name

Code or
Program
Location

Self Generation CAL. PUB.
Incentive
UTIL. CODE
Program
§ 379.6(j)

Standard
CONN. GEN.
Service
STAT.
(renewable
§ 16portfolio
244c(h)(2)
requirement)

Renewable
Energy and CONN. GEN.
Efficient
STAT.
Energy Finance § 16-245aa
Program

Domestic Content Requirement

“In administering the self-generation
incentive program, the commission
shall provide an additional incentive of
20 percent from existing program
funds for the installation of eligible
distributed
generation
resources
manufactured in California.”
“[A]n electric distribution company
providing . . . standard service . . .
shall . . . file with the Public Utilities
Regulatory Authority for its approval
one or more long-term power purchase
contracts from Class I renewable
energy source projects with a
preference for projects located in
Connecticut that receive funding from
the Clean Energy Fund . . . .”
Requires the Connecticut Green Bank
to “establish a renewable energy and
efficient energy finance program . . . .
Said bank shall give priority to
applications for grants, investments,
loans or other forms of financial
assistance to projects that use major
system components manufactured or
assembled in Connecticut.”

Costs

$83 million
annually
through
2019

No
Budgetary
Data Found

No
Budgetary
Data Found

2014

Delaware

Illinois
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“The Public Utilities Regulatory
Authority shall provide an additional
incentive of up to five per cent of the
then-applicable incentive provided
pursuant to this section for the use of
major
system
components
Residential
CONN. GEN.
manufactured
or
assembled
in
Solar
STAT.
Connecticut, and another additional
Investment
§ 16-245ff
incentive of up to five per cent of the
Program
then-applicable incentive provided
pursuant to this section for the use of
major
system
components
manufactured or assembled in a
distressed municipality . . . .”
Provides additional credit toward
satisfying renewable energy portfolio
Renewable
DEL.
standards to retail electricity suppliers
Energy
CODE
or municipal energy companies for
Portfolio
ANN. tit.
purchasing certain kinds renewable
Standard
26, § 356
energy from facilities located in
Credit
Delaware.
“A Retail Electricity Supplier or a
Rural Electric Cooperative shall
receive an additional 10% credit
3.2.15
toward meeting the RPS for solar or
DEL.
wind energy installations sited in
Administration
ADMIN.
Delaware, provided that a minimum of
of RPS
CODE
50% of the cost of the renewable
§ 3008
energy equipment, inclusive of
mounting components, relates to
Delaware manufactured equipment.”
“The
Illinois
Power
Agency
Renewable Energy Resources Fund
shall be administered by the Agency to
procure renewable energy resources.
Illinois Power
20 ILL.
Prior to June 1, 2011, resources
Agency
COMP.
procured pursuant to this Section shall
Renewable
STAT.
be procured from facilities located in
Energy
3855/1Illinois . . . . Beginning June 1, 2011,
Resources
56(b)
resources procured pursuant to this
Fund
Section shall be procured from
facilities located in Illinois or in states
that adjoin Illinois.”

No
Budgetary
Data Found

No
Budgetary
Data Found

No
Budgetary
Data Found

No
Budgetary
Data Found
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Indiana

Iowa
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Renewable
Portfolio
Standard

20 ILL.
COMP.
STAT.
3855/175(c)

Clean Energy
Vehicles

IND.
CODE
§ 5-22-58.5(f)

Qualifications
for Financial
Incentives

IND.
CODE
§ 8-1-3712(b)

Rates for
Alternate
Energy
Production
Facilities

IOWA
CODE
§ 476.43

Renewable
Energy Tax
Credit

“Renewable energy resources shall be
counted for the purpose of meeting the
renewable energy standards set forth in
paragraph (1) of this subsection (c)
only if they are generated from
facilities located in the State . . . .”
“The
Indiana
department
of
administration shall adopt rules or
guidelines to provide a preference for
the purchase or lease by state entities
of clean energy vehicles manufactured
wholly or partially in Indiana or
containing parts manufactured in
Indiana.”
Providing for a higher regulated rate of
return to electricity providers, provided
that, inter alia, “at least fifty percent
(50%) of the megawatt hours of clean
energy obtained by the participating
electricity supplier to meet the energy
requirements of its Indiana retail
electric customers during the CPS goal
period under consideration must
originate from clean energy resources
located in Indiana.”
“[T]he board shall require electric
utilities to . . . own alternate energy
production facilities or small hydro
facilities located in this state [or e]nter
into long-term contracts to purchase or
wheel electricity from alternate energy
production facilities or small hydro
facilities located in the utility’s service
area.”

“A . . . purchaser of renewable energy
may receive renewable energy tax
credits in an amount equal to . . . one
dollar and forty-four cents per one
IOWA
thousand standard cubic feet of
CODE
hydrogen fuel generated by and
§ 476C.1-2
purchased from an eligible renewable
energy facility,” where an “eligible
renewable energy facility” is one
“located in this state.”

2015

No
Budgetary
Data Found

No
Budgetary
Data Found

No
Budgetary
Data Found

No
Budgetary
Data Found

No
Budgetary
Data Found

2016

Kansas

Louisiana
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Solar and
Wind
Manufacturing
Incentive

Purchase of
Feedstock by
Operators of
Fenewable
Fuel
Manufacturing
Facilities;
Notice
Requirements;
Annual Report
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KAN.
STAT.
ANN.
§ 74-50,
136

Provides state-backed financing for
“eligible wind or solar energy
projects,” which include “product
development and design, applied
research, manufacturing, improvement,
replacement or acquisition of real or
personal property and modernization
and retooling of existing property in
Kansas.”

“[N]ot to
exceed
$150
[million]
for all
eligible
aviation,
wind or
solar
energy
projects.”

LA.
STAT.
ANN. §
3:3712

Designed “to assure that Louisiana
farmers have the opportunity to have
Louisiana harvested crops purchased
as feedstock by operators of renewable
fuels manufacturing facilities in
Louisiana . . . Beginning July 1, 2006,
there will be a presumption that
renewable fuel plants operating in
Louisiana and deriving ethanol from
the distillation of corn shall use as
feedstock at least twenty percent of the
corn crop harvested in Louisiana. In
succeeding years, the minimum
percentage of Louisiana harvested corn
used to produce renewable fuel in
Louisiana facilities shall be at least the
same percentage of corn used
nationally to produce renewable fuel as
reported by the United States
Department of Agriculture’s Office of
the Chief Economist. . . . [Providing
similar provisions for biodiesel].”

No
Budgetary
Data Found
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Exclusions
and
Exemptions;
Gasohol

LA.
STAT.
ANN.
§ 47:305.
28(A)

Tax Credit for
“Green Job
Industries”

LA.
STAT.
ANN. §
47:6037
(A)(4)

“The sales or use taxes imposed by the
state of Louisiana or any such taxes
imposed by any parish or municipality
or other local entity within the state
shall not apply to the sale at retail, the
use, the consumption, the distribution,
and the storage, to be used or
consumed in this state, of any motor
fuel known as gasohol, containing a
blend of at least ten percent alcohol, if
the alcohol therein has been produced,
fermented, and distilled in Louisiana
from agricultural commodities.”
“‘Green job industry’ or ‘green job
industries’
shall
mean
energy
efficiency and renewable energy
industries, energy-efficient building,
construction, and retrofit industries, the
renewable electric power industry, the
energy efficient and advanced drive
train vehicle industry, the biofuels
industry, the deconstruction and
materials use industries, the energy
efficiency assessment industry serving
the residential, commercial, or
industrial sectors, and manufacturers
that produce sustainable products using
environmentally sustainable processes
and materials approved by a nationally
recognized
high
performance
environmental building rating system,
or that have the ENERGY STAR
designation from the United States
Environmental Protection Agency.
However, any such rating system that
uses a material or product-based
credit system which is disadvantageous
to materials or products manufactured
or produced in the state of Louisiana
shall not be utilized.” (emphasis
added).

2017

No
Budgetary
Data Found

No
Budgetary
Data Found

2018
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Maine

Capacity
Resource
Adequacy

ME.
STAT. tit.
35-A
§ 3210-C

Maryland

Production
Credits for
Renewable
Fuels

MD.
CODE
ANN.,
AGRIC.
§ 101506

Massachusetts

Renewable
Energy
Portfolio
Standard

Mass.
Gen.
Laws ch.
25A
§ 11F

Mass.
Clean
Energy
Commonwealth Center:
http://per
Solar II
ma.cc/Y
W5RAC35

Michigan

Basis for
Granting
Michigan
Incentive
Renewable
Energy Credits

MICH.
COMP.
LAWS
§ 460.
1039(d)
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Providing that the state may direct
“utilities to enter into long-term
contracts for capacity resources.” In
selecting capacity resources for
contracting, the state shall give priority
to, inter alia, new energy efficient and
renewable resources located in the
state.
Providing that the recipients of credits
for the production in Maryland of
ethanol and biodiesel must report to
the state “the number of bushels of
Maryland-grown small grains” and
“Maryland-produced soybean oil and
other bio-based oils” used.
“In satisfying its annual obligations
under subsection (a) [the renewable
portfolio requirement], each retail
supplier shall provide a portion of the
required minimum percentage of
kilowatt-hours sales from new on-site
renewable energy generating sources
local in the commonwealth . . . .”
“Massachusetts Company Components
Adder: To qualify for this adder, the
System Owner must provide evidence
that the modules, the inverter(s), and
any other significant component which
is important to the electricity
production of the project are
manufactured by a company with a
significant Massachusetts presence, as
determined at the sole discretion of
MassCEC.”
“[T]he following additional renewable
energy credits, to be known as
Michigan incentive renewable energy
credits, shall be granted under the
following circumstances . . . 1/10
renewable energy credit for each
megawatt hour of electricity generated
from a renewable energy system
constructed using equipment made in
this state as determined by the
commission.”

No
Budgetary
Data Found

$3 million.

No
Budgetary
Data Found

$6 million

No
Budgetary
Data Found
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Made in
Minnesota
Solar
Installations

Renewable
energy
production
incentive

Solar Energy
Production
Incentive

Solar Thermal
Rebates

MINN.
STAT.
§ 174.
187(2)

MINN.
STAT.
§ 216C.
41

MINN.
STAT.
§ 216C.
411415
MINN.
STAT.
§ 216C.
416

Rebates for
Solar
Photovoltaic
Modules

MINN.
STAT.
§ 116C.
7791

CommunityBased Energy
Development;
Tariff

MINN.
STAT.
§ 216B.
1612

“Notwithstanding any other law to the
contrary, if the commissioner engages
in any project for the construction,
improvement, maintenance, or repair
of any building, highway, road, bridge,
or land owned or controlled by the
department and the construction,
improvement, maintenance, or repair
involves installation of one or more
solar photovoltaic modules, the
commissioner must ensure that the
solar photovoltaic modules purchased
and
installed
are
‘Made
in
Minnesota.’”

Provides incentive payments to
qualified renewable energy generation
facilities located in Minnesota,
including “anaerobic digester system
that is located at the site of an
agricultural operation [and thus uses
feedstock generated on-site].”
“Incentive payments may be made
under this section only to an owner of
grid-connected solar photovoltaic
modules . . . who . . . has received a
‘Made in Minnesota’ certificate.”
Provides rebates “for the installation of
‘Made in Minnesota’ solar thermal
systems in the state.”

2019

$15 million
for ten
years

Total: up to
$10.9 mil.
annually
Wind:
$9.4 mil.
Hydro,
Anaerobic
Digesters:
$1.5 mil.
No
Budgetary
Data Found
$250,000
per year for
ten years
(2014-23)

$2 mil. in
fiscal year
2011;
$4
mil. in
“Rebate eligibility. (a) To be eligible
2012;
for a rebate under this section, a solar
photovoltaic module: (1) must be $5 mil. in each
2013-15
manufactured in Minnesota.”
Providing for “a community-based
No
energy development tariff” for which
Budgetary
entities qualify in part based upon the
“value-added portion of payments for Data Found
goods manufactured in Minnesota.”

2020

Mississippi
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Solar Energy
in State
Buildings

MINN.
STAT.
§ 16B.
323

Mississippi
Industry
Incentive
Finance Fund

MISS.
CODE.
ANN.
§ 57-1221
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“As provided in paragraphs (b) and (c),
a project for the construction or major
renovation of a state building, after the
completion of a cost-benefit analysis,
may include installation of ‘Made in
Minnesota’ solar energy systems of 40
kilowatts capacity on, adjacent, or in
proximity to the state building.”
“‘Approved business enterprise’ means
any project that: (i) Locates or expands
in this state and creates a minimum of
two hundred fifty (250) new, full-time
jobs with a total capital investment in
the state of a minimum of Thirty
Million Dollars ($30,000,000.00) in
Tier 1 or Tier 2 counties;
(ii) Locates or expands in this state and
creates a minimum of one hundred
fifty (150) new, full-time jobs with a
total capital investment in the state of a
minimum of Fifteen Million Dollars
($15,000,000.00) in areas federally
designated as low-income census
tracts; (iii) Locates or expands in this
state and creates a minimum of one
thousand (1,000) new, full-time jobs;
or (iv) Locates or expands in this state
with significant regional impact as
determined by MDA . . . It is the policy
of the MDA and the MDA is authorized
to accommodate and support any
enterprise that receives a loan under
this section for a project defined in
Section 17-25-23 that wishes to have a
program of diversity in contracting,
and/or that wishes to do business with
or cause its prime contractor to do
business with Mississippi companies.”
(emphasis added).

No
Budgetary
Data Found

No
Budgetary
Data Found
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Wood Energy
Credit

MO.
CODE
REGS.
ANN. tit.
4, § 3404.010
(1)(A)

Missouri
Qualified Fuel
Ethanol
Producer
Incentive
Program

MO.
CODE
REGS.
ANN. tit.
2, § 1101.010

Missouri
Qualified
Biodiesel
Producer
Incentive
Program

MO.
CODE
REGS.
ANN. tit.
2, § 1102.010

“Only the pure charcoal or raw
charcoal produced from Missouri
forest industry residue by a Missouri
wood energy producer is eligible for
the wood energy tax credit. . . . The tax
credit to the wood energy producer
shall be five dollars ($5) per ton of
processed Missouri forestry industry
residue. The calculation of the tax
credit shall be five dollars ($5) per ton
of wood pellets sold and for charcoal
shall be five dollars ($5) per ton of
charcoal sold, adjusted by a multiplier
of four (4).”
A Missouri Qualified Fuel Ethanol
Producer (“MQFEP”) is eligible for a
grant based in part on the “number of
bushels of Missouri agricultural
products used by the MQFEP in the
production of fuel ethanol . . . [and] the
number of bushels of Missouri
agricultural products to be usedby the
MQFEP in the production of fuel
ethanol.”
Allows MQBPs to seek grants from the
state, where an MQBP is defined in
part 1) as a producer that uses only
feedstock originating the United
States, and 2) that is either 51% owned
by a Missouri resident or uses at least
80% feedstock from Missouri.

2021

In 2007—
$28.6
million in
credits had
been issued
and $26.4
million
redeemed

Maximum
annual
grant of
$3.125
million

Maximum
annual
grant of $6
million

2022

Montana

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Biomass
Facilities

MO.
REV.
STAT.
§ 620.
2300 (3)

Biodiesel Tax
Credit

MONT.
CODE
ANN.
§ 15-32703(4)

Ethanol
Production
Credit

MONT.
CODE
ANN.
§ 15-70522(2)
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“[U]pon receipt of an application and
approval from the department, the
commission shall assign double credit
to any electric power, renewable
energy, renewable energy credits, or
any successor credit generated from:
(1) Renewable energy resources
purchased from the biomass facility
located in the park [which is located in
MO] by an electric power supplier;
(2) Electric power generated off-site by
utilizing biomass fuel sold by the
biomass facility located at the park; or
(3) Electric power generated off-site by
renewable energy resources utilizing
storage equipment manufactured at the
park that increases the quantity of
electricity delivered to the electric
power supplier.”
“The following requirements must also
be met for a taxpayer to be entitled to a
tax credit under this section: (a) The
investment must be for depreciable
property used primarily to blend
petroleum diesel with biodiesel made
entirely
from
Montana-produced
feedstocks.”
“Except as provided in subsections (3)
and (4), the tax incentive on each
gallon of ethanol distilled in
accordance with subsection (1) is 20
cents a gallon for each gallon that is
100% produced from Montana
products, with the amount of the tax
incentive for each gallon reduced
proportionately, based upon the
amount of agricultural or wood
products not produced in Montana that
is used in the production of the
ethanol.”

No
Budgetary
Data Found

No
Budgetary
Data Found

The
program
limits
individual
facility
payments
to $2 mil.
annually,
and $6 mil.
over the
life of a
facility.
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Oregon
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Carolina
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Biodiesel Tax
Credit

MONT.
CODE
ANN.
§ 15-70369(1)

Electricity
Produced by
Qualifying
Systems

OR. REV.
STAT.
§ 757375(1)

Renewable
Portfolio
Standard

OR. REV.
STAT.
§ 469A.
025(6)(a)

Distributed
Energy
Resource
Program

S.C.
CODE
ANN. §
58-39130

“A licensed distributor who pays the
special fuel tax under 15-70-343 on
biodiesel, as defined in 15-70-301,
may claim a refund equal to 2 cents a
gallon on biodiesel sold during the
previous calendar quarter if the
biodiesel is produced entirely from
biodiesel ingredients produced in
Montana.”
“Any electricity produced from a
qualifying system under ORS 757.370
[solar PV systems] that is physically
located in this state may be used by an
electric company to comply with the
renewable
portfolio
standard
established under ORS 469A.005 to
469A.210.”
“Direct combustion of municipal solid
waste in a generating facility located in
this state may be used to comply with a
renewable portfolio standard. The
qualification of a municipal solid
waste facility for use in compliance
with a renewable portfolio standard
has no effect on the qualification of the
facility for a tax credit under ORS
469B.130 to 469B.169.”
“Upon approval of its application, an
electrical utility shall be permitted to
recover its costs related to the
approved distributed energy resource
program . . . . An electric utility may
implement a distributed energy
resource program by . . . purchase of
power from renewable energy facilities
located in South Carolina.”

2023

No
Budgetary
Data Found

No
Budgetary
Data Found

No
Budgetary
Data Found

No
Budgetary
Data Found

2024
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Texas

Agricultural
Biomass and
Landfill
Diversion
Incentive
Program

TEX.
AGRIC.
CODE
ANN.
§ 22.
003(b)

Utah

Contracts for
the Purchase
of Electricity
from a
Renewable
Energy
Facility

UTAH
CODE
ANN.
§ 54-17801 to
802

Virginia

Generation,
Distribution,
and
Transmission
Rates After
Capped Rates
Expire

VA CODE
ANN.
§ 56585.1(6)
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“[A] farmer, logger, diverter, or
renewable biomass aggregator and biocoal fuel producer is entitled to receive
a grant in the amount of $20 for each
bone-dry ton of qualified agricultural
biomass, forest wood waste, urban
wood waste, co-firing biomass, or
storm-generated
biomass
debris
provided by the farmer, logger,
diverter, or renewable biomass
aggregator and bio-coal fuel producer
in a form suitable for generating
electric energy to a facility that:
(1) is located in this state . . . .”
“Within a reasonable time after
receiving a request from a contract
customer . . . a qualified utility shall
enter into a renewable energy
contract . . . to supply some or all of
the contract customer’s electric service
from one or more renewable energy
facilities selected by the contract
customer.” § 54-17-802. To qualify as
a ‘renewable energy facility,’ a facility
must be located in Utah.”
Providing preferential treatment in the
regulation of rates to any “utility that
constructs or purchases any such
generation facility consisting of at least
one megawatt of generating capacity
using energy derived from sunlight and
located in the Commonwealth and that
utilizes goods or services sourced, in
whole or in part, from one or more
Virginia businesses.”

Total
grants
awarded
may not
exceed $30
million per
year, or $6
million per
facility per
year.

No
Budgetary
Data Found

No
Budgetary
Data Found
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Washington

Wyoming
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Renewable
Energy System
Cost Recovery

Ethanol Tax
Credit

WASH.
REV.
CODE
§ 82.16.
120

WYO.
STAT.
ANN.
§ 39-17109(d)(iv)

Provides investment cost recovery
incentive for: “(A) Any solar inverters
and solar modules manufactured in
Washington state; (B) A wind
generator
powered
by
blades
manufactured in Washington state;
(C) A solar inverter manufactured in
Washington state; (D) A solar module
manufactured in Washington state; (E)
A stirling converter manufactured in
Washington state; or (F) Solar or wind
equipment manufactured outside of
Washington state”
“To qualify to redeem tax credits under
this subsection, an ethanol producer
shall purchase at least twenty-five
percent (25%) of Wyoming origin
products used in the distillation
process, excluding water, during the
calendar year in which the tax credits
were earned. Each ethanol producer
shall verify the origin of the products.”

2025

$1,929,196
in 2012

$4,000,000
per year

